Opinion
CV 123-194
03-05-2024
NORA JEANINE GEORGE, Plaintiff, v. WOODSPRING SUITES AUGUSTA RIVERWATCH and HOTEL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRIAN K. EPPS JUDGE
Plaintiff commenced the above-captioned case pro se and is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Because she is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened to protect potential Defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Pleadings drafted by pro se litigants must be liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam), but the Court may dismiss a complaint, or any part thereof, that is frivolous or malicious or that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii).
I. SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. BACKGROUND
In her original and amended complaints, Plaintiff names WoodSpring Suites Augusta Riverwatch (“WoodSpring”) and Hotel Management Services, Inc., as Defendants. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 1-2; doc. no. 5, pp. 1-2.) Taking all of Plaintiff s allegations as true, as the Court must for the purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows.
Plaintiff was employed at WoodSpring as a Guest Services Assistant (“GSA”) from April 4, 2022, until she was terminated on October 3, 2022. (Doc. no 5-1, p. 1.) Plaintiff was the only white employee, and General Manager LaShawn Fryer is African American. (Id. at 2.) On unspecified dates, hotel guests complained to Plaintiff that Ms. Fryer made racial statements about guests and changed charges on guest accounts. (Id.) On an unspecified date, Ms. Fryer made comments regarding Plaintiff s race and her multiracial grandchildren. (Id.) Plaintiff also heard Ms. Fryer make racially motivated statements about hotel guests, including “put the dingy linens in the Mexican's rooms; they only mess them up anyways,” “they are sneaking illegals in the rooms,” and “there goes that white lady that made the complaint.” (Id.) On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff met with a regional manager and reported this information, but Plaintiff received no resolution. (Id.)
Plaintiff also witnessed Ms. Fryer engage in religious practices at WoodSpring. (Id.) On an unspecified date, Ms. Fryer played sermons and religious songs on her phone speaker in the front office. (Id.) When a member of Plaintiff s family passed away Ms. Fryer texted Plaintiff a message on July 6, 2022 that included a Bible verse. (Id. at 2, 10.) On July 12, 2022, Ms. Fryer told Plaintiff, “I know we are of different faiths but I just want you to know that I am here if you need to talk.” (Id. at 2.) On August 18, 2022, Ms. Fryer performed a “blessing of the building” with “the company's chaplin assistant” after “a guest of weird faith” occupied a room. (Id.) When Plaintiff complained about the blessing on August 31, 2022, the regional manager responded that Woodspring is a faith-based organization. (Id.)
Born in 1974, was the oldest employee at this WoodSpring location. (Doc. no. 5, p. 4; doc. no. 5-1, p. 2.) On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff requested more training “on the system” and Ms. Fryer told Plaintiff, “I know you are smarter than that.” (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff's diagnosed disabilities are neuropathy, mental illness and PTSD. (Id. at 3.) Upon Plaintiff's hiring, she notified Ms. Fryer she “had medical reasons for not attending work.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff requested Ms. Fryer arrange the work schedule to accommodate her upcoming medical appointments. (Id. at 2, 15-16.) Plaintiff provided dates of her medical appointments one month in advance, but Ms. Fryer nonetheless scheduled Plaintiff to work on some of the days when she had appointments. (Id. at 2.) For example, Plaintiff had to reschedule a mental health appointment she booked for September 19, 2022. (Id. at 3, 19.) Although Plaintiff had a handicap sign for her vehicle, Ms. Fryer said the handicap spaces were reserved for customers and warned Plaintiff she would receive a “write up” if she continued to park there. (Id.) Ms. Fryer further questioned Plaintiff “about why [she] even had a handicap tag.” (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff also experienced hostility in the workplace. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff and Guest Services Assistant Brian Hart (“GSA Hart”) disagreed over the nature of tasks assigned to Plaintiff and what tasks Plaintiff had to complete before departing at the end of her shifts. (See id. at 3, 21-24.) In one instance, GSA Hart “aggressively snatched papers from [Plaintiff],” triggering an anxiety attack. (Id. at 3, 27-28.) Plaintiff repeatedly informed Ms. Fryer about Plaintiff's interactions with GSA Hart. (See id. at 3, 21-24.) Plaintiff repeatedly complained to Ms. Fryer about her interactions with GSA Hart. (See id. at 3, 21-24.) Plaintiff and Ms. Fryer also argued intensely on a regular basis, often concerning Plaintiff s time-off requests and assigned tasks. (Id. at 3, 20, 25-26, 33, 36.) On one occasion, Ms. Fryer yelled at Plaintiff in front of customers. (Id. at 3.) On another, Ms. Fryer sent Plaintiff a text message including capitalized words. (Id. at 3-4, 35.) Plaintiff explained to Ms. Fryer that capitalized words constitute a form of yelling. (Id. at 3-4, 36-37.) Plaintiff was then “threatened with insubordination.” (Id. at 4; see also id. at 37.)
