Opinion
11-12-2015
Laura J. GENOVA, appellant, v. Lisa A. CHIOVARO, respondent.
Elana Sharara, Great Neck, N.Y., for appellant. DeSena & Sweeney, LLP, Bohemia, N.Y. (Shawn P. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondent.
Elana Sharara, Great Neck, N.Y., for appellant.
DeSena & Sweeney, LLP, Bohemia, N.Y. (Shawn P. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SANDRA L. SGROI, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmieri, J.), entered September 22, 2014, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ), and that, in any event, the alleged injury was not caused by the subject accident (see generally Jilani v. Palmer, 83 A.D.3d 786, 787, 920 N.Y.S.2d 424 ).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d), and as to whether the alleged injury was caused by the accident (see Perl v. Meher, 18 N.Y.3d 208, 218–219, 936 N.Y.S.2d 655, 960 N.E.2d 424 ; Estrella v. GEICO Ins. Co., 102 A.D.3d 730, 731–732, 959 N.Y.S.2d 210 ). Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.