(Punctuation omitted.) Gentry v. Hutchins, 319 Ga.App. 636, 638, 738 S.E.2d 92 (2013), citing Effingham County v. Rhodes, 307 Ga.App. 504, 506–507(3), 705 S.E.2d 856 (2010). Here, in support of his summary judgment motion, Taylor relied upon his affidavit, which contains the following material facts:
See Banks, 608 S.E.2d at 747 ("Beyond the specific concept of resource allocation, as a general matter county road officials 'necessarily [have] discretionary powers as to what work should be done, when, how and where necessary.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Vickers v. Motte, 137 S.E.2d 77, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964))); see also Gentry v. Hutchins, 738 S.E.2d 92, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that county employees had discretion regarding when to execute work orders and were therefore entitled to official immunity); Norris v. Emanuel Cty., 561 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that road superintendent who had discretion regarding when to repair washed out intersection enjoyed official immunity). The Court notes that even if a citizen had taken Brown aside and specifically informed him of the crack in the middle of the bridge in question, Brown would have been required to evaluate how and when to fix that crack.
Accord Hicks v. McGee, 289 Ga. 573, 577(1), 713 S.E.2d 841 (2011). A ministerial duty may be established by evidence such as a written policy, see Grammens v. Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 620, 697 S.E.2d 775 (2010), an unwritten policy, see Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga.App. 563, 575(2), 716 S.E.2d 611 (2011), a supervisor's specific directive, see Gentry v. Hutchins, 319 Ga.App. 636, 639, 738 S.E.2d 92 (2013), or a statute. See Hicks, supra at 575–576, 713 S.E.2d 841. “Procedures or instructions adequate to cause an act to become merely ministerial must be so clear, definite and certain as merely to require the execution of a relatively simple, specific duty. [Cit.]” Effingham Cnty. v. Rhodes, 307 Ga.App. 504, 507(2), 705 S.E.2d 856 (2010).