On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff injured her right wrist while separating linens. (Id. at 3, 29-31.) Throughout the month of September, Plaintiff received treatment for her wrist injury, but Plaintiff was only compensated for appointments that occurred while Plaintiff was scheduled for work. (Id. at 3, 32, 34.)
On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff received a termination letter citing policy violations related to attendance, fraternization, failure to complete duties, and gossiping. (Id. at 4, 38-40.) On December 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on the bases of race, disability, and religion. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff had an initial intake interview with an EEOC representative and received a Notice of Right to Sue letter on September 26, 2023. (Doc. no. 5, p. 5; doc. no. 5-1, pp. 1, 7-8.)
Plaintiff has been unable to gain employment due to her wrongful termination. (Doc. no. 5, p. 5.) As a result, Plaintiff suffers from emotional and physical stress. (Id.) For relief, she requests monetary damages. (Doc. no. 5, p. 5, Doc no. 5-1, p. 4.)
B. DISCUSSION
1. Legal Standard for Screening
The amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the amended complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the amended complaint must provide a “‘plain statement' possessing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
Finally, the court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. Plaintiff's ADEA Claims Should Be Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies
Although a plaintiff may bring a private action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in federal court, “before filing suit under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, a plaintiff must exhaust all available administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC.” Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint, 379 Fed.Appx. 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). For actions under the ADEA, Plaintiff may file suit sixty days after filing with the EEOC without a response from the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1100 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff's EEOC charge makes no mention of discrimination on the basis of age. (See doc. no. 5-1, p. 5-7.) “A plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit “has noted that judicial claims are allowed if they ‘amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus' the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but has cautioned that allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989)). Because Plaintiff made no mention of age discrimination in her EEOC charge, it is a new allegation of discrimination and thus, Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies as to her ADEA claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's ADEA claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Forehand v. Fla. St. Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal for failure to obtain right-to-sue letters before lawsuit); see also Burnett v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 376 Fed.Appx. 905, 907-908 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (plaintiff must allege exhaustion of administrative remedies in complaint). Upon exhaustion, Plaintiff may re-file her ADEA claims.
3. Plaintiff Fails to State a Valid ADA Claim
As the Court explained in its prior order directing Plaintiff to amend her complaint, (doc. no. 4, pp. 7-8), a prima facie disability claim under the ADA requires Plaintiff to allege she is: (1) disabled; (2) a qualified individual as defined in the statute; and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability. See Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016); Shepard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 470 Fed.Appx. 726, 729 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The ADA defines a qualified individual as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “The ADA requires an employer to make reasonable accommodations to an otherwise qualified employee with a disability, unless doing so would impose [an] undue hardship.” Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255. However, “[a]n accommodation is only reasonable if it allows the disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the job in question,” and the duty to provide such reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless the employee makes a specific demand for the accommodation and demonstrates it is reasonable. Id. at 1255-56.
