( Department of Transportation, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 759, citing E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 506 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 614, 579 P.2d 505]. See also American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 604-607 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899]; GeneralBrewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518, 519 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 907] ["The only attack on the cross-complaint which is plausible — though erroneous — would be that it is premature, not that the cause of action it pleads is outlawed. (Fn. omitted.)]".

Thus, Allen's right to cross-complain against Southland arose no later than the time Pacific Panorama sued Allen. ( Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 612-623 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 871, 659 P.2d 1160], citing General Brewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518 -519 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 907].) (3) Citing Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., supra, 33 Cal.3d 604, People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 744, and E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 614, 579 P.2d 505], Southland contends the court properly granted its motion to quash because Allen's asserted cause of action for indemnity will accrue only when Allen becomes liable to Pacific Panorama under a settlement or judgment.

(See Annot., What Statute of Limitations Covers Action for Indemnity (1974) 57 A.L.R.3d 833.) (7) One thing, however, is settled and beyond question, and that is that a cause of action for indemnity based on tort accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, at the time the indemnity claimant suffers loss or damage — that is, at the time of payment of the underlying claim. (See Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 612 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 871, 659 P.2d 1160]; General Brewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518, 520 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 907]; Cobb v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 251 Cal.App.2d 929, 933; Annot. When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Claim for Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort (1974) 57 A.L.R.3d 867.

Accordingly, we decline to reverse for any purpose other than to enter appropriate joint and several judgments against the defendants. Because the issue has not been briefed we express no opinion as to whether defendants can file indemnity suits independent of the principal action for partial indemnification under the principles of American Motorcycle; nor do we pass upon the effect of the compulsory cross-complaint provision contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30 or the statute of limitations applicable to indemnity actions. (See De La Forest v. Yandle (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 59 [ 340 P.2d 52]; General Brewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 907].) The judgments are reversed and the causes are remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a joint and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs in each case against the defendants Kellstrom, Eichel and Lionudakis for the amount of the plaintiff or plaintiffs' total damages as found by the jury, reduced only by the percent of comparative fault attributable to the plaintiff or plaintiffs whose damages are being calculated, and reduced further by the amount of any pretrial settlement applicable, all in accordance with this opinion.

A claim for equitable indemnity does not accrue until the plaintiff actually pays the sums for which indemnity is sought. (See People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 744, 751; Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi (1964) 60 Cal.2d 834, 843 ["The implied promise of indemnity and reimbursement applies only to the actual loss and not to the liability incurred."]; see also General Brewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518, 519.) Shell contends this rule offends public policy because it permits a plaintiff to revive an entire indemnity claim simply by incurring an additional minor expense, such as renting a truck to inspect the abandoned wells five years after the last real work was done.

A claim for equitable indemnity does not accrue until the plaintiff actually pays the sums for which indemnity is sought. (See People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 744, 751; Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi (1964) 60 Cal.2d 834, 843 [“The implied promise of indemnity and reimbursement applies only to the actual loss and not to the liability incurred.”]; see also General Brewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518, 519.) Shell contends this rule offends public policy because it permits a plaintiff to revive an entire indemnity claim simply by incurring an additional minor expense, such as renting a truck to inspect the abandoned wells five years after the last real work was done.

Smith relied on De La Forest v. Yandle (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 59, 62, 340 P.2d 52, for this proposition, but De La Forest simply determined that because the parties seeking indemnification had filed suit within one year of a settlement, their indemnity action was "not barred by any statute of limitations pleaded." (De La Forest, supra, at p. 62, 340 P.2d 52; see also General Brewing Corp. v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 518, 519-520, 70 Cal.Rptr. 907 [argument that indemnity claim was barred by one-year period in § 340, subd. (3) was rejected because cause of action had not yet accrued].