"A surety is not liable on a bond unless it appears that the work unpaid by the principal was completed pursuant to the contract that the bond purports to cover." General Equipment Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173, 180 (Pa.Super. 1993) (citations omitted). Jerome Gardocky, Western's senior claims representative, has agreed that the soil removal work commenced following the notice to proceed issued by Wal-Mart and was indeed completed.
Garzarelli v. A.E. Staley Man. Co., Inc.fn_ ........... 6/9/94 0072 Denied 434 Pa. Super. 700 E.D. 641 A.2d 1232 (1994) General Equipment Manufacturers, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co.fn_ ............. 5/13/94 0003 Denied 430 Pa. Super. 526 W.D. 635 A.2d 173 (1994) Gonzalez v. Com.fn_ ... 5/25/94 0536 Denied No. 3012 M.D. Philadelphia (1993) 1992
In exercising this discretion, the trial court may limit cross-examination due to concerns that the matter is collateral, would likely confuse or mislead the jury, or would waste time. See Commonwealth v. Largaespada, 184 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2018); Gen. Equip. Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173, 182 (Pa.Super. 1993). Here, Appellants were able to elicit Kimble's admissions that his wife had obtained a PFA against him and had divorced him.
HutchisonIII, 763 A.2d at 842, quoting General Equipment Manufacturersv. Westfield Ins. Co. (" General Equipment"), 430 Pa.Super. 526, 635 A.2d 173, 185 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 663, 644 A.2d 1200 (1994) (citations omitted in Hutchison III). AccordJones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 1205 (Pa.Super. 2004.) See alsoKeiter v. Miller, 170 A. 364, 365 (Pa.Super. 1934) (providing that the cases excepted from the general rule that the commission of the act charged cannot be proved by showing a like act to have been committed by the same person are those in which "the knowledge or intent of the party was a material fact to be proved, and on which the evidence, apparently collateral, had a direct bearing"), citing 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 53; Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence, art. 11.
With regard to evidence of pedophilic behavior within the organization, we find instructive an analogous argument raised in a civil matter cited in Appellee's Substituted Brief on Remand. That case is General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Insurance Co., 635 A.2d 173 (Pa.Super. 1993), wherein a subcontractor filed suit against a general contractor for nonpayment, and attempted to introduce evidence of the general contractor's failure to pay other subcontractors. On review of the propriety of the admission of such evidence, we stated as follows:
An alleged error in jury instructions must be considered in light of the evidence presented at trial. GeneralEquipment Manufacturers v. Westfield Ins. Co., 430 Pa. Super. 526, 547-548, 635 A.2d 173, 184 (1993); Butler v. Kiwi, S.A., 412 Pa. Super. 591, 594-96, 604 A.2d 270, 272 (1992), allo.denied, 531 Pa. 650, 613 A.2d 556 (1992). Since this instruction would have assumed facts not in evidence, the trial court's refusal to give such an instruction was not error.
In exercising this discretion, the trial court may limit cross-examination due to concerns that the matter is collateral, would likely confuse or mislead the jury, or would waste time. See Commonwealth v. Largaespada, 184 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2018); Gen. Equip. Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173, 182 (Pa.Super. 1993). Here, Appellants were able to elicit Kimble's admissions that his wife had obtained a PFA against him and had divorced him.
A contract of suretyship "represents a three-party association where a creditor is entitled to performance of a contractual duty by the principal debtor or alternatively, if the debtor defaults, by the debtor's surety." Reliance Ins. Co. v. Penn Paving, Inc., 734 A.2d 833, 836 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Gen. Equip. Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173, 180 (Pa. Super. 1993)). In this case, the EB Bond named PVPGC as the Contractor/Principal, USSC as the Surety, and the Borough as the Owner.
As stated in this Court's prior Memorandum and Order (Doc. 20), a surety such as Platte may raise any defense available to its principal. General Equip. Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Platte argues that DBI did not properly complete its contract with V-Tech, and therefore, that it does not owe DBI the requested sum.
. "A surety may assert any defense of which its principal could take advantage." Id.; Superior Precast, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 71 F. Supp. 2d 438 (E.D. Pa. 1999); General Equip. Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In the present case, DBI is entitled only to "such sums as may be justly due claimant."