Plaintiff's claims under the ADA appear to arise out of two allegations that Ms. Fryer (1) told Plaintiff not to park in handicap parking spots; and (2) scheduled Plaintiff to work on days when she had already booked mental health appointments. Assuming arguendo Plaintiff is disabled and a qualified individual under the ADA, neither allegation is sufficient to state a failure to accommodate claim. Plaintiff must “show that [s]he was ‘unlawfully discriminated against'-that is, that h[er] employer failed to reasonably accommodate h[er] disability, leading to an adverse employment decision.” Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1263 n.17 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
A mere threat to discipline Plaintiff for using handicap parking spaces does not constitute adverse employment action. See Nurse v. Teleperformance, Inc., No. 115-CV-94, 2016 WL 3766374, at *3 n.1 (S.D. Ga. July 8, 2016) (Hall, J.), affd, 686 Fed.Appx. 690 (11th Cir. 2017). Likewise, Plaintiff fails to connect the scheduling conflicts between her workdays and medical appointments to any adverse employment decision. While the termination letter does cite attendance policy violations, the letter explains these violations concern Plaintiff's lack of timely communication about her absences, not the actual absences. (See doc. no. 5-1, pp. 38-39.) The attendance policy requires employees to “call the [General Manager] directly, (no calling, texting, or communicating through other employees) to discuss their absence,” and defines “[p]roper notice of an absence/tardiness” as “2 or more hours prior to the start of the shift.” (Id. at 38.) The letter explains that Plaintiff's violations were related to her communicating two absences by text message less than two hours prior to her shift. (See id.) The Amended Complaint thus fails to allege a causal connection between the allege failure to accommodate Plaintiff's medical appointments in the work schedule and the termination of her employment. See Beasley, 69 F.4th at 756; Holly, 492 F.3d at 1263 n.17.
4. Plaintiff Fails to State a Valid Title VII Claim
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of race and religion. (See doc. no. 5, pp. 3-4.) Liberally construing the allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint, she raises claims of wrongful termination and a hostile work environment under Title VII. (See generally id.) As explained below, she fails to state either type of claim.
a. Plaintiff's Wrongful Termination Claim Should Be Dismissed Because She Failed to Identity a Similarly Situated Comparator
As the Court explained in its prior order directing Plaintiff to amend her complaint, (doc. no. 4, p. 6), “[t]o establish aprima facie case of wrongful termination based on discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) [s]he was member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) [s]he was qualified for the job; and (4) h[er] employer treated ‘similarly situated' employees outside h[er] class more favorably.” Cooper v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 837 Fed.Appx. 657, 667 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). Concerning the fourth element, typically “a similarly situated comparator will have (1) engaged in the same basic conduct or misconduct; (2) been subject to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule; (3) ordinarily have the same supervisor; and (4) shared a similar employment or disciplinary history.” Id. Although “a complaint need not set out facts ‘to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case[,]' the well-pleaded factual allegations of a complaint still must ‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action due to intentional racial [or religious] discrimination.'” Goldwire v. Alston, No. 421-CV-095, 2022 WL 680194, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2022).
Here, Plaintiff merely identifies “other GSAs” as possible comparators, (doc. no. 5-1, p. 2), but fails to allege these comparators shared similar misconduct or disciplinary histories to support her speculation her termination was the result of intentional race or religious discrimination. See Nurse v. City of Alpharetta, 775 Fed.Appx. 603, 606 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff has alleged no facts whatsoever suggesting intentional discrimination. He has offered neither a comparator nor any other specific facts that would raise his claim above the purely speculative.”); see also Conner v. City of Naples Airport Auth., No. 221-CV-332, 2021 WL 4593791, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2021). Thus, Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim should be dismissed.
b. Plaintiff's Hostile Work Environment Claim Should Be Dismissed Because She Does Not Establish the Workplace Was Permeated with Severe or Pervasive Discrimination
Plaintiff also fails to state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII based on race or religious discrimination. As explained in the Court's prior Order, “to state a claim under Title VII for a hostile work environment, Plaintiff must ‘allege that: (1) [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) [s]he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on h[er] membership in the protected group; (4) it was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for that environment under a theory of either vicarious or direct liability.'” (Doc. no. 4, p. 7 (quoting Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010)).) “To sustain a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must prove that ‘the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'” Mahone v. CSX Transp., Inc., 652 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
To start, the section of the Amended Complaint entitled “Hostile Work Environment” alleges conduct and remarks that are plainly not connected to Plaintiff's membership in any protected group. This section merely describes “an unpleasant working relationship” and “a difficult work environment beset by recurring conflict and mistrust between herself' and colleagues Ms. Fryer and GSA Hart, which does not give rise to a claim under Title VII. Mitchell v. Univ. of N. Ala., 785 Fed.Appx. 730, 738 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see also Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal law doesn't prohibit hostility in the workplace-only hostility caused by impermissible discrimination.”); (doc. no. 5-1, pp. 3-4).
