[7] However, where a default judgment is set aside on jurisdictional grounds, it also must be vacated. This result is compelled by our cases which hold that where a judgment is procured without service of process on the defendant, there is a want of personal jurisdiction, and the judgment is considered void. General Ins. Co. v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 (1960); Geisler v. People, 135 Colo. 121, 308 P.2d 1000 (1957); Greene v. Phares, 124 Colo. 433, 237 P.2d 1078 (1951). It is an elementary principle of due process that where such a circumstance arises the underlying judgment must be vacated in the first instance, as a void judgment cannot be allowed to remain in effect pending the outcome of a trial on the merits.

iled or refusedto accept and receipt" for the certified mailing by the ChiefHighway Commissioner of the Notice of Service and processin the Cooks' Clarendon County action within the meaningof Section 10-431.1: 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446; 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091; 464 S.W.2d 573; 169 A.2d 228; 3 F. Supp. 439; 119 N.W.2d 272; 258 Ala. 319, 62 So.2d 792; 376 P.2d 888; 8 Terry 114, 87 A.2d 881; 330 S.W.2d 121; 147 Me. 63, 83 A.2d 296; 66 N.J. Super. 310, 169 A.2d 228; 187 F. Supp. 173; 58 Wn.2d 36, 360 P.2d 744; 144 W. Va. 215, 107 S.E.2d 372; 107 Mont. 489, 96 P.2d 750; 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537; 5A Am. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Section 862, page 776; Annotations 82 A.L.R. 768, 96 A.L.R. 594, 125 A.L.R. 457, 138 A.L.R. 1464; 9A Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Section 5915, page 363; Annotation at 95 A.L.R.2d 1033; 123 So.2d 745, 95 A.L.R.2d 1029; 107 S.E.2d 372; 209 So.2d 438; 219 F. Supp. 1; 87 A.2d 881; 356 P.2d 888; 217 N.Y.S.2d 627; 29 S.E.2d 310. As to the failure of Federal to appearand defend in the name of the alleged uninsured motorist(McDaniel) in the Clarendon County action brought by itsinsureds, the Cooks, after Federal was served with a copyof the pleadings therein under the provisions of the UninsuredMotorist Laws, and/or its subsequent unsuccessfulaction in moving to re-open the default judgments renderedtherein, not causing it to be bound by said judgments: Section 46-750.33, 1973 Cumulative Supplement to 1962 Code; 354 P.2d 1085, 79 A.L.R.2d 1245; 217 N.E.2d 814; 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206; 256 S.C. 65, 180 S.E.2d 643. As to Great American's not being entitledto be absolved of liability to the Cooks on their judgmentsagainst McDaniel by reason of the fact that the ClarendonCounty process was not forwarded to it: 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673; 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608; 137 S.E.2d 608; 145 S.E.2d 673; 137 S.E.2d 608; 256 S.C. 376, 182 S.E.2d 727; 259 S.C. 45, 190 S.E.2d 487; 20

The fact that papers were forwarded to a party later is irrelevant. Grabner v. Willys Motors, Inc., 9 Cir., 282 F.2d 644, 647, 86 A.L.R.2d 994. Nonresident service-of-process statutes are in derogation of the common law and are given a strict construction; each step prescribed is jurisdictional and a condition precedent to completion of service of process upon a nonresident defendant. General Insurance Company of America v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888, 890-891. It becomes obvious that there were multiple fatal departures from established requirements.

We must agree with both the reasoning and conclusion in such decisions. Ex Parte Smith (1953), 258 Ala. 319, 62 So.2d 792; General Insurance Co. of America v. O'Day (1960), 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888; Paxson v. Crowson (1952), 47 Del. (8 Terry) 114, 87 A.2d 881; Parker v. Bond (Mo. 1959), 330 S.W.2d 121; White v. March (1951), 147 Maine 63, 83 A.2d 296; Zander v. Martine (1961), 66 N.J. Super. 310, 169 A.2d 228; Kohler v. Derderian (D.C., N.Y., 1960), 187 F. Supp. 173; Muncie v. Westcraft Corporation (1961), 58 Wn.2d 36, 360 P.2d 744; Mollohan v. North Side Cheese Co. (1959), 144 W. Va. 215, 107 S.E.2d 372. We shall not burden this opinion with specific references to them.

For example, in Jones v. Colescott, supra, the plaintiffs failed to comply with an explicit and mandatory requirement of the rules, and in Coppinger v. Coppinger, supra, the plaintiffs had fraudulently withheld necessary information from the court. See also Jayne v. Peck, 155 Colo. 513, 395 P.2d 603 (1964); General Insurance Co. v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 (1960); Weber v. Williams, 137 Colo. 269, 324 P.2d 365 (1958). Although no cases in Colorado have specifically addressed whether publication may begin prior to a court order, Hancock relies on dictum in Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo.