Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5998.
November 17, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Accompanying Appendix (Docket No. 11), Plaintiff's Opposition thereto (Docket No. 16), and Plaintiff's Accompanying Appendix (Docket No. 17), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32 (1986); Carter v. Exxon Co., 177 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1999). An issue of material fact is said to be genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court's "function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Carter, 177 F.3d at 202 (citation omitted). The court's inquiry at the summary judgment stage is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is need for a trial; whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-52. If there is sufficient evidence to reasonably expect that a jury could return a verdict in favor of plaintiff, that is enough to thwart imposition of summary judgment. See id. at 248-51.
This suit arises out of Plaintiff Jean Gendron's ("Gendron") termination from her employment with Defendant PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PWC"), a tax consulting and accounting firm. After exhausting her administrative remedies, Gendron filed suit alleging age and gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951 et seq. ("PHRA"). In this summary judgment motion PWC argues that Gendron cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation; PWC does not argue that Gendron has failed to make out a prima facie case of age or gender discrimination. PWC also argues that Gendron cannot establish by a preponderance of the evidence that PWC's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Gendron's termination are pretextual.
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas three-step burden shifting framework guides the analysis of discrimination claims under Title VII. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Third Circuit has applied the same analysis to claims raised under the ADEA, see Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997), as well as to claims arising under the PHRA, see Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997). Second, if the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence to support a finding that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). If the defendant fails to meet this burden, the plaintiff prevails. If the defendant meets this burden, the third step is reached. The plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that "the employer's proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, and not the real motivation for the unfavorable job action." Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003)).
A prima facie case of retaliation requires proof that (1) Plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) after engaging in protected activity, Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a); Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). PWC argues that the evidence asserted by Gendron in this case does not satisfy the causal relationship requirement. Gendron suggested in a February 27, 2001 memo to her superiors that she was being subjected to age and gender discrimination because her performance reviews were negative and because she disagreed with her reviewers' assessment of her work. Noting that Gendron's performance problems were raised in evaluations written before Gendron wrote her memo, and also noting the fact that Gendron was fired almost six months after she wrote her memo, PWC argues that such facts preclude the court from finding there to be a causal link between Gendron's memo and her termination.
The Court does not agree with PWC's conclusion. Although Gendron's February memo does provide evidence of "protected activity," the time lapse between the memo and Gendron's termination is not the only evidence the Court may consider in determining whether a link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. The Third Circuit has stated that "timing plus other evidence may be an appropriate test where the temporal proximity is not so close as to be `unduly suggestive.'" See, e.g., Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). The Record contains circumstantial evidence from the period between February and her termination in August suggesting that Gendron's firing came in response to her discrimination complaint. As such, Gendron has met her burden in asserting a prima facie case of retaliation and PWC's summary judgment motion must be denied with respect to Gendron's retaliation claim.
Gendron has also produced sufficient evidence of pretext to survive PWC's summary judgment motion. Although PWC offers a number of performance evaluations indicating Gendron's performance was below the company's standards, some of these evaluations are based on conflicting underlying facts. For instance, Gendron's first negative evaluation written by Steve Wilkerson in 1999 came shortly after two partners Gendron often worked for wrote reports characterizing Gendron's performance as exceeding company standards. Although the Record contains references to a number of PWC clients who complained about Gendron's performance, an issue of material fact exists as to whether Gendron's performance problems, and specifically her poor performance evaluations, are merely pretextual in this case. Plaintiff's assertion of pretext therefore must survive summary judgment; Defendant's motion is denied.