The alleged racial and religious comments by Ms. Fryer do not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. Regarding the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim, “[t]he ‘severe or pervasive' requirement entails both an objective component-namely, that a reasonable person would find the environment hostile or abusive-and a subjective component.” Id. at 1302 (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002)). Factors considered when evaluating objective severity include: “(1) the frequency of the conduct, (2) its severity, (3) whether it was ‘physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance,' and (4) whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's job performance.” Id. The “standards for judging hostility are intended to be ‘sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code.'” Tonkyro v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 837 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Faragher v. Cty. of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
Regarding Ms. Fryer's occasional stereotyping and offensive comments regarding the race of hotel guests, “the ‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee' will not suffice in establishing a hostile work environment.” Collins v. Peco Foods, Inc., No. 722-CV-1139, 2023 WL 6200806, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2023) (quoting Tonkyro, 995 F.3d at 837); see also Harris, 82 F.4th at 1305 (finding “ignorant and extremely demeaning” comment involving racial stereotype insufficient to establish hostile work environment where comment was isolated, not directed at plaintiff, and not as severe as comments courts previously found sufficient). Similarly, isolated references to Plaintiffs race and her grandchildren are not sufficiently severe or humiliating under the objective standard to establish an abusive working environment, even if Plaintiff subjectively perceived these comments to be offensive. See, e.g., Mahone, 652 Fed.Appx. at 823. In addition, Plaintiff failed to allege any of the conduct at issue was sufficiently frequent, severe, threatening, or humiliating. Nor did she allege facts showing any of the remarks unreasonably interfered with her job performance.
As for Ms. Fryer's references to religion and religious practices in the workplace, these are also insufficient to establish a hostile work environment. Plaintiff does not allege Ms. Fryer's practice of playing sermons and music on her phone, nor her blessing of the building was in any way motivated by Plaintiff's actual or perceived religion. See Alhallaq v. Radha Soami Trading, LLC, 484 Fed.Appx. 293, 296 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“[Plaintiff] has not plausibly alleged that the harassment, namely, the remarks that she was ‘dirty' and for her ‘to go to Hell' and ‘burn in Hell,' and the playing of Christian gospel music, was done on account of her Muslim religion.”).
Moreover, Ms. Fryer's religious text messages, offering support to Plaintiff following a death in her family, is not a communication that a reasonable person would interpret as creating a hostile or abusive working environment. See Schultz v. City of Hapeville, No. 108-CV-3222, 2010 WL 11493296, at *7 n.8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 15, 2010), adopted by, 2010 WL 11493295 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Even if the Court considers [Plaintiff]'s allegations that [a supervisor] led overtly Christian prayers at meals, changed a department password access code to ‘P.R.A.Y.,' and wore a Christian cross on his [uniform] as the basis for a hostile work environment claim, he fails to allege facts that show this conduct constituted ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment.'” (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21)). In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of a racial or religious hostile work environment under Title VII.
5. The Court Should Not Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Any Related State Law Claims
Since Plaintiff has not alleged any viable federal claim under Title VII or the ADA, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Section 1331 provides the Court authority to rule in a § 1983 case. Federal courts are given the additional power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, § 1367(c)(3) states that “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” Id. § 1367(c)(3) (emphasis added).
A District Court is well within its discretion to dismiss state law claims once the basis for original federal court jurisdiction no longer exists. See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (directing dismissal of state law claims when case “retains no independent basis for federal jurisdiction”); see also Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 951 n.26 (11th Cir. 1997) (“After dismissing Panama's federal claims against the . . . defendants, the district court correctly dismissed its remaining state law claims against these defendants.”). The Court is recommending dismissal of all of Plaintiff's federal claims. Accordingly, any potential state law claims Plaintiff believes she may have should also be dismissed.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff s amended complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice, any potential state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice, and this civil action be CLOSED.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of March, 2024, at Augusta, Georgia.