Upload a complaint or brief to quickly find on-point case law.
CARA A.I. uses the facts and legal issues in your document to find relevant authorities.
Drag a complaint or brief hereUpload a complaint or briefPDF documentWORD documentTXT documentOr, choose a document to uploadChoose DocumentSecure
Find on-point cases faster with CARA A.I.
§

George v. Ute Water Conservancy District

950 P.2d 1195 (Colo. App. 1997)
Depth of Treatment
Newest to Oldest
Oldest to Newest
Cite Count
George v. Ute Water Conservancy District

40 Citing cases

  1. Athena Botanicals, LLC v. Green Earth Techs.

    Civil Action 1:19-cv-03275-RMR-STV (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2024)

    (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4). “It must also be sufficiently specific to allow a court to understand the nature of the obligation.” Id. (citing George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Colo.App. 1997)). Here, HALO claims that it “was promised an ownership interest in Athena and SJHC in exchange for its investment of funds in the form of equipment and processing.

  2. Cummings v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

    440 P.3d 1179 (Colo. App. 2018)   Cited 6 times

    ¶ 53 If employees could not reasonably construe anything in the manual as a promise of either procedural or substantive employment rights, an implied contract claim fails irrespective of whether there was a clear and conspicuous disclaimer. Jaynes , 148 P.3d at 248 ; George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist. , 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. App. 1997). This is so because a fundamental requirement of all contracts is that the terms of a contract "must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine whether the contract has been performed or not."

  3. G a Land v. Cty. of Brighton

    233 P.3d 701 (Colo. App. 2010)   Cited 19 times
    Recognizing that "[t]he mere existence of funding and environmental approvals for the project and the issuance of a notice of intent to acquire the property do[es] not automatically result in a de facto taking" because "[a]t that point, the project still could have been abandoned by the condemnor and the property never actually disturbed"

    It must also be sufficiently definite to allow a court to understand the nature of the obligation. Soderlun v. Pub. Serv. Co., 944 P.2d 616, 620 (Colo.App. 1997); George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Colo.App. 1997). In Hansen v. GAB Business Services, a division of this court concluded an employer's compensation plan that included a performance-based bonus did not contain a valid promise because the plan did not clearly and unambiguously obligate the employer to pay the bonuses.

  4. Benton v. Town of S. Fork

    587 F. App'x 447 (10th Cir. 2014)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a district court's failure to consider a police department as a separate defendant was harmless because the department was not a proper defendant to the action

    Under the Colorado law, Mr. Benton had to plead facts suggesting circumstances that would have allowed a reasonable inference of race discrimination. See George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. 1997). But, Mr. Benton does not identify his race or suggest any facts that would allow a reasonable inference of race discrimination.

  5. Jones v. Denver Public Schools

    427 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2005)   Cited 141 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Pointing to 29 U.S.C. § 2613, which "entitl[es] an employer to require certification by a health care provider," as one of the "certification rights" that may be exercised under the FMLA

    Id. at 1164. On the other hand, in George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1198-1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997), the same court emphasized that "summary judgment is appropriate if the employer has clearly and conspicuously disclaimed intent to enter into a contract limiting the right to discharge employees," and found handbook language promoting "fair and equitable standards for all employees" insufficient to alter employees' at-will status. Although Colorado courts do not consider a disclaimer "clear and conspicuous" if it is "inconspicuously placed in an appendix to the handbook," see Ferrera v. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458, 461 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990) (construing Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 765 P.2d 619 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988)), they have found disclaimers clear and conspicuous when they appear on the first page of the handbook, see id., or "in close proximity to the provision setting forth . . . required procedure on termination," George, 950 P.2d at 1199.

  6. Romero v. Denver Public Schools

    Civil Action No. 09-cv-01043-CMA-KLM (D. Colo. Jul. 22, 2010)   Cited 4 times
    Concluding that procedures in an employee handbook did not create a property interest in employment in part because the manual prescribing the procedures contained a disclaimer conspicuously stating that "[t]he procedures do not change the at-will status of classified employees"

    Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument regarding Policy GDQD-R fails as a matter of law.See George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. App. 1997) (If the employer has clearly and conspicuously disclaimed intent to enter into a contract limiting the right to discharge employees, then summary judgment is appropriate). Assuming Policy GDQD-R did create a contract between Plaintiff and the District, Plaintiff's claim would still fail because the undisputed facts show no breach.

  7. Murray v. Cars Collision Center of Colorado, LLC

    Civil Action No. 04-cv-01456-CBS-EWN (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2006)

    Colorado courts have found disclaimers located "in close proximity" to provisions setting forth termination procedures to be clear and conspicuous. Jones, 427 F.3d at 1324; George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Colo.App. 1997). I conclude that this second disclaimer in the employee handbook is also clear and conspicuous.

  8. Sidlo v. MillerCoors, LLC

    718 F. App'x 718 (10th Cir. 2018)   Cited 32 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that under Colorado law an implied contract of employment exists if the employer manifested an intent to enter into a binding contract and the employee's continued employment constituted acceptance of and consideration for the promise

    But an employer's disclaimer of contractual obligations is effective " if the employer has clearly and conspicuously disclaimed intent to enter into a contract limiting the right to discharge employees." George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo.App. 1997). Colorado courts weigh whether a disclaimer is clear by considering:

  9. Defazio v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.

    554 F. App'x 692 (10th Cir. 2014)   Cited 4 times
    Noting in connection with a claim of wrongful discharge of public policy that the employee-plaintiff "failed to identify any statute, rule, or public policy implicated by his dismissal" after determining that the employer-defendant's Code of Business Conduct did not bar the plaintiff's discharge

    Indeed, it is settled law in Colorado that where, as here, "the handbook contains such . . . clear and conspicuous disclaimer[s,] . . . the handbook will not be construed as a contract limiting the employer's right to discharge its employees." George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. App. 1997); cf. Geras v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 638 F.3d 1311, 1316 (10th Cir. 2011). *

  10. Young v. Dillon Cos. Inc.

    468 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2006)   Cited 358 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that relevant inquiry is whether the reasons behind the employer's employment decision were held in good faith, even if they later proved to be untrue

    Soderlun v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 944 P.2d 616, 620 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997). If, however, a statement by an employer is "merely a description of the employer's present policies . . . it is neither a promise nor a statement that could reasonably be relied upon as a commitment." Id.; accord George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist, 950 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997). Mr. Young claims he can satisfy the elements for implied contract or promissory estoppel by virtue of three pieces of evidence.