Opinion
No. 05-18-00982-CV
08-11-2020
JOHN H. GEORGE, Appellant v. MARIA GUADALUPE GEORGE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-11713
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Reichek
Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
Appellant John H. George, a pro se litigant, appeals the division of community property in the trial court's July 27, 2018 Final Decree of Divorce. In five issues, John contends the trial court abused its discretion by rendering an unjust and unfair division of property and purportedly signing two, separate judgments. John also seeks a complete and current financial disclosure, including a disclosure of total legal expenses, from appellee Maria Guadalupe George, and immediate payment of $7,500.00 from Maria to compensate John for alleged arrearages owed under the decree. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
John and Maria married in July 1970. On June 12, 2017, John filed for divorce in Dallas County. Maria filed a general denial and counterclaim. Their children were grown at the time of the divorce. The case was tried to the bench on July 27, 2018.
John appeared pro se at trial and presented no witnesses or evidence. Maria was represented by counsel. She testified and offered documentary evidence, which the trial court admitted. That evidence included Maria's proposed division of property, which listed the parties' debts and assets and provided unverified values of Maria's bank accounts, retirement accounts, and credit card balances and of personal property in each party's possession. Maria testified that John committed adultery, treated her cruelly, did not contribute financially or emotionally to the marriage or the children, and had not held an income-producing job for more than twenty years. She asked the trial court to award her more than half of the community estate and most of the community debt as a just and right division of the community estate. Her requested division of property included the marital residence, which had a market value of $182,150 according to county tax records. Maria testified that she owed the IRS about $70,000 in unpaid taxes and needed to borrow from the house to pay that debt. Maria also asked that two burial plots she purchased be awarded to her. Maria also presented evidence that John kept $11,227.58 in insurance proceeds that were issued to Maria and John to repair hail damage on the roof of their home in 2003 without telling Maria and by forging her signature on the check. John cross-examined Maria but presented no witnesses.
The trial judge signed a "Final Decree of Divorce" on July 27, 2018, granted the divorce on the grounds of insupportability and adultery, and divided the marital estate. The court awarded Maria the marital home, two bank accounts, the retirement accounts from her employment as a teacher at Dallas Independent School District, a 2011 Honda CR-V, the cash in her possession, certain artwork, certain property in her possession, including a piano, furniture, book, and kitchen items, exercise equipment, and both cemetery plots. Maria remains liable for her 2017 tax liability, $63,153.43 in credit card debt, and the note on the Honda CR-V. The court awarded John $65,000 payable at $300.00 per month as his share of the marital home. The court also awarded John the cash in his possession, office furniture, a large screen television, two printers, certain artwork, his bicycle, tea cups and china, certain property in his possession, including books, furniture, and game room items, and an Acura vehicle. Maria estimated that John's bicycle was worth $8,000; John told the court it was worth $1,500. John remains liable for his 2017 tax liability. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In five issues, John seeks a new division of the community estate. We will address each issue in turn.
A. Division of Community Property
In his first issue, John claims that the community property was not justly and equally divided and seeks an equal portion of the community property. We review a trial court's property division for an abuse of discretion. Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of substantive and probative character to support the trial court's decision. Moroch v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). In family law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with the traditional sufficiency standards of review; as a result, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of reversal but are factors relevant to our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its exercise of that discretion. In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). We then proceed to determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id.
Upon granting a divorce, a court must divide the community property "in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. When exercising its broad discretion to divide the community property, the trial court may consider many factors, including the nature of the property, the relative earning capacity and business opportunities of the parties, the parties' relative financial condition and obligations, the parties' education, the size of the separate estates, the age, health, and physical conditions of the parties, fault in the breakup of the marriage, the benefit the innocent spouse would have received had the marriage continued, and the probable need for future support. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Slicker, 464 S.W.3d at 858. The property division need not be equal, and mathematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699-700. The party complaining of the division of the community estate has the burden of showing from the evidence in the record that the trial court's division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d at 858.
Here, the trial court awarded John $65,000 as his share of the value of the marital home to be paid by Maria in monthly installments of $300.00, his vehicle, and other personal property. John argues on appeal that he estimates the parties' financial equity to be "at least $400,000" and, as such, he is entitled to at least $200,000 of that community property. John bases this estimate on his unsubstantiated statements in this Court that the marital home has a current market value of $200,000, Maria has at least $200,000 in savings that purportedly includes a $100,000 retirement savings account balance John recalls from ten years ago. John cites no record references to support these estimates, and the record includes no such evidence. The parties did not introduce verified proof of the value of Maria's savings accounts or retirement accounts. The only evidence of the value of those accounts was Maria's unverified total for each account listed on her proposed division of property, which was admitted as Respondent's Exhibit 1 at trial. The bank and retirement accounts were purportedly worth $86,610.94. Similarly, the only evidence of the value of the marital home in the appellate record is a printout from the Dallas County Tax Office admitted into evidence that shows a 2016 property value of $182,150 and Maria's estimated value of the home of $207,960.00, which is listed on her proposed division of property. John did not testify or introduce any evidence at trial of the value of the marital home or any of the assets awarded to him or Maria that would be different from the information provided by Maria and admitted into evidence. Without this information, John cannot show the trial court awarded him a disproportionately small share of the community property.
