Opinion
E066400
02-03-2017
GEORGE NEWMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE RAMONA TERRACE COMMUNITY, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
George Newman, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Citron & Citron, Thomas H. Citron and Katherine A. Tatikian for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. 37-2013-00077448-CU-OR-NC) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Diego County. Jacqueline M. Stern, Judge. Affirmed. George Newman, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Citron & Citron, Thomas H. Citron and Katherine A. Tatikian for Defendant and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant George Newman is a resident of Ramona Terrace Estates, a 218-space senior mobile home park, located at 1212 H Street in Ramona, California (Park). Newman filed a notice of appeal, challenging a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of defendant and respondent The Ramona Terrace Community, LLC (Ramona Terrace).
Newman's appellate submissions do not comply with appellate rules and protocol. He does not provide adequate record citations. Instead, he attaches multiple photographs that were never admitted in the underlying arbitration. Newman expressly declines to make any arguments on appeal because "no argument is necessary." Nevertheless, in spite of these deficiencies, we have thoroughly reviewed the record. We have also reviewed the letter briefs submitted by the parties in lieu of personally appearing for oral argument. Because Newman agreed to arbitration of his claims but refused to participate in the arbitration as ordered, we affirm the judgment.
II
BACKGROUND
Newman leases space 152 in Ramona Terrace Estates, pursuant to a lease he signed on April 29, 2010. The lease includes an arbitration agreement. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, Newman agreed to arbitrate any dispute with Ramona Terrace: "RELATING TO, ARISING OUT OF, CONCERNING, OR CONNECTED WITH THIS AGREEMENT, RESIDENCY DOCUMENTS, THE INTERPRETATION OR ENFORCEMENT THEREOF, THE LEASEHOLD, THE HOMESITE, SERVICES, FACILITIES, OR MAINTENANCE IN OR ABOUT THE PARK, AND ANY DISPUTE RESPECTING THESE MATTERS BETWEEN HOMEOWNER AND OWNER SHALL BE RESOLVED SOLELY BY MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION . . . INSTEAD OF IN COURT."
On November 26, 2013, without requesting Ramona Terrace to mediate or arbitrate to resolve his disputes or providing Ramona Terrace with prior notice, Newman filed this civil action, alleging that a dispute existed between himself and Ramona Terrace regarding the Park's operation, maintenance, various activities, physical conditions and improvements in the common area facilities. All Newman's claims involving Park facilities, maintenance, and services, including management, are within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
After Newman filed the civil action against Ramona Terrace, the superior court granted Ramona Terrace's motion to compel arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) The order to compel stated in relevant part: "Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted pursuant to CCP 1281 et seq. The Court concludes . . . that Plaintiff Newman and Defendant entered into a mediation/arbitration agreement in April 2010; that after the instant litigation was initiated Defendant demanded Plaintiff mediate and/or arbitrate the instant dispute and Plaintiff refused; and the mediation/arbitration clause attached to the parties' lease agreement applies to the allegations in Plaintiff's instant action. Thus, the Court concludes that by refusing to mediate this matter, Plaintiff has revoked the parties' nonbinding mediation agreement and Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate the instant action in accordance with the parties' agreement. . . ."
After some further proceedings, the court appointed John Seitman as arbitrator and ordered the parties to attend the arbitration. Arbitrator Seitman conducted an arbitration in December 2014. Newman refused to attend or present any evidence or testimony. Arbitrator Seitman entered a "Final Award" in Ramona Terrace's favor. The arbitrator found:
"The evidence establishes that The Ramona Terrace Community, located at 1212 H Street, Ramona, California 92065, is properly and well maintained, and that all utilities meet or exceed all governmental standards. The quality of the mobile home park has improved since its acquisition by Respondent.
"The Arbitrator also finds that no public agencies have cited this mobile home park for any violations of mobile home park laws since acquisition of the property by Respondent in 2009.
