General Accident, Ltd., v. Sircey

4 Citing cases

  1. Sibson v. Robert's Express

    104 N.H. 192 (N.H. 1962)   Cited 9 times
    In Sibson, however, the court merely held that an insurer who paid its insured's property damage claims could not bring a separate subrogation action to recover its payments after the insured had litigated claims for personal injury stemming from the same event.

    See Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100; Annot. 62 A.L.R. 2d, supra, 989. Cf. Hoosier Casualty Co. v. Davis, 172 Ohio St. 5. Other jurisdictions recognize no such exception. Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317; Coniglio v. Fire Insurance Co., 337 Mich. 38; General Accident, Ltd. v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Arlt, (N. D.) 61 N.W.2d 429. We think that under the practice prevailing in this jurisdiction the view illustrated by the Moultroup case, supra, should be controlling, and that "the insurer's right of recovery was limited to a right to intervene in the first suit . . ."

  2. Mich. Head & Spine Inst., PC v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co.

    No. 340656 (Mich. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2018)

    Defendant also argues that prohibiting an assignment would be consistent with "the broader rule in Michigan prohibiting the splitting of causes of action." Defendant cites Gen Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp v Sircey, 354 Mich 478, 482; 93 NW2d 315 (1958), for the following proposition: "In this state the rule against splitting of causes of action is strictly enforced to prevent vexation and expense to a defendant. It is a rule of justice that one shall present his whole cause of action in one suit.

  3. Martin v. Johnson

    87 Mich. App. 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    Traditionally, since both causes arose out of one tortious act, Michigan law considered them to comprise but one cause of action. General Accident Fire Assurance Corp, Ltd v Sircey, 354 Mich. 478 ; 93 N.W.2d 315 (1958), Coniglio v Wyoming Valley Fire Ins Co, 337 Mich. 38; 59 N.W.2d 74 (1953). Thus, an action by the insurer against the tortfeasor for property damage would operate to preclude a subsequent action by the insurer for personal injury, or vice-versa. 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, ยง 149, pp 662-663.

  4. Flanary v. Reserve Insurance Co.

    110 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. 1961)   Cited 6 times

    In proceeding against Fenton and accepting settlement of his claim against the latter, plaintiff precluded himself from thereafter taking the position that he had been paid only for personal injuries and suing Fenton for his car loss. In so doing he also precluded his insurer, defendant herein, from doing so. Coniglio v. Wyoming Valley Fire Insurance Company, 337 Mich. 38. See, also, General Accident Fire Assurance Corp., Ltd., v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478, and cases cited therein for discussion of rule against splitting causes of action. This was in violation of defendant's rights under the subrogation clause in the policy and of plaintiff's agreement therein to do nothing after loss to prejudice those rights.