[ยถ 4] At the district court hearing, the parties agreed the court could decide the issues on the affidavits of Larson and the personal representative, and the court treated the proceeding as a bench trial. See Kadlec v. Greendale Twp. Bd. of Twp. Supervisors, 1998 ND 165, ยถ 9, 583 N.W.2d 817; Roeders v. City of Washburn, 298 N.W.2d 779, 781 (N.D. 1980); George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743, 744-46 (N.D. 1977). In actions tried without a jury, a district court's findings of fact are governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction the trial court made a mistake."
In North Dakota, a divorce may not be granted unless "the plaintiff in good faith has been a resident of the state for six months next preceding the entry of the decree of divorce." NDCC ยง 14-05-17; Byzewski, supra; Shulze v. Shulze, 322 N.W.2d 250, 252 (N.D. 1982). Legal residence is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder and to be reviewed according to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a), NDRCivP. Dietz v. City of Medora, 333 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 1983); George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743, 745 (N.D. 1977). The controlling North Dakota statute on the issue of residence provides, in part:
Residence is a question of fact and therefore subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Dietz v. City of Medora, 333 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 1983); George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743, 745 (N.D. 1977). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; e.g., Bye v. Elvick, 336 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1983). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made; the mere fact the appellate court might have viewed the facts differently if it had been the initial trier of the case does not entitle it to reverse the lower court. E.g., George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1977). The record reflects that Jandt continued to order additional water tanks after he complained of defects, and he continued to lease the tanks to customers.
Legal residence, determined according to the rules in ยง 54-01-26, N.D.C.C., is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder and to be reviewed according to the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. See George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743, 745 (N.D. 1977); Wehrung, supra 78 N.W.2d at 70; Moodie, supra 258 N.W. at 563. During the trial the judge heard the following evidence concerning Tjaden's legal residency: (1) he votes in Medora; (2) he belongs to Medora clubs and advisory councils and supports a church in Medora; (3) his will, checks, income tax forms, passport, and car registration list Medora as his address; (4) he has a telephone in Medora and receives newspapers in Medora; (5) he is provided a home in Medora by his employer at which he keeps personal possessions; and (6) it is his declared intent to be a legal resident of the City of Medora.
"Our standard of review of a district court's finding of fact is not, however, a redetermination of the weight of the evidence." George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743, 745-746 (N.D. 1977), quoted in Hoge v. Burleigh Cty. Water Management Dist., 311 N.W.2d 23, 28 (N.D. 1981). Our review of the record and our analysis of finding of fact No. 13 reveal no indication of the weight given or not given by the trial judge to Dr. Olson's testimony based on her personal observations. The Grosses have not convinced us that finding of fact No. 13 indicates that the testimony of Dr. Olson was discounted by the trial judge to the extent that a reversal by this court would be justified.
This court has many times commented on that standard. In George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743, 745-46 (N.D. 1977), we said: "Our standard of review of a district court's finding of fact is not, however, a redetermination of the weight of the evidence.
As trial de novo has been abolished by the Legislature and the trial court in the instant case found that there is no evidence of fraudulent intent on the part of Peter Schmidt in transferring the real property to himself and Martha as joint tenants, our standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" rule set forth in Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. This court has stated repeatedly that a finding will be determined clearly erroneous only when, although there is some evidence to support it, this court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. E.g., George v. Compson, 251 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1977); Mattco, Inc. v. Mandan Radio Ass'n, Inc., 246 N.W.2d 222 (N.D. 1976); In re Estate of Elmer, 210 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1973). It is with this test in mind that we must review the record. Hildegard, in her brief, argues the fraudulent nature of the conveyance in that Peter "defaulted continuously thereafter in the payments required to be made. . . ."