Moreover, the property division is not disproportionate when the parties' debts are included. Although the trial court awarded John less than fifty percent of the 2016 market value of the home and awarded Maria her retirement accounts, the court also ordered Maria to remain responsible for $63,153.43 in credit card debt and a $15,000 auto loan in addition to her monthly payments to John for his share of the home's value. Further, the trial court properly considered John's fault in the breakup of the marriage. The trial court heard testimony that John committed adultery on at least two occasions, kept more than $11,000 in insurance proceeds for himself instead of using the money to repair the hail damage on the parties' home, and contributed very little financially and emotionally to Maria, the parties' children and grandchildren, and the home. Under this record, we conclude John has failed to show that the trial court's disposition of community assets was an abuse of discretion or was manifestly unjust and unfair. See Matter of Marriage of Collinsworth, 598 S.W.3d 357, 366 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.); see also Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). We overrule John's first issue.
B. One Final Judgment
In his second issue, John complains that the trial court signed two divorce decrees; a handwritten decree and a typewritten decree that were both dated July 27, 2018 and both purportedly signed by the trial court judge. The appellate record includes only one "Final Decree of Divorce." It is typewritten, signed by the trial court judge, and dated July 27, 2018. The trial court judge crossed out certain language and handwrote additional language into the decree, including a finding of adultery. The judge initialed the substantive changes made in her own hand. John is, therefore, incorrect that two judgments exist in this case.
Further, we conclude the "Final Decree of Divorce" is a final judgment. A divorce decree is a final judgment when the decree "finally disposes of all claims and all parties" in "clear and unequivocal language" that leaves no doubt of the court's intention. In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 540-41, n. 15 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 205-206 (Tex. 2001)); In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). The "Final Divorce Decree" was signed after a trial on the merits and states that the decree "is a final judgment" and that the judgment "finally disposes of all claims and all parties and is appealable." This language is clear and unequivocal. The "Final Divorce Decree" is the final judgment for purposes of appeal, and we overrule John's second issue. See In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 540-41; see also O'Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 301 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013) (citing Huff v. Huff, 648 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. 1983) (a divorce decree is a final judgment "distinguishable from other final judgments only by the remedies available for their enforcement.").
C. Post-Judgment Discovery and Enforcement
In his remaining issues, John seeks discovery of Maria's financial records and payment of arrearages allegedly owed by Maria in the amount of $7,500.00. We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211-12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Id. at 212. The law is well established that, to present an issue to this Court, a party's brief shall contain, among other things, a concise, nonargumentative statement of the facts of the case, supported by record references, and a clear and concise argument for the contention made with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. TEX. R. APP. P.38.1; McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). We cannot address an appellant's issues unless he provides us with an argument, analysis, and authorities to support the claim. Dodd v. Mona, No. 05-19-00446-CV, 2020 WL 3046198 *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8, 2020, no pet. h.).
In his pro se brief, John repetitively states that he seeks discovery of Maria's financial records and payment of arrearages allegedly owed by Maria in the amount of $7,500.00, but does not provide a clear argument of why he seeks this information or the payment or why he is entitled to the information or the payment. John also fails to provide any legal or factual support for his arguments. John fails to provide a clear and concise argument for his contentions with appropriate citations to authorities and the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see also McIntyre, 50 S.W.3d at 682. Because John's final three issues are bare assertions of error, without supporting argument or authority, we conclude he has waived our review of those complaints. See Washington v. Bank of New York, 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Hogan v. Aspire Fin., Inc., No. 05-19-00385-CV, 2020 WL 3054509, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8, 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, present nothing for review on appeal).
To the extent John seeks enforcement of the decree and discovery in aid of enforcement of the decree in issues three, four, and five, such requests for relief lie in the trial court. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 9.001, 9.002, 9.006; see also Chakrabarty v. Ganguly, 573 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.) (court that rendered divorce decree generally retains the power to enforce the property division and may render further orders to enforce the division to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the prior order). To the extent John is claiming he needs additional discovery so he can challenge the trial court's division of community property, John was afforded ample opportunity to seek such relief in the trial court and to challenge the evidence presented by Maria at trial. Moreover, any new evidence obtained by John would be of no assistance to him in this appeal because our review is limited to the record before the trial court at the time of its ruling. See Stephens Cty. v. J.N. McCammon, Inc., 122 Tex. 148, 52 S.W.2d 53, 55 (1932); see also Ginn v. Pierce, 595 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. filed). We overrule John's third, fourth, and fifth issues.
CONCLUSION
We have concluded the division of community property was fair and just and overruled John's remaining appellate issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Robbie Partida-Kipness/
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
JUSTICE 190982F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-11713.
Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-Kipness. Justices Myers and Reichek participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee MARIA GUADALUPE GEORGE recover her costs of this appeal from appellant JOHN H. GEORGE. Judgment entered this 11th day of August, 2020.