Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05AS05587
RAYE, J.Defendant Richard Carlton Risher brings this pro se judgment roll appeal from a judgment entered against him following a court trial at which he failed to appear. The court determined that defendant has “no right, title, estate, lien or interest in or to” a home in Sacramento, and entered judgment quieting title to the house in plaintiff Shirley George.
Defendant urges us to declare the judgment void because it “is founded on a fraud perpetrated by” plaintiff’s counsel; he also argues he should have been included in the settlement agreements plaintiff made with other defendants.
Finding no basis for reversal, we shall affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
From the very sparse record on appeal, we glean the following.
In 1993, as part of the distribution of assets ordered by the superior court at the conclusion of the probate of the estate of Joe Risher, the estate’s personal representative granted title to a single-family residence in equal shares to five probate estate beneficiaries, as tenants in common. Plaintiff and defendant are two of the five beneficiaries.
Attached to defendant’s brief on appeal are various exhibits; some appear to be copies of documents filed in the superior court, but others are mediation statements, correspondence, and grant deeds. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d) allows a party to attach to his brief copies of “exhibits or other materials in the appellate record,” to aid the court in reviewing the record. (Italics added.) The problem here is that, with the exception of the judgment, none of the exhibits is contained within the appellate record. Thus, they are not appropriately before us.
Some years thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant action against the four other beneficiaries or their respective heirs; the record does not contain a copy of the complaint.
Plaintiff recites in her brief on appeal that she brought the action in 2005.
A court trial was conducted on June 25, 2007. At some time before the trial of this action, defendant became, and remains, incarcerated in federal prison in Tennessee.
No reporter’s transcript of the trial is in the record. The judgment recites that, as all other defendants “ha[d] settled with plaintiff, the trial proceeded with respect to all claims and matters alleged in the pleadings and papers on file in this action as between plaintiff and defendant Richard Carlton Risher.
“Having determined that proper and due notice of the date, time and place of trial was properly given, having considered the evidence admitted at trial, and the papers and documents on file, including the verified pleadings on file, having further examined into and having determined the plaintiff’s title against the claims of defendant Richard Carlton Risher, having further heard and been satisfied with the evidence respecting the claims of defendant Richard Carlton Risher” and considered counsel’s arguments, the court found that “[a]s of July 1, 1998, plaintiff Shirley George held, and continues to the date of this Judgment to hold, her title and interest in and to the Property as fee-simple absolute owner, subject solely and only to the interests of” the other defendants “under respective settlement agreements, the basis of plaintiff’s said title and interest being adverse possession.”
As to defendant, the court found he “has, owns and is entitled to no right, title, estate, lien or interest in or to the Property of any kind or nature whatsoever.”
DISCUSSION
I. In Propria Persona Status and Standard of Review
Defendant brings this appeal without the assistance of counsel. He cites a United States Supreme Court case for the proposition that we should hold him to a “lesser standard of review” than we would hold attorneys appearing in this court. We disagree with this contention.
The case plaintiff relies on, Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519 [30 L.Ed.2d 652], involved a federal civil rights suit under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (§ 1983). We have previously acknowledged that in such cases Haines establishes a different standard of review, specifically that “[w]here a section 1983 complaint is drafted by a pro. per. litigant, it is held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers....’” (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 564, quoting Haines, at p. 520.)
Although defendant’s appeal makes stray references to the federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, and cites the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, neither the proceeding in the trial court nor defendant’s appeal asserts or concerns any section 1983 claim.
Accordingly, we must apply the normal rule that litigants are treated equally whether or not they employ an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 (Rappleyea) [“Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation”]; People v. Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534.)
Moreover, on appeal, we must presume the trial court’s judgment is correct. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) In service of that rule, we adopt all intendments and inferences to affirm the judgment or order unless the record expressly contradicts them. (See Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.)
