As a general rule, one aggrieved by an administrative decision must exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing a judicial remedy. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the APA governs judicial review of orders of the Commission, see Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253, 255 (1), 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985), and it requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to judicial review of an administrative decision under the APA. See Ga. Dept. of Community Health v. Ga. Society of Ambulatory Surgery Centers, 290 Ga. 628, 629, 724 S.E.2d 386 (2012) ("Under the APA, a person cannot seek judicial review of an agency action unless he has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency."
In the context of the APA, "the word ‘aggrieved’ has been interpreted to mean that the person seeking to appeal must show that he has an interest in the agency decision that has been specially and adversely affected thereby." Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign For a Prosperous Go., 255 Ga. 253, 256 (1), 257 (2), 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985) (noting additionally that under entire statutory scheme applicable to public service commission proceedings, "any ‘party’ to [the] proceedings … may be ‘aggrieved’ by a decision which is adverse to the position that it takes therein") (citation omitted). See also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed., 2019) (defining "aggrieved" as "having legal rights that are adversely affected; having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights").
Additionally, the APA, unlike the CON Act, grants to intervenors only an "extremely limited right of participation" that does not include the right "to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise be fully heard on the issues involved." Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign For a Prosperous Georgia, 255 Ga. 253, 257 (1) (336 SE2d 790) (1985). Nothing in the text of OCGA § 31-6-44 (d), nor in the larger framework of the CON Act, supports a construction that would treat the rights of an intervening competitor who opposed a CON application that is initially denied so diametrically differently from an intervening competitor who opposed a CON application that is initially granted during the Department's first level of administrative review.
Additionally, the APA, unlike the CON Act, grants to intervenors only an "extremely limited right of participation" that does not include the right "to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise be fully heard on the issues involved." Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign For a Prosperous Georgia , 255 Ga. 253, 257 (1), 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985). Nothing in the text of OCGA § 31-6-44 (d), nor in the larger framework of the CON Act, supports a construction that would treat the rights of an intervening competitor who opposed a CON application that is initially denied so diametrically differently from an intervening competitor who opposed a CON application that is initially granted during the Department's first level of administrative review.
Rather, they assert that Georgia Power has inflated the basis for calculating the franchise fees by including in its declaration of "revenue" certain "cost recovery items" which were not contemplated by the PSC orders. They further contend that this accounting practice by Georgia Power violates the applicable PSC orders and unlawfully overcharges customers for amounts not authorized by the PSC.The Administrative Procedure Act governs judicial review of agency decisions, including those of the PSC. Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga. , 255 Ga. 253, 254 n.2, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985). The relevant provision is OCGA § 50–13–19.
In other words, such an individual must demonstrate special damage suffered as a result of the decision appealed from, rather than some damage common to all those similarly situated. Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253, 258 (2) ( 336 SE2d 790) (1985). Zitrin offers two arguments to show that he is an aggrieved party.
Appellants have shown that they are aggrieved by the PSC's certification order because they are Georgia Power ratepayers and an increase in one's utility rates has previously been held to provide a person with the requisite aggrieved status. Georgia Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia, 255 Ga. 253, 258 (2) ( 336 SE2d 790) (1985). However, Appellants must satisfy both prongs of OCGA § 50-13-19 (a) in order to establish standing to seek judicial review of the PSC's certification order.
" Under subsection (c) of the same statute, "[a]ny other person desiring to intervene must file an application for leave to intervene within 30 days following the first published notice of the proceeding." See Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253, 255-257 (1) ( 336 SE2d 790) (1985) (a party to a PSC proceeding does not have an automatic right to judicial review, but must show that it properly intervened in that proceeding and that it is "aggrieved" by the administrative decision as defined by OCGA § 50-13-19 (a)). Although the trial court ruled that the municipalities did not have standing in the action, it is undisputed that the GMA timely petitioned for leave to intervene and that the PSC allowed it to do so.
A "contested case" is defined by OCGA § 50-13-2 (2) as a proceeding in which "the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." In Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253 ( 336 SE2d 790) (1985), the Supreme Court of Georgia allowed judicial review of orders issued by the Commission in a rate case proceeding in which Georgia Power was authorized to raise its rates. The court noted, however, that
(Citations omitted.) Georgia Power v. Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia, 255 Ga. 253, 257-258 (2) ( 336 S.E.2d 790) (1985). "[O]ne who suffers or will suffer economic injury as the result of an administrative decision may be considered aggrieved for purposes of obtaining judicial review of the decision."