Opinion
C. A. PM-2022-06748
01-05-2024
JOYLINN GELPI v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
For Plaintiff: Stefanie A. Murphy, Esq. For Defendant: Judy Davis, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Stefanie A. Murphy, Esq.
For Defendant: Judy Davis, Esq.
DECISION
MONTALBANO, J.
Before this Court is the second amended application for postconviction relief filed by Joylinn Gelpi (Petitioner). See Amended Application for Post Conviction Relief, Nov. 24, 2023. (Second Am. Appl.). Petitioner contends that her conviction and sentence should be vacated on the basis that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Am. Appl. for Post-Conviction Relief (Pet'r's Mem.) at 2. Petitioner further contends that she entered a plea that was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 4. Finally, Petitioner argues there exists evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacating her plea in the interest of justice. See Second Am. Appl. ¶ 3. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 10-9.1-1 and 10-9.1-2.
I
Facts and Travel
On December 13, 2017, a Providence County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, charging her with Count 1: First-Degree Sexual Assault; Count 2: Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Sexual Assault; Count 3: Kidnapping; Count 4: Conspiracy to Commit Kidnapping; Count 5: Felony Assault; Count 6: Felony Assault; Count 7: Felony Assault; Count 8: Felony Assault; Count 9: Felony Assault; Count 10: Felony Assault; Count 11: Felony Assault; Count 12: Felony Assault; Count 13: Simple Assault; Count 14: Simple Assault; Count 15: Felony Assault; Count 16: Failure to Report Known or Suspected Abuse; Count 17: Failure to Report Known or Suspected Abuse; Count 18: Felony Assault; Count 19: Simple Assault. (Grand Jury Indictment, Dec. 13, 2017.)
On April 16, 2019, Petitioner appeared before this Court for a scheduled disposition hearing. (Plea Hr'g Tr. at 1:5, Apr. 16, 2019.) Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the assault with the intent to commit first-degree sexual assault charge (Count 1 amended), the conspiracy to commit first-degree sexual assault charge (Count 2), the conspiracy to commit kidnapping charge (Count 4), felony assault (Counts 5, 6, 7, 8), and the failure to report known or suspected abuse (Counts 16, 17). In exchange for Ms. Gelpi's nolo contendere plea to Counts 1 amended, 2, 4, 5-8, 16, and 17, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts against Petitioner, being Counts 3, 9-15, 18, and 19. (Plea Form, Apr. 16, 2019; see also RCP 48(a) Dismissal.) Petitioner was sentenced to twenty years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) on Count 1 amended, ten years to serve on Count 2, running consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 1 amended. See Plea Form, Apr. 16, 2019. Additionally, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years to serve, suspended with probation, on Count 4, consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 2, five years to serve, suspended with probation, on Counts 5-8, 16, and 17, all running concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 1 amended. Id. Time to serve was retroactive to November 17, 2017. Id.
Count 1 was originally filed as First-Degree Sexual Assault. See Grand Jury Indictment, Dec. 13, 2017.
On November 28, 2022, Petitioner filed her initial petition for postconviction relief. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a letter on December 5, 2022 and another application on December 21, 2022. Those pro se applications included motions to assign, appoint counsel, proceed in forma pauperis, motions for transcripts, and writs for habeas corpus. Attorney Stefanie A. Murphy was appointed by the Court to represent Petitioner on January 26, 2023. On August 24, 2023, Petitioner filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of her Amended Application for Postconviction Relief. See Pet'r's Mem. Finally, Petitioner's applications were amended by an Amended Application filed on November 24, 2023. See Second Am. Appl. The second amended application was the subject of an evidentiary hearing before this Court on December 12, 2023.
II
Standard of Review
Postconviction relief is a statutory remedy for:
"[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime, a violation of law, or a violation of probationary or deferred sentence status and who claims: (1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; . . . (4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. . . ." Section 10-9.1-1(a). See D'Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270, 1275 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637, 641 (R.I. 2002)).
In pursuing such claims, a petitioner bears the burden of proving-by a preponderance of the evidence-that she is entitled to postconviction relief. Hazard v. State, 64 A.3d 749, 756 (R.I. 2013); Burke v. State, 925 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I. 2007) (citing Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I. 2007)). The proceedings for such relief are "civil in nature." Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1988) (citing State v. Tassone, 417 A.2d 323, 326 n.2 (R.I. 1980)). In accordance with the statute, the "court shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented." Section 10-9.1-7.
