Illinois State Constitution of 1970, article XIII, section 4, which became effective on January 1, 1972, states that "[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished." In response, the CTA cites George v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 692, 374 N.E.2d 679, as support for the proposition that "the eradication of sovereign immunity had no effect whatsoever on the CTA" and that, therefore, the right to sue the CTA is a "special statutory" cause of action. In George, the appellant argued that the elimination of tort immunity for governmental entities abolished immunity from punitive damages as well as for compensatory damages.

01 et seq.) as a "separate public corporation" it was not a local public entity as defined in section 1-206 of the Tort Immunity Act at the time plaintiff's cause of action arose and thus not exempt from punitive damage claims. Plaintiff further contends that Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 531 N.E.2d 1, and George v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 692, 374 N.E.2d 679, are inapplicable because the Chicago Transit Authority was designated as a municipal corporation in the statute that created it, while METRA was not. Plaintiff distinguishes West v. Northeastern Illinois R.R. Corp. (1989), 180 Ill. App.3d 307, 535 N.E.2d 987, on the basis that both parties in West assumed that NIRC (METRA) was a local public entity for the purpose of the notice of claims provision of the Tort Immunity Act and, therefore, the court was not called upon to decide its status, the matter at issue here. METRA asserts:

Statutory and common law provisions which differentiate between municipal and private corporations as to tort liability have been held reasonable and valid classifications under the equal protection and special legislation clauses. (See Schuman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1950), 407 Ill. 313; Cooney v. Society of Mount Carmel (1979), 75 Ill.2d 430; George v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 692.) In Schuman, this court emphasized the CTA's status as a municipal corporation and the uniqueness of its function in rejecting a challenge to a provision of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act which imposed upon claimants a notice-of-claim requirement and reduced the statute of limitations period for actions to be commenced against the CTA.

ers who are meant to benefit from public example made of wrongdoer; (2) virtually unlimited taxing power of city precludes examination of its wealth, but if trier of fact does not look at wrongdoer's wealth, punishment is inappropriate; and (3) punishment of municipal employees may better be carried out by superiors who are responsible to electorate); Ranells v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975) (punitive damages not available where husband and wife were killed when chlorine gas escaped from municipal filtration plant located across street from their home; the court observed the possibility of astronomical awards with municipal defendants while also noting that to eliminate the financial wealth of the defendant would destroy the punishment rationale); Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C.App. 1975) (punitive damages not available where a citizen sued for false arrest and assault, the court noting that deterrence would not be achieved in municipal context); George v. Chicago Transit Auth., 58 Ill.App.3d 692, 693, 15 Ill.Dec. 896, 897, 374 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1978) (punitive damages not available where fare-paying passenger injured in train collision; "[t]here is no justification for punishing taxpayers or attempting to deter them from future misconduct committed by CTA employees over whom they would have no control."); Sharapata v. Islip, 82 App. Div.2d 850, 441 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 339, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (1982) ("Were sovereign entities open to punitive damage, would this then mean that the monetary worth of the taxing power of the State or locality against whom such a claim might be directed would be a societally acceptable factor, no matter how relevant to the calculation of a just award? To ask the question is to answer it.").

(Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that because the immunity of a county from punitive damages antedates the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act ( e.g., City of Chicago v. Langlass (1869), 52 Ill. 256; George v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 692, 374 N.E.2d 679), such a defense is preserved by operation of section 2-111. I again disagree.

Likewise, punitive damages against municipalities are not available under the IWCA. See George v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 Ill.App.3d 692 (extending immunity from punitive damages to the CTA despite its exclusion from the Tort Immunity Act). The CTA's motion to strike demands for punitive damages from the Amended Complaint is granted.

In Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim against the CTA under Illinois' Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. ("the Tort Immunity Act"). Courts that have considered whether the Tort Immunity Act applies to the CTA and have held that the Act specifically excludes the CTA. See Slaughter v. Rock Island City Metro Mass. Trans., 275 Ill. App.3d 873, 656 N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (3d Dist. 1995); Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority, 67 Ill.2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977); and George v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 Ill. App.3d 692, 374 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1978). However, the CTA may be held liable under the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, 70 ILCS 3605 et seq. This case was obviously filed within the six month notice period provided for in section 70 ILCS 3605/41.

Punitive damages are generally unavailable on Plaintiffs' federal and state claims. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); Collins v. School District 189, 115 Ill.App.3d 100, 70 Ill.Dec. 914, 915-16, 450 N.E.2d 387, 388-89 (5th Dist. 1983); Holda v. Kane County, 88 Ill.App.3d 522, 43 Ill.Dec. 552, 555-56, 410 N.E.2d 552, 555-556 (2d Dist. 1980); George v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 Ill. App.3d 692, 15 Ill.Dec. 896, 898-900, 374 N.E.2d 679, 681-83 (1st Dist. 1978). And Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim will provide vindication of the policies behind the First Amendment and Article I, §§ 4 and 5 of the Illinois Constitution.

This is because shareholders can at least theoretically change the management which employs persons who subject the corporation to exemplary damages. George v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 Ill. App.3d 692, 15 Ill. Dec. 896, 897-80, 374 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (1978). Other courts have allowed the municipality to be treated as a regular corporation for the recovery of compensatory damages but denied the same status for exemplary measures.

In view of the Tort Immunity Act's express prohibition of assessing punitive damages against local governmental entities, we find inherent in the Act a public policy against imposing punitive damage liability on local taxpayers. ( George v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 692; see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981), 453 U.S. 227, 69 L.Ed.2d 616, 101 S.Ct. 2748.) We hold that, regardless of whether plaintiff can prove that she was discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim, the Tort Immunity Act precludes plaintiff from recovering punitive damages from the district.