George v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. George v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company

    344 S.C. 582 (S.C. 2001)   Cited 20 times
    Finding summary judgment was not premature because defendant "had a full and fair opportunity to develop the record on this issue, but failed to do so."

    JUSTICE WALLER: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion in George v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 206, 519 S.E.2d 107 (Ct.App. 1999). We reverse.

  2. Haulers Insurance Company, Inc. v. Wyatt

    172 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 5 times

    When these provisions are read together, it is clear that the policy language "other than auto only aggregate" means that there is a $1,500,000 aggregate limit for accidents that do not involve the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered automobile and that "[o]ther than auto only" refers to accidents not involving a covered automobile. "Aggregate" is not an unusual or technical word, and it is not used as such in the policy. While we have not been directed to, nor has our research revealed, a Missouri case on point, our decision finds support in the South Carolina case of George v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 206, 519 S.E.2d 107 (1999), which interpreted a policy similar to that in the instant case. In George, an accident occurred involving an automobile covered by a garage operations insurance policy.

  3. First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Brumbaugh

    553 F. App'x 282 (4th Cir. 2014)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses

    South Carolina courts allow third parties to seek contract reformation of insurance contracts to which they are not a party. George v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 S.E.2d 107, 110 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) rev'd on other grounds, 545 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. 2001), ("Ordinarily, a party requesting reformation must have been a party to the written document or in privity with a party. However, a third-party beneficiary to an insurance contract may bring such an action.

  4. In re Moore

    C/A No. 04-15363-HB, C/A No. 04-15364-HB, (Substantively Consolidated), Adv. Pro. No. 05-80204-HB (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2008)

    King v. Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 313, 318 S.E.2d 125, 128 (S.C.Ct.App. 1984) (citing Jumper v. Queen Mab Lumber Co., 115 S.C. 452, 106 S.E. 473 (1921)).See also Belin v. Stikeleather, 232 S.C. 116, 101 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1957) (a mutual mistake is one where both parties intended a certain thing and by mistake in the drafting did not get what both parties intended. Before equity will reform an instrument, it must be shown by evidence which is most clear and convincing not simply that it was a mistake on the part of one of the parties); George v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 206, 218, 519 S.E.2d 107, 113 (S.C.Ct.App. 1999) (same). A contract can be reformed due to unilateral mistake only "under strong and extraordinary circumstances showing imbecility or something which would make it a great wrong to enforce the agreement.

  5. United Servs. Auto. Assoc. v. Markosky

    340 S.C. 223 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 8 times
    In Markosky, an insured failed to notify its insurer of a traffic accident, and this court rejected an argument that the MVFRA required the insurer to pay more than the mandatory minimum liability limits to a third party despite the existence of greater policy limits.

    The court found the Financial Responsibility Act "provides no basis to hold that the provision of the policy limiting coverage to the statutory minimum is contrary to public policy." Id. at 410, 380 S.E.2d at 862; SeeGeorge v. Empire Fire andMarine Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 206, 519 S.E.2d 107 (Ct.App. 1999) (cert. pending) (upholding exclusion for coverage of permissive users in excess policy, in two policy structure).