When there has been a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea, postconviction inquiry focuses on the nature of counsel's advice regarding the plea and the voluntariness of the plea. State v. Dufresne, 436 A.2d 720, 722 (R.I. 1981). Furthermore, "[a] defendant who pleads guilty [or nolo contendere] on the advice of counsel must demonstrate at his postconviction hearing that that advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 723 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). In Dufresne, counsel advised the defendant to plead guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree murder after incriminating statements had been admitted against him, which our Supreme Court concluded was "within the range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys." Id. at 724.
"In applications for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence, we use the same standard of review as in a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence." D'Alessio, 101 A.3d at 1275. This standard involves two parts, and to satisfy the threshold prong, the evidence must be:
"(1) newly discovered and not available at the time of trial; (2) it must not have been discoverable by due diligence; (3) it must be material, not simply cumulative or impeaching; and (4) it must be of the type that would likely change the verdict at trial. . . . If the evidence meets the four-part threshold prong, it then must meet the second prong, which is an assessment of whether it is credible enough to warrant relief." Id. at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[M]aterial evidence is that which creates a 'reasonable probability of a different result.'" Id. at 1276 (quoting Bleau, 808 A.2d at 643).
III
Analysis
Petitioner argues her plea should be vacated on constitutional grounds alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel from Attorney Melissa Larsen (Attorney Larsen). Petitioner further contends that she entered a plea that was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, in violation of Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Finally, Petitioner alleges that there exists evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vacating her plea in the interests of justice.
At the December 12, 2023 evidentiary hearing on the second amended application, Petitioner, through counsel, withdrew the claim regarding the existence of evidence of material facts not previously presented or heard that requires vacating the plea in the interests of justice.
A
Compliance with Rule 11
Rule 11 states, in pertinent part:
"A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. . . ." Super. R. Crim. P. 11
Waivers of constitutional rights must consider the totality of the circumstances and the waivers must be "voluntary and knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Johnson v. Mullen, 120 R.I. 701, 706, 390 A.2d 909, 912 (1978) (internal quotation omitted). "At the conclusion of a plea hearing, the trial justice should be able to say with assurance that the accused is fully aware of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Camacho v. State, 58 A.3d 182, 186 (R.I. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). That objective can be obtained by: "(1) an explanation of the essential elements by the judge at the guilty plea hearing; (2) a representation that counsel had explained to the defendant the elements he admits by his plea; (3) defendant's statements admitting to facts constituting the unexplained element or stipulations to such facts." Id. at 186 (internal quotation omitted). In the final analysis, "[t]he applicant bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [he or she] did not intelligently and understandingly waive [his or her] rights." Id. at 186-87 (internal quotation omitted).
In the present case, Petitioner alleges her plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily because (1) her attorney, Ms. Larsen, did not explain to her that she would not be automatically eligible for good time credits in prison due to the nature of her charges; (2) Ms. Larsen failed to request and use Petitioner's medical or psychological records for a more favorable judgment with the Court; and (3) Ms. Larsen failed to ensure that Petitioner understood the consequences of her plea. Pet'r's Mem. at 5.
Viewing the entire record of the plea colloquy, this Court hereby determines that Petitioner's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. At the outset of the plea, this Justice inquired about Petitioner's education, her ability to understand the English language, whether she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and whether Petitioner was suffering from any mental disability that would affect her ability to understand what was happening at the plea hearing. See Plea Hr'g Tr. at 3:7-18, Apr. 16, 2019. The following exchange took place between the Court and Petitioner:
"THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
"THE DEFENDANT: Up to 12th grade and dropped out.
"THE COURT: Do you have any problems reading, writing, or understanding the English language?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Are you currently under the influence of any alcohol or drug?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Do you suffer from any mental disability that would affect your ability to understand what's going on in this courtroom today?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
"THE COURT: You're represented by Miss Larsen in this matter. Are you satisfied with the work of your attorney in this case?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Showing you now a form entitled 'Request to Enter Plea of Nolo Contendere or Guilty,' have you read this form, Miss Gelpi? (Indicates)
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Has your attorney explained to you the contents of this form?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor." Id. at 3:7-4:4.