It is the burden of the party challenging a judgment on appeal to provide an adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) Thus, an appellant must not present just an analysis of the facts and legal authority on each point made; he must support arguments with appropriate citations to the material facts in the record. If he fails to do so, the argument is forfeited. (County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
Defendant is not exempt from the rules governing appeals because he is representing himself. As we have explained, a party representing himself before California courts is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 984-985; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
Because defendant provides us with only a partial clerk’s transcript of the proceedings, we must treat this as an appeal “on the judgment roll.” (Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082-1083; Krueger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.) Therefore, we “‘must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the [trial court’s] findings....’ [Citations.]” (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154 (Ehrler).) Our review is limited to determining whether any error “appears on the face of the record.” (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163.)
II. Defendant Has Failed to Show Error
“In an action to quiet title based on adverse possession the burden is upon the claimant to prove every necessary element: (1) Possession must be by actual occupation under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. (2) It must be hostile to the owner’s title. (3) The holder must claim the property as his own, under either color of title or claim of right. (4) Possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for five years. (5) The holder must pay all the taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period. [Citations.]” (Dimmick v. Dimmick (1962) 58 Cal.2d 417, 421-422; see Preciado v. Wilde (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 321, 325 (Preciado).)
Of course, it is well established that “additional principles” arise when -- as here -- a claim of adverse possession is asserted by one cotenant against another. (Preciado, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) Because each tenant in common has a right to occupy the whole of the property, “[t]he possession of one is deemed the possession of all; each may assume that another in exclusive possession is possessing for all and not adversely to the others[.]” (Johns v. Scobie (1939) 12 Cal.2d 618, 623; see Preciado, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) As a result, “‘“‘[b]efore title may be acquired by adverse possession as between cotenants, the occupying tenant must bring home or impart notice to the tenant out of possession, by acts of ownership of the most open, notorious and unequivocal character, that he intends to oust the latter of his interest in the common property. [Citations.] Such evidence must be stronger than that which would be required to establish a title by adverse possession in a stranger. [Citation.]’”’” (Preciado, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 325, italics omitted, quoting Russell v. Lescalet (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 310, 314; see also 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) § 16:32, p. 70.)
Lacking a reporter’s transcript of the trial, we must presume substantial evidence was adduced at trial to meet this rigorous standard. (Ehrler, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 154.)
Defendant contends the judgment is nonetheless void because his rights to the “due process guaranty [sic] of equal protection of the law” were violated; he suggests he was denied “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
But defendant does not contend he was denied the right to appear at trial; rather the heart of his claim is that he was not “include[d] or appraised[d] [sic]... of the settlement proffers” made by plaintiff to the other defendants. As a result, he argues, this court should reverse the judgment and order plaintiff “to reinstate settlement negotiations and make the same offer to [defendant] as [was] made to the other Defendants (heirs).” He apparently believes that “equal protection of the law” means plaintiff was required to tell him what settlement she had reached with the other defendants and to offer him the same.
He is mistaken. There is no authority for defendant’s assertion that plaintiff was obliged to make the same, or any, settlement offer to any of the defendants. Although the house was once owned in equal shares by plaintiff and all defendants (or their predecessor heirs), the trial court found there was no requirement of equal distribution when it determined that plaintiff alone owned the house by operation of adverse possession. This means the court also ruled that, after 1998, no defendant -- including defendant here -- had any legitimate claim, equal or otherwise, to the house or against plaintiff by virtue of her ownership of the house through adverse possession.
Whatever the outcome of the trial proceeding, plaintiff could legitimately decide before trial to settle with some of the defendants; she remained free to do so for any reason or no reason. But settling with some of the defendants did not require plaintiff to settle with all of them.
Finally, we disregard defendant’s repeated assertions that plaintiff’s counsel “deceiv[ed] the court” and/or “fraudulently [misled] the court to believe that [defendant] had knowingly and intelligently and voluntarily refused to settle and chose to go to trial.” These disparaging remarks find no support in the record, and (as we discussed above) reflect defendant’s misunderstanding of counsel’s obligations regarding settlement.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.