"With regard to Claimant Newman, the Arbitrator finds that he does not have the authority to act on behalf of other tenants in the mobile home park; that he has not attempted to sell his home in the mobile home park, nor has he submitted a lease assignment to the mobile home park; and that any rent increases he incurred while residing in the mobile home park were reasonable and proper. Further, Mr. Newman has never asked the mobile home park to accommodate any disability from which he may suffer; he has not encountered any hazards at the mobile home park, nor has he tripped and/or injured himself on any raised floor tiles in the clubhouse or any cracks in the street at the mobile home park. Moreover, Mr. Newman has not suffered any damage or injury as a result of any conditions in common areas of the mobile home park. The Arbitrator also finds that the excavation behind the carwash at the mobile home park is open and obvious.
"The arbitrator further finds that Mr. Newman has suffered no damages as a result of any of the conduct alleged in his complaint.
"The Arbitrator further finds that Claimant has failed to prove that Respondent [Ramona Terrace] breached any fiduciary duty to him, or that any fraud or misrepresentation occurred in the acquisition or management of the mobile home park by Respondent.
"Based on the forgoing, the Arbitrator finds that Claimant Newman is not entitled to any relief in this arbitration and that Respondent The Ramona Terrace Community, LLC is entitled to prevail against Claimant Newman on all claims.
"This Final Award fully resolves all claims submitted for decision in this arbitration. Any claims not specifically referenced herein are deemed denied."
The superior court granted Ramona Terrace's petition to confirm the arbitration award. The superior court denied Newman's petition to vacate the arbitration award, in which Newman accused the arbitrator of suffering from dementia. The court then entered a judgment in favor of Ramona Terrace on May 27, 2015.
III
DISCUSSION
We begin by observing that there is no question that Newman's claims were subject to arbitration. California law binds plaintiff to the terms of arbitration agreement which he expressly agreed to in writing. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236), and requires the enforcement of its terms. (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1292.) Each of Newman's claims against Ramona Terrace falls squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement. For example, California courts have held that binding arbitration applies to contract claims and to tort causes of action for negligence and premises liability (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 217), nuisance (Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj (2004) 33 Cal.4th 73, 80), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1149), intentional interference with property rights (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 355-357), trespass to land (Peebler v. Olds (1946) 28 Cal.2d 402, 405), breach of the warranty of habitability (Dickens v. Lee (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 985, 987), breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 297, 302) and other statutory causes of action (County of Solano v. Lionsgate Corp. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 741, 747-749). (Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1314-1316.)
The record here shows that there was an agreement to arbitrate and that Newman's claims are encompassed in it: "the trial court is required to order arbitration unless it determines that the petitioner waived its right to arbitration or that grounds existed for revocation of the agreement." (Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 809, 817.) Newman forfeited any claim that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable, as well as any other challenges to the contractual arbitration clause. (Cummings v. Future Nissan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 321, 329-330.)
Furthermore, this appeal is limited in scope. As explained by the California Supreme Court, an arbitrator's decision is generally not subject to judicial review: "[I]t is the general rule that, 'The merits of the controversy between the parties [to a private arbitration agreement] are not subject to judicial review.' [Citations.] More specifically, courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator's reasoning. [Citations.] Further, a court may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator's award. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, it is the general rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law." (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11; Jones v. Humanscale Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 401, 407-408.)
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 10, emphasized that: "This expectation of finality strongly informs the parties' choice of an arbitral forum over a judicial one. The arbitrator's decision should be the end, not the beginning, of the dispute. [Citation.] Expanding the availability of judicial review of such decisions 'would tend to deprive the parties to the arbitration agreement of the very advantages the process is intended to produce.' [Citation.]
"Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that judicial intervention in the arbitration process be minimized. [Citations.] Because the decision to arbitrate grievances evinces the parties' intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential delays at the trial and appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component of the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration. Thus, an arbitration decision is final and conclusive because the parties have agreed that it be so. By ensuring that an arbitrator's decision is final and binding, courts simply assure that the parties receive the benefit of their bargain."
