Opinion
Case No. 00-CV-70202
January 4, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.
This is a Social Security case. Cathy Geml (Geml) appeals from the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) that she was not disabled at the time of her application and was therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits (benefits). Geml applied for benefits, claiming she was disabled since July 23, 1984 due to "fibromyalgia pelvic cripple, back injury, D C, and surgeries." Her insured status expired on December 31, 1989. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ), where Geml was represented by counsel. The ALJ found that at the time her insured status expired, Geml was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because she could perform a limited range of sedentary, unskilled tasks that do not involve prolonged standing, walking, sitting, or lifting and/or carrying more than ten pounds. The Appeals Council found no basis to grant a review of the ALJ's determination.
Geml instituted this action for judicial review of the determination under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, before whom Geml and the Commissioner filed motions for summary judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (MJRR) that the ALJ's decision be upheld. The magistrate judge finds that substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ's findings that Geml retained the residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of unskilled sedentary jobs in the national economy.
II.
Judicial review of a Social Security disability benefits application is limited to determining whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Futernick v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 1973).
III.
Initially, as the magistrate judge noted, the relevant time period for determining Geml's entitlement to benefits was from July 23, 1994 to December 31, 1989, the date her insured status expired.
Geml was twenty-nine years old at the time her insured status expired and thirty-seven years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. She has an high school education with some additional secretarial training. Her past relevant work is that of a receptionist in a dentist office and a manager at a Hallmark store. Geml has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July of 1994 because of back pain which began in 1982, when she was diagnosed with endometriosis. Geml is married and has two children, born in 1984 and 1987. Geml had a laparoscopy in 1985, a D C in January of 1986, and was diagnosed with vaginitis in March of 1986. In 1987 and 1989, Geml had additional laparoscopies and D Cs. During the 1987 procedures, no evidence of endometriosis was found. In 1989, Geml was examined by Dr. Carl Reichert, Jr. for complaints of back pain. Dr. Reichert noted no significant abnormalities. He believed that Geml's complaints were probably muscle related and therefore prescribed back strengthening exercises. He also noted that Geml reported doing frequent aerobic exercises. A September 1989 pap test and pelvic exam were normal.
At the time of the hearing, Geml complained of constant, severe pelvic and back pain, and testified that she is unable to any household chores. She testified she must lay in a recliner often and has made accommodations in order to take care of her personal needs, such as cutting her hair. She also testified, which was confirmed by her husband's testimony, that her husband primarily takes care of their children, although it was not clear in her testimony whether her husband primarily cared for their children during the relevant period of disability.
A vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing. The VE classified Geml's past relevant work as semi-skilled and performed at the light exertional level. The VE was asked a hypothetical question, including Geml's age, education, and work experience, who is limited to sedentary work, lifting no more than 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, with a sit/stand option, and a moderate limitation on stooping and squatting. The VE testified that such a person could perform 4,000 positions in the Detroit metropolitan area, including unskilled positions involving assembly, packaging, sorting and inspecting. The VE also testified that 3500 of the same types of jobs were available if the lifting was limited to only 5 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally. When asked to fully credit Geml's testimony regarding her non-exceptional limitations (severe pain and frequent need to lie down in a recliner), the VE testified that all work would be precluded.
The ALJ determined that although Geml had a history of endometriosis and back pain, she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments to establish disability under the social security act. He also determined that Geml's testimony of severe pain and non-exceptional limitations was not fully credible. He determined that at the time her insured status expired, she had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of unskilled sedentary work with a sit/stand option and was therefore not disabled.
IV.
Geml's overall objection to the MJRR is that the magistrate judge erred in finding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Geml specifically objects to the magistrate judge's finding that although the ALJ's decision incorrectly noted that Geml did not describe needing help taking care of her children, this misstatement did not undermine the ALJ's conclusion, especially when considered in light of the substantial evidence that Geml was not disabled.
The Court agrees with the magistrate judge's analysis. As carefully set forth in the MJRR, the medical evidence regarding Geml's endometriosis and back pain during the relevant time period simply fails to establish that Geml was precluded from working. See MJRR at pp. 5-9.
Geml also objects to the magistrate judge's statement that Geml's report of doing aerobic exercise in 1989 discredits her complaints of chronic debilitation, fatigue, and severe pain. Geml argues that her circumstances are similar to that in Cohen v. Secretary of Health and Hum. Serv., 964 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1992), where the plaintiff suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome. The plaintiff, a professional ballroom dancer, testified that she still continued dancing at a reduced schedule, attended classes, and did homework. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs daily activities did not warrant a finding that she was able to work.
Geml's reliance on Cohen is misplaced. Unlike Geml, who complains of chronic fatigue, the plaintiff in Cohen was actually diagnosed with chronic fatigue syndrome. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that the medical evidence in Cohen supported Cohen's testimony regarding her limitations on her daily activities, which had decreased significantly from before the onset of her condition. Such is not the case here.
Geml also objects to the magistrate judge's finding that the hypothetical posed to the VE accurately portrayed Geml's condition. Geml argues that the hypothetical should have incorporated Geml's complaints of severe pain, fatigue, and need to lay down. The magistrate judge found that because Geml's complaints were not substantially supported, the ALJ properly excluded them from the hypothetical.
Substantial evidence may be produced through reliance on a VE's testimony in response to a hypothetical question, but only if the question accurately portrays the claimant's physical and mental impairments. Varley v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). There is no requirement that the ALJ include a claimant's unsubstantiated claims in the hypothetical. Id. Moreover, subjective allegations alone are insufficient to support a claim of benefits. Sizemore v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir. 1988).
As noted above, the magistrate judge reviewed the medical evidence in detail and determined that Geml's complaints of severe pain, fatigue, and need to lie down were not supported by medical evidence. As such, the ALJ was not required to incorporate these limitations in the hypothetical. The hypothetical considered Geml's age, education, work experience and incorporated limitations on standing, sitting and lifting.
Moreover, the ALJ did include Geml's complaints in a hypothetical, to which the VE responded that if Geml's testimony was fully credited, all work was precluded. The ALJ did not rely on this hypothetical, however, because it was not supported by the medical evidence. Overall, the magistrate judge was correct in finding that the hypothetical relied upon by the ALJ accurately portrayed Geml's condition at the time. Thus, this objection fails.
V.
For the above reasons, the findings and conclusions of the MJRR are adopted as the findings and conclusions of the Court, as supplemented above. Accordingly, Geml's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.