In the first place, Mr. Bostian at the time of the alleged incredible statements had not as yet been appointed receiver and apparently very shortly after he was so appointed he brought proceedings to restrain plaintiff from operating or interfering with the operation of the routes by defendant and she was so restrained by order of court. Even had Mr. Bostian been acting as receiver at the time of making the alleged statements he could not have either abandoned nor made a gift of this property except under order of court. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 51 S.Ct. 270, 75 L.Ed. 645; Whitney v. Wenman, 198 U.S. 539, 25 S. Ct. 778, 49 L.Ed. 1157; In re Humeston, 2 Cir., 83 F.2d 187; Gerstel v. Shaw, 5 Cir., 71 F.2d 371; Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 5 Cir., 62 F.2d 582. After such appointment he was a mere custodian. General Order 40 in Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C.A. following section 53.

The case of Taylor v. Voss is not in conflict with the conclusion here reached. Nor is the decision in Gerstel v. Shaw (C. C.A.) 71 F.2d 371, so far as the report of the case in 71 F.2d discloses, for, as there reported, if it was a mere proceeding in bankruptcy, it does not appear that the appeal record, treated as an application for leave to appeal, was not seasonably filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals; and if it was a controversy in bankruptcy, as it probably was, the appeal in fact taken in the District Court was seasonable, and the appellate court had jurisdiction. If it was a mere proceeding in bankruptcy and the appeal record from the District Court, if treated as an application to the Court of Appeals for leave to appeal, was in fact not filed in that court within thirty days of the order appealed from and that was the basis of the decision in the Gerstel Case, we decline to follow it.

A bankruptcy receiver ordinarily has no power to surrender, abandon, or make some other disposition of the property in his custody in the absence of an order of the bankruptcy court authorizing such step to be taken. Summe v. Chapman Dairy Company, 238 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1956); Gerstel v. Shaw, 71 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1934); 8 C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 154. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.