Genl. Alum. Corp. v. Dist. Ct.

8 Citing cases

  1. Tyler v. Tyler

    697 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that reliance "on the district court's order purporting to eliminate the need for a new trial motion" amounts to "excusable neglect" as a basis for relief from final judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)

    The determination of whether a party's conduct constitutes excusable neglect that justifies relief from a judgment is left to the discretion of the trial court. General Aluminum Corp. v. Arapahoe County District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340 (1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 132 Colo. 236, 287 P.2d 49 (1955). The decision of the trial court will be upheld unless the court has abused its discretion.

  2. Broyles v. Fort Lyon

    695 P.2d 1136 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 19 times
    Applying that statute

    An order granting a motion to set aside an order or judgment is not itself a final judgment. General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340 (1968); Westerkamp v. Westerkamp, 155 Colo. 534, 395 P.2d 737 (1964); Schtul v. Christ, 132 Colo. 293, 287 P.2d 661 (1955). Such an order merely sets the stage for further proceedings.

  3. Snow v. Dist. Ct.

    572 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 11 times

    The decision on whether to set aside an entry of default is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340; Dudley v. Keller, 33 Colo. App. 320, 521 P.2d 175. [2,3] We can detect no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to vacate the entry of default.

  4. Weaver Const. v. Dist. Ct.

    190 Colo. 227 (Colo. 1976)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that where defendant filed a motion to set aside default judgment, and requested that he be permitted to file an answer to merits of the complaint, such request constituted a general appearance waiving objection to personal jurisdiction

    [6] Further, the petitioner in this action has failed to sustain its burden of clearly proving that the trial court abused its broad discretion to set aside judgments. Credit Inv. Loan Co. v. Guaranty Bank Trust Co., 166 Colo. 471, 444 P.2d 633 (1968); General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340 (1968); Coerber v. Rath, supra; Riss v. Air Rental, Inc., 136 Colo. 216, 315 P.2d 820 (1957). We therefore hold that the trial court did not proceed "without or in excess of its jurisdiction" in setting aside the judgment as to the Grinnells, and in this regard we discharge the rule.

  5. Stiger, Jr. v. Dist. Ct.

    535 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1975)   Cited 9 times

    Aurora v. Congregation, 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385 (1959); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958). [4] In General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340 (1968), this court held: "Under the provisions of Rule 116(a) above quoted, therefore, the only proper procedure to secure review of a trial court's order granting an application to set aside a default judgment is by writ of error [appeal] after final judgment."

  6. Dodge County, United States A., Inc. v. Robinsin

    539 P.2d 1292 (Colo. App. 1975)   Cited 1 times

    We recognize that a motion to vacate a default judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340. However, unless the verified motion of Appelgren fails to present facts sufficient to merit vacating the judgment, the trial court must consider evidence relative to the motion.

  7. Catlin v. Pelletier

    517 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1973)

    The only proper procedure to secure review of an order setting aside a default judgment is by appeal after final judgment. General Aluminum Corp. v. Arapahoe County District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340. C.A.R. 1(a)(1).          Appeal dismissed.

  8. Rogers v. Tovrea

    484 P.2d 1246 (Colo. App. 1971)   Cited 1 times

    '(T)he only proper procedure to secure review of a trial court's order granting an application to set aside a default judgment is by writ of error after final judgment.' General Aluminum Corp. v. Arapahoe County District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340.          We note that the present attorney of record for plaintiff in error was not the attorney who originated this appeal.