Gen. Motors v. Buchanan

12 Citing cases

  1. Medernix, LLC v. Snowden

    903 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)

    [2] "The scope of discovery under the Civil Practice Act [("CPA")] is broad." General Motors v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 814 (2) (a), 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022). Under OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (1), parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party.

  2. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Finnerty

    191 N.E.3d 211 (Ind. 2022)   Cited 5 times

    Most state courts to consider the apex-deposition rule—several within the last few years—have declined to adopt it, citing existing protections under, or conflicts with, their discovery rules. SeeGen. Motors, LLC v. Buchanan , 313 Ga. 811, 821, 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022) ; Andrews v. Devereux Found. , No. 109 EDA 2021, 2021 WL 3465051, at *3 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2021) ;

  3. Cooper v. Pollard

    897 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)

    First, it is clear to us that, despite the trial court’s repeated attempts to explain the discovery process, Morgan failed to appreciate both the nature and scope of discovery. As our Supreme Court explained in General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022), "the scope of discovery under the Civil Practice Act is broad." Id. at 814 (2), 874 S.E.2d 52.

  4. Cooper v. Pollard

    No. A24A0389 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2023)

    First, it is clear to us that, despite the trial court's repeated attempts to explain the discovery process, Morgan failed to appreciate both the nature and scope of discovery. As our Supreme Court explained in General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811 (874 S.E.2d 52) (2022), "the scope of discovery under the Civil Practice Act is broad." Id. at 814 (2).

  5. Premier Pediatric Providers, LLC v. Kenne- Saw Pediatrics, P.C.

    898 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. 2024)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining that when the trial court has an option of dismissing an appeal, even if the court abused its discretion in the underlying determination, an appellate court should not order the trial court to dismiss a case, rather, it should remand for reconsideration after correcting the legal error

    As with many mixed questions involving the conduct of litigants during trial proceedings, the trial court is generally in the better position to resolve questions about the nature of and fault for the delay in filing a transcript, having had "the opportunity to observe and assess the conduct, demeanor, and credibility of the parties and their counsel throughout the proceedings." Resurgens, P.C. v. Elliott, 301 Ga. 589, 598 (2) (b), 800 S.E.2d 580 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also, e.g., Gen, Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 815 (2) (a), 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022) (decision to issue a protective order reviewed for abuse of discretion); Resurgens, 301 Ga. at 597-598 (2) (b), 800 S.E.2d 580 (decision to impose discovery sanctions reviewed for abuse of discretion); Horn v. Shepherd, 292 Ga. 14, 17-18 (4), 732 S.E.2d 427 (2012) (decision to find a party in contempt reviewed for abuse of discretion); Sanders v. Am. Liberty Ins. Co., 225 Ga. 796, 796-797, 171 S.E.2d 539 (1969) (trial courts "may exercise a sound and legal discretion" when deciding whether to open default (citation and punctuation omitted)). As with those questions, the trial court is the court best suited to weigh a party’s conduct, the status of the litigation, and other matters relevant to whether the responsible party has acted unreasonably and inexcusably in failing to file a transcript before the statutory deadline.

  6. Kuhlman v. State

    317 Ga. 232 (Ga. 2023)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that the appellant’s lawsuit for declaratory relief "comes within the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity" in Paragraph V, where a State board denied the appellant’s application for relief from the prohibition on the possession of firearms by convicted felons and the appellant sought declaratory relief that this denial violated the laws of the state

    When interpreting a Georgia statute, federal court decisions construing a federal statute or rule have persuasive value only to the extent that the language and context of the Georgia statute at issue are materially similar to the federal statute or rule. See General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan , 313 Ga. 811, 821 (2) (c), 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022) ("[W]here the language of a Georgia statute deviates from the federal rules [of evidence], the persuasive value of the authority interpreting and applying the federal rules is diminished."); Stubbs v. Hall , 308 Ga. 354, 358 (3) (a), 840 S.E.2d 407 (2020)

  7. Mab Monroe, LLC v. Mayfield Self Me-064 Storage, LLC

    No. A24A1443 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2025)

    Discovery might eventually bear these claims out, but that discovery has not yet occurred. See General Motors v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 814 (2) (a) (874 S.E.2d 52) (2022) (under the Civil Practice Act, discovery is broad and should "be construed liberally in favor of supplying a party with facts.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Studenic v. Birk, 260 Ga.App. 364, 367 (579 S.E.2d 788) (1) (2003) ("[T]rial courts must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.")

  8. Othman v. Navicent Health Inc.

    908 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    "The gist of a [trespass to personalty claim] is the injury done to the possession of the property." Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 856 (2) (a), 802 S.E.2d 835 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by General Motors v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 826 (2) (d) n.6, 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022). Personalty is defined as: "all property which is movable in nature, has inherent value or is representative of value, and is not otherwise defined as realty." OCGA § 44-1-3.

  9. Paces Funding, LLC v. Tillman

    904 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)

    although we acknowledge as a general principle that we look to federal case law interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as persuasive authority where the language of a Georgia statute deviates from the federal rules, the persuasive value of the authority interpreting and applying the federal rules is diminished. (Citation omitted.) General Motors v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 821 (2) (c), 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022). [15] Here, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) is clear that direct appeals may not be taken from orders which are not final when appealed — that is, "where the case is no longer pending in the court below."

  10. Kudzu Capital, LLC v. City of Decatur

    368 Ga. App. 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023)

    Kudzu's reliance on our prior decisions in Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Lake Spivey Golf Club, Inc. , 207 Ga. App. 693, 694 (1), 428 S.E.2d 687 (1993), disapproved on other grounds by General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan , 313 Ga. 811, 826 (2) (d) n.6, 874 S.E.2d 52 (2022), Brookhaven Assoc. v. DeKalb County , 187 Ga. App. 749, 749-750 (1), 371 S.E.2d 231 (1988), and Dept. of Transp. v. Petkas , 189 Ga. App. 633, 638-639 (5), 377 S.E.2d 166 (1988), is misplaced because none of those decisions involved evidence regarding the purchase price of the subject property. (b) Next, Kudzu argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the City's motion to exclude evidence of Kudzu's alleged right to require the City to open the West Dearborn Circle right-of-way for vehicular use because the evidence was relevant in determining just and adequate compensation for the property.