Although Newman appears to be challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment confirming the arbitration award, Newman has not identified any exception to the general rule of limited appellate review. Newman offers no salient argument, either in his opening brief or his corrected opening brief regarding limited review or sufficiency of the evidence. (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 1004; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
Contrary to Newman's apparent contention, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the arbitrator's award was not reviewable by the trial court or by this court on appeal: "Limited judicial review is a well-understood feature of private arbitration, inherent in the nature of the arbitral forum as an informal, expeditious, and efficient alternative means of dispute resolution. By choosing private arbitration, the parties 'evince [their] intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid potential delays at the trial and appellate levels.' (Moncharsh [v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 10.]) Judicial interference with the arbitrator's decision would thus defeat the very advantages the arbitral parties sought to achieve. (Ibid.)
"Accordingly, the parties, simply by agreeing to arbitrate, are deemed to accept limited judicial review by implication, particularly where their agreement specified that the award would be 'final' and 'binding' upon them. (Moncharsh [v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10.]) In effect, it is appropriate to insulate a private arbitral award from close judicial scrutiny because, given the inherent nature of arbitration, 'the parties have agreed that it be so.' (Id., at p. 10, italics in original.)" (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 831; Ulene v. Murray Millman of California, Inc. (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 655, 659.)
To the extent, we may exercise limited appellate review, we conclude Newman has not met his burden to challenge the judgment. The superior court's findings should be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Turner v. Cox (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 596, 603.) An independent standard of review applies to questions of law based on undisputed facts. (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9.)
The order confirming the arbitration award is presumed to be correct on appeal. All intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.) Particularly, "[e]very reasonable intendment will be indulged in by the courts to give effect to arbitration proceedings." (Ulene v. Murray Millman of California, Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.2d at p. 660.)
Newman has the burden to demonstrate error, including the burden to provide an adequate record to allow this court to determine whether error occurred. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296.) Unfortunately, plaintiff has not provided this court with a reporter's transcript (Cal. Rules of Court 8.130(e), (f)) or a settled statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h).) In addition, Newman has not supplied record citations. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205.)
Notwithstanding the foregoing deficiencies, Newman has failed to preserve any issues for appeal. First, Newman refused to attend the arbitration despite being ordered to do so, and he did not oppose Ramona Terrace's petition to confirm the arbitration award. Although he filed a motion to vacate the judgment, he has not provided any reasoned arguments on appeal. Instead, based on an array of unauthenticated photographs attached to his brief, Newman asserts, "Appellant is of the opinion, that no argument is necessary here. By taking the reader back to that old saying, quoted at the beginning of the introduction, in the Appellant's original AOB, [¶] 'A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS', and would add, two more old sayings, [¶] 'PICTURES DON'T LIE', AND [¶] 'SEEING IS BELIEVING'. [¶] Can there be any argument, that this park, has not been well maintained, with 90 photographs, and 3 citations, telling us otherwise??? [¶] The Appellant thinks not." We therefore disregard Newman's contentions: "We need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished." (Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384; People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Building Permit Consultants, Inc. (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 284; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
Both California and federal courts agree that arbitration is substantially lower in cost, faster and more efficient, than a civil trial. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 348; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910-924; Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2103) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1143; St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1204.) Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 243, reasoned: "Like other methods of alternative dispute resolution, binding arbitration benefits both the developer and the entire common interest community by providing a speedy and relatively inexpensive means to address allegations of defect damage to the common areas and other property interests." Here, as in Pinnacle, "binding arbitration benefits" Ramona Terrace, Newman, and the Park by providing a "speedy and relatively inexpensive means to address" allegations of damage to the common areas of the Park and other property interests as well as other disputes encompassed in the arbitration agreement's scope. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1160.) Newman has offered no argument to justify overturning the judgment confirming the arbitration award.
Finally, in his letter brief, Newman raises an impermissible new argument about peremptory challenges. (New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098.) Newman failed to file a timely writ petition to challenge the trial court's denial of peremptory challenges to have Judge Stern removed or denial of any affidavits of prejudice. We reject this new argument.
IV
DISPOSITION
Newman has not provided any reasoned argument or evidence supporting reversal of the judgment affirming the arbitration award. We affirm the judgment. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.