But see Glendon Energy Co. , 836 F.Supp. at 1122 (holding that it is not proper "on a motion for reconsideration to ask the Court to rethink what [it] had already thought through—rightly or wrongly"). Adams argues that this Court erred in relying on the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's opinion in George Wash. Motor Lodge Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. , 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 552, 545 A.2d 493, 494 (1988), because PennDOT determined in a Proposed Report in 1989 that the case was not controlling. Adams also disagrees with this Court's reliance on Kegerreis Outdoor Adver. Co. v. DOT , 157 A.3d 1033, 1039 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017), asserting that the case decided the meaning of the term "interchange" under the Act, not the meaning of "main-traveled way" as it applies to a "divided highway."
For state police power to be exercised reasonably, it must be in "the interests of the public generally," "the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and must "not be unduly oppressive upon individuals." George Washington Motor Lodge Co. v. Department of Transportation , 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 552, 545 A.2d 493, 495 (1988). The requirements contained in § 175.29(a)(6) support the "interests of the [motoring] public generally," are "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose" of protecting the public from unsafe vehicle inspections, and are not "unduly oppressive upon individuals." Id.
Here, such an interpretation was made by the Commonwealth court in George Wash. Motor Lodge Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. See 118 Pa. Commw. 552, 555, 545 A.2d 493, 494 (1988) (construing the various portions of the Act and concluding that "[t]here is no inconsistency in requiring the measurement of distance between signs to be determined only on one side of the way and measuring the distance between a sign and any intersection no matter where the location"). See alsoKegerreis Outdoor Adver. Co. v. DOT , 157 A.3d 1033, 1039 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (upholding PennDOT's interpretation of how to measure the 500–feet spacing limitation in the Interchange Prohibition).
Here, such an interpretation was made by the Commonwealth court in George Wash. Motor Lodge Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. See 118 Pa. Commw. 552, 555, 545 A.2d 493, 494 (1988) (construing the various portions of the Act and concluding that "[t]here is no inconsistency in requiring the measurement of distance between signs to be determined only on one side of the way and measuring the distance between a sign and any intersection no matter where the location"). See also Kegerreis Outdoor Adver. Co. v. DOT, 157 A.3d 1033, 1039 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (upholding PennDOT's interpretation of how to measure the 500-feet spacing limitation in the Interchange Prohibition).
36 P.S. § 2718.105(c)(2)(i) (emphasis added). Further, this Court has previously affirmed DOT's interpretation of the terms "exit" or "entrance" within the "Interchange Prohibition" to mean any or all exits or entrances from the main-traveled way. George Washington Motor Lodge Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation , 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 552, 545 A.2d 493, 495 (1988) (rejecting applicant's interpretation of the 500 feet requirement in the "Interchange Prohibition" as only applying to the side of the roadway from where the sign is visible and accepting DOT's interpretation of this requirement as applying to any and all exits or entrances from the sign). As noted above, an agency's interpretation of its governing statute is entitled to considerable weight and deference. Martin Media .
In response, DOT asserts the Secretary's interpretation of DOT's OAC regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute under which it was promulgated. See Penn Adv.; Miller's Smorgasbord;George Washington Motor Lodge Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 552, 545 A.2d 493 (1988). DOT urges the Secretary's determination that the preference for the application first received is optional under 67 Pa.Code § 445.6(d)(4) and, in this case, inappropriate, is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation.
We note that the existence of evidence to support an interpretation contrary to that adopted by DOT is immaterial; the agency's interpretation of the regulation is controlling unless shown to be clearly erroneous. George Washington Motor Lodge Co. v. Department of Transportation, 545 A.2d 493, 495 (Pa.Commw. 1988). We note, however, that an agency's interpretation of a regulatory statute must be afforded considerable weight and deference by a reviewing court.
clearly applies to Martin Media's structure as it would have been within five hundred feet to an entrance/exit ramp. Further, this Court has no power or authority to insert words into statutory provisions, where the legislature has not done so. George Washington Motor Lodge Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 118 Pa. Commw. 552, 545 A.2d 493 (1988). We note that, in reviewing the meaning of statutes, this Court is mandnated to construe any word or phrase, not otherwise defined, according to the rules of grammar and according to the common and approved usage.
However, DOT's interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute under which it was promulgated. George Washington Motor Lodge Company v. Department of Transportation, 118 Pa. Commw. 552, 545 A.2d 493 (1988). Our analysis of this regulation convinces us that DOT's interpretation that intact can have both financial and physical components is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the statute under which it was promulgated.
An administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless (1) that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, or (2) the regulation is inconsistent with the statute under which it is promulgated. George Washington Motor Lodge Company v. Department of Transportation, 118 Pa. Commw. 552, 545 A.2d 493 (1988) (citing E. Smalis Painting Company, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 70 Pa. Commw. 90, 452 A.2d 601 (1982)). Section 445.7 of Chapter 445, Title 67 of the Pennsylvania Code governs the restoration of damaged or partially destroyed nonconforming signs and Section 445.8 of Chapter 445, Title 67 of the Pennsylvania Code governs abandoned signs.