Opinion
August 25, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Widlitz, J., Wager, J.).
Appeal from the order dated April 30, 1984 dismissed (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
Judgment affirmed.
The defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs are awarded one bill of costs.
The plaintiff's decedent died of an acute pulmonary embolism in the intensive care unit of the defendant Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center about 6 1/2 hours after being transferred there from the cardiac-care unit of the defendant South Nassau Communities Hospital. The transfer was recommended following a diagnosis of multiple massive pulmonary emboli. The instant action was brought on the theory that the defendants failed to administer to the decedent the drug heparin, which is the primary treatment for a patient with a pulmonary embolism. The jury found for the defendants. On this appeal the plaintiff contends that various evidentiary errors denied her a fair trial.
The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain laboratory slips of patients other than the decedent. The record indicates that this evidence was introduced only after the plaintiff challenged the genuineness of a laboratory worksheet which contained information tending to show that heparin had been administered to the decedent at Long Island Jewish Medical Center after his arrival there. The laboratory slips contained data which coincided with that in the worksheet challenged by the plaintiff and the names of the patients were redacted. The plaintiff concedes that she was not prejudiced by the admission of the redacted laboratory worksheet itself which was properly admitted as secondary evidence (see, Dependable Lists v Malek, 98 A.D.2d 679, 680).
The plaintiff's contentions that the trial court admitted evidence which should have been excluded due to the defendants' alleged failure to comply with prior disclosure orders are without merit. The record indicates that the defendants did not refuse to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fail to disclose information which the court found ought to have been disclosed, pursuant to notice (see, CPLR 3126; Mancusi v Middlesex Ins. Co., 102 A.D.2d 846).
Additionally, the record indicates that the plaintiff unreasonably sought to conduct discovery throughout the trial. The plaintiff made no motion for leave to conduct discovery proceedings (see, 22 N.Y.CRR former 675.7, now 202.21), and there was no indication that any unusual or unanticipated circumstances existed which might permit such a motion to be granted (see, Bovsun v Sanperi, 112 A.D.2d 125, 126; Ehrhart v County of Nassau, 106 A.D.2d 488; Kirk v Blum, 79 A.D.2d 700).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the plaintiff's examination of the physician on the medical malpractice panel. The plaintiff explicitly sought to make the physician an expert witness. It is improper to do so (see, Bernstein v Bodean, 53 N.Y.2d 520, 529).
We have considered the plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.