Opinion
S95A1464.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 13, 1995.
Recall petition. Floyd Superior Court. Before Judge Emerson from Douglas Circuit.
Jones, Byington, Durham Payne, Frank H. Jones, for appellants.
Meeks Richardson, W. Gene Richardson, for appellees.
Bobby George and three other members of the Cave Spring City Council sought to enjoin elections superintendent Shirley Baker from conducting a recall election because the recall petitions were filed within six months of previous recall petitions being found invalid. The trial court denied the injunction. Because the Recall Act does not restrict the filing of a new recall petition following a judicial determination of insufficiency, we affirm.
O.C.G.A. § 21-4-1 et seq.
In 1994 voters in Cave Spring initiated a recall effort against George and three other members of Cave Spring's City Council. George filed an action in superior court to enjoin the recall effort. On December 8, 1994, the trial court found that the petitions failed to meet certain requirements of the Recall Act and that the elections superintendent failed to comply fully with her official duties. While that case was on appeal, other voters filed new applications to initiate another recall drive against the same council members. On April 10, 1995, Baker issued the recall applications at issue here.
See Hunter v. George, 265 Ga. 573 ( 458 S.E.2d 830) (1995) (affirming that portion of the trial court's order).
1. The council members contend that this recall effort should be enjoined because O.C.G.A. § 21-4-14 (b) prevents the issuance of any further application for recall against the same officer until at least six months have elapsed from the date of the finding of insufficiency of the prior petition. This argument ignores the plain language of section 21-4-14 (b). That section provides that "[i]f the election superintendent finds that a recall petition is insufficient" no further application for a recall petition shall be filed for six months. Thus, a judicial determination that the recall petition was issued in violation of the Recall Act is not a bar to a subsequent petition. In this case, because a trial court and not the elections superintendent held that the initial recall petition was invalid, section 21-4-14 (b) is inapplicable. Distinguishing between insufficiency findings by an elections superintendent and by a court is not unreasonable or arbitrary. This may well reflect the legislature's determination that no time proscription on the filing of a subsequent petition is necessary because of the longer time frame inherently involved in receiving a judicial finding of insufficiency.
See Collins v. Morris, 263 Ga. 734, 737 ( 438 S.E.2d 896) (1993) (following a judicial determination that a prior application was legally insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 21-4-6 "there is no statutory provision proscribing the filing of an additional application") (emphasis supplied).
2. Additionally, the elections superintendent may only undertake a narrowly defined review of the petitions. The trial court's invalidation of the first recall petitions was based upon findings of improper conduct that are beyond the scope of the statutory review the elections superintendent may take.
O.C.G.A. §§ 21-4-3 (7.1) and 21-4-11 (a).
See Hunter, 265 Ga. at 574-75.
For these reasons, the second petition was not subject to the time proscription in O.C.G.A. § 21-4-14 (b) and the trial court correctly denied the injunction.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.