Consistent therewith, an unbroken line of decisions hold that a determination that plaintiff recover a specified sum from defendant, who, in turn, recovers from plaintiff a different specified sum is not a final judgment, but merely an interlocutory order, until the court strikes the balance of the two sums and renders judgment for the net amount in favor of the party whose recovery is greater. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Bodenheim, 37 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1930, no writ); Harris v. O'Brien, 54 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1932, no writ); Herrin Transp. Co. v. Marmion, 113 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1938, no writ); Manley v. Razien, 160 S.W.2d 995 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1942, no writ). The Comparative Negligence Act does not purport to authorize an appeal from a determination that each of two claimants shall recover a sum certain from the other; thus, ascribing to the phrase "is entitled" its ordinary meaning of permissiveness results in a nonappealable interlocutory order and leads to an absurdity which thwarts the express purpose of the legislature in enacting the Comparative Negligence Act.

Having determined that Manley was entitled to recover of Razien a specified sum, and that Razien was entitled to recover of Manley a specified sum, the court should have set off one sum against the other and rendered judgment only for the balance, and not having done so, the judgment is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be prosecuted. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Bodenheim, Tex. Civ. App. 37 S.W.2d 312; Harris v. O'Brien, Judge, et al., Tex. Civ. App. 54 S.W.2d 277; Nalle et al. v. Harrell et al., 118 Tex. 149, 12 S.W.2d 550; Walker et al. v. Mears, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 67 S.W. 167; Article 2215, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. The appellees contend that the above rule does not apply to this case because of the presence of more than one defendant in each of the purported recoveries, it being their theory that the rule is inapplicable here because of the alleged right of contribution between the respective appellees.

The failure of the court to do that rendered the judgment interlocutory; on this conclusion we are forced to dismiss the appeal. Harris v. O'Brien, Tex. Civ. App. 54 S.W.2d 277, 280, and the many authorities cited therein; quoting from General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bodenheim, Tex. Civ. App. 37 S.W.2d 312, one of the cases cited in the O'Brien Case, "`Having determined appellee was entitled to recover of appellant a specified sum and that appellant was entitled to recover of appellee a different specified sum, the court should have set off the one sum against the other, and, having done so, should have rendered judgment for the balance in favor of the party entitled thereto. As the court did not do that, the judgment is not a final one from which an appeal could be prosecuted,' citing article 2211, R. S. 1925; Walker v. Mears, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 67 S.W. 167; Eastham v. Sallis, 60 Tex. 576; Kinney v. Tel. Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 222 S.W. 227.

" General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bodenheim, 37 S.W.2d 312, seems to be directly in point in support of relator's proposition that the failure to strike a balance between the amount due by relator to respondent Harder and the amount due by respondent Harder to relator rendered the decree interlocutory. The following statement from the opinion reflects the holding in the Bodenheim Case: "May 22, 1926, appellee, G. A. Bodenheim, purchased property (described as a `compressor' and `coil') of the appellant, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, paying a part of the purchase price in cash and agreeing to pay the remainder thereof, to wit, $336, in monthly payments of $14 each.