In Georgia Society of Plastic Surgeons. Inc. v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710 (1987), the Georgia Supreme Court had the opportunity to address whether a cause of action exists in Georgia for injurious falsehood (also known as trade libel), and it explicitly refused to do so. Anderson, 257 Ga. at 714.
Review of Georgia authority reveals only one instance where trade libel was specifically discussed, in dicta, as a potential cause of action. See Ga. Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710, 714โ715(4), 363 S.E.2d 140 (1987). In Anderson, the Supreme Court of Georgia pretermitted consideration of whether Georgia law recognized a cause of action โfor damages resulting from disparagement of goods and services (i.e., trade libel),โ because, assuming that damages would lie for trade libel, it substantially overlapped with plaintiff's claim of personal defamation.
The defendants did not file a cross-appeal from the trial court's adverse ruling, and "[t]he general rule is that an appellee must file a cross-appeal to preserve enumerations of error concerning adverse rulings." Ga. Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson , 257 Ga. 710, 711 (1), 363 S.E.2d 140 (1987). See OCGA ยง 5-6-38 (a) ; McGregor v. River Pond Farm , 312 Ga. App. 652, 657 (3), 719 S.E.2d 546 (2011).
We reverse the injunction because the jury did not find all of those statements defamatory in its verdict and because the order sweeps more broadly than necessary. See Ga. Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710, 715 ( 363 S.E.2d 140) (1987); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 777 ( 218 S.E.2d 54) (1975) (upholding narrowly drawn injunction that restrained commercial investigative company from making two statements about an individual). Judgment reversed in Case No. S92A0595.
The trial court ruled adversely to Ryan on this issue, and he did not file a cross-appeal challenging that adverse ruling. See Ga. Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710, 711(1), 363 S.E.2d 140 (1987) (โThe general rule is that an appellee must file a cross-appeal to preserve enumerations of error concerning adverse rulings. OCGA ยง 5โ6โ38[.
(a), or when a false statement โreflects merely upon the quality of what the plaintiff has to sell or solely on the character of his business,โ id. at cmt. (g); see also Georgia Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, Inc. v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710, 714, 363 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1987) [ (per curiam) ] (citing same). The fundamental difference between a claim for defamation and one for injurious falsehood, then, is that the former protects the reputation of an injured party while the latter protects the party's property interests.
Livia failed, however, to file a cross-appeal, and an appellee ordinarily must file a cross-appeal to preserve a claim of error, except when the claim of error is material to, and intertwined with, a claim of error properly raised by the appellant. Georgia Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710, 711(1), 363 S.E.2d 140 (1987). Here, we can fully address the claims of error pressed by Kurt in his appeal without addressing the additional claim of error urged by Livia in her brief.
Husband objected at the hearing to the court's consideration of any claims asserted in the amended contempt petition, on this ground. However, he has not filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's consideration of the issues raised in the amendment, see Georgia Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710, 711 (1) ( 363 SE2d 140) (1987), and lack of adequate notice was not a basis for the trial court's decision on the issue. The trial court also addressed Wife's claims for temporary alimony for the months of June, July, and August 2009, while Husband pursued an appeal. The court reasoned that, as Wife was not entitled to periodic permanent alimony under the "Final Judgment and Decree" of November 5, 2008, and the "Final Judgment and Decree" was essentially affirmed by this Court's denial of Husband's application for discretionary appeal, the trial court's ruling that no periodic permanent alimony would be due was effective as of the date the order memorializing that decision was filed (i.e., November 5, 2008), and Husband was thus not obligated to pay temporary alimony for the months of June, July, and August 2009.
Consistent with this Court's firm policy to protect the right of free speech, we apply the general rule that "equity will not enjoin libel and slander," and therefore reverse the grant of the interlocutory injunction on the ground that it constitutes an impermissible prior restraint. See id.; see also Ga. Soc. of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson, 257 Ga. 710 (5) ( 363 S.E.2d 140) (1987); Brannon v. American Micro Distributors, 255 Ga. 691 ( 342 S.E.2d 301) (1986); Pittman v. Cohn Communities, 240 Ga. 106 ( 239 S.E.2d 526) (1977). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
But Stacia failed to file a cross-appeal of this aspect of the trial court's ruling and, thus, arguably waived any to challenge it. SeeGa. Society of Plastic Surgeons v. Anderson , 257 Ga. 710, 711 (1), 363 S.E.2d 140 (1987) (holding that, as a general rule, appellee must file cross-appeal to preserve enumerations of error concerning adverse rulings); see also OCGA ยง 5-6-38. In any event, we find Stacia's attempt to distinguish White unpersuasive, as the salient factor in White was also that the payments were deemed alimony because they were indefinite in nature given that they necessarily depended on which party outlived the other.