This contention is without merit. 244 Ga. App. 546 ( 536 S.E.2d 258) (2000). 238 Ga. App. 299 ( 520 S.E.2d 468) (1999).
470 S.E.2d at 663. See, e.g., Farm City Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 539 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Iowa 1995) (explaining that the term "entitled" in the exclusion "could mean a legal right or authority to drive under the applicable law . . .[;] `consent' or `permission' from the vehicle owner . . .[; or] both consent and legal entitlement"); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 326 N.C. 771, 392 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1990) (stating that "the fact that [the driver] knew that he had no legal right to drive, is distinguishable from the dispositive question under the policy exclusion of [the driver's] reasonable belief of being `entitled' to drive the vehicle based upon the permission of the person in possession of the vehicle"); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 244 Ga.App. 546, 536 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (2000) (quoting Hurst, 470 S.E.2d at 663); Canadian Indem. Co. v. Heflin, 151 Ariz. 257, 727 P.2d 35, 37 (Ct.App. 1986) (reasoning that the entitlement "exclusion at issue here is clearly ambiguous-as shown by the divergent interpretations given to it by the parties and the trial court"); and State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 700 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky.Ct.App. 1985) (noting ambiguity of the exclusionary language because "[t]he policy does not . . . specify whether `entitled' means simply obtaining permission from the owner of the vehicle or whether a valid license from the applicable state would also be required to avoid exclusion from coverage"). Other jurisdictions, however, have held that "entitlement" exclusions are unambiguous.