Petitioner's first argument is unconvincing as Attorney Larsen testified at the postconviction-relief hearing that Count 1 was amended at her request "specifically due to Ms. Gelpi's concerns about good time, so she had concerns about good time so we were trying to fashion a plea in the way that would enable her to get good time." Postconviction-Relief Hr'g Tr. at 30:10-13, Dec. 12, 2023 (Relief Hr'g Tr.). Attorney Larsen explained her efforts to communicate the possibility of good time credits to Petitioner in more detail. Specifically, she testified:
"And with respect to that, I had reached out to Kathy Kelly, who was, at that time, ACI legal counsel. I spoke to her on November 20th, 2018, and then I went to visit Ms. Gelpi at the ACI on November 12th, 2018 [sic] to relay what I had learned. I also wrote letters regarding good time on November 26th, 2018, and I had mentioned it in another letter on January 6th, 2019. So, in total, I had written Ms. Gelpi 22 letters." Id. at 30:13-20.
This Court finds that Attorney Larsen discussed the possibility of good time credits with Petitioner and made a good faith inquiry to the ACI about good time credits. Moreover, the manner in which the Department of Corrections (DOC) or the ACI determine eligibility for good time credits does "not implicate the court's determination of the voluntariness of a plea." Cote v. State, 994 A.2d 59, 63 (R.I. 2010); but see Morey v. Wall, 849 A.2d 621 (R.I. 2004) (application for postconviction relief as to how computation of good-time credits is determined by DOC was appropriate).
Petitioner's argument that Attorney Larsen failed to use her medical and mental health records for a more favorable judgment with the Court is without merit. Attorney Larsen testified that she was aware that Petitioner had mental health issues and that she obtained medical releases from Petitioner for her medical records. Relief Hr'g Tr. at 28:6-8. Attorney Larsen further testified that it was Petitioner and her father's request to use the medical records for the purposes of mitigation with the prosecutor. Id. at 28:21-22. Finally, Attorney Larsen testified that she used Petitioner's medical records as a tool in negotiating for sentencing purposes. Id. at 29:8-11. Petitioner knew before the plea hearing that she had a mental impairment, yet still affirmed at the plea hearing that she did not have a mental disability that would have affected her understanding that day. Plea Hr'g Tr. at 3:15-18, Apr. 16, 2019. At the postconviction-relief hearing, Petitioner testified about when she became aware that she had a mental impairment:
"Q: Now, you talked about not knowing about your mental health condition, right?
"A: Because I was just recently diagnosed in 2017 - rediagnosed. I was diagnosed when I was a little, little girl with child mental retardation. I was just rediagnosed as an adult.
"Q: Well, you talked about, you just got the records from The Providence Center. You went to The Providence Center before you were incarcerated, right?
"A: Correct.
"Q: So you knew you were going to The Providence Center, right?
"A: Correct.
"Q: And you were in treatment, presumably talking to the doctors, right?
"A: Yes.
"Q: So you're saying today that they never told you what your diagnosis was?
"A: I never got - I never had my paperwork in front of me. It was always at home. I didn't keep my paperwork with me." Relief Hr'g Tr. at 22:12-23:7.
Petitioner's testimony on this point is simply not credible. She was aware of a lifetime of mental health treatment and still affirmed that she did not have a mental disability that affected her ability to understand what was happening at the plea hearing. The Court finds Attorney Larsen's testimony credible in that she obtained Petitioner's medical records and used such information during negotiations with the prosecutor and the Court. Those negotiations ultimately led to the plea to the amended Count 1 and a sentence including time to serve that was significantly lower than the life in prison sentence she was facing absent the amendment. In addition, as Attorney Larsen explained to Petitioner prior to the plea, after consulting with legal counsel to the DOC, amending Count 1 to a charge of intent to commit First Degree Sexual Assault left her eligible to receive good time credits.
Finally, Petitioner argues that Attorney Larsen failed to ensure she understood the consequences of her plea, but the evidence in the record does not support that allegation. Petitioner acknowledged at the plea hearing that she was satisfied with Attorney Larsen's representation and that Ms. Larsen explained the contents of the plea form to her. Plea Hr'g Tr. at 3:20-4:4, Apr. 16, 2019. This Justice also explained what a nolo contendere plea is, and Petitioner acknowledged that she understood. Id. at 4:13-19. Furthermore, Attorney Larsen testified about her process in reviewing the plea and plea form with Petitioner:
"Q: Do you have a recollection of reviewing the plea form with your client?
"A: I do, yes. I see her initials on the plea form, and this is my handwriting on the plea form.
"Q: Why would her initials be on the plea form?
"A: It's my practice, as well as, I believe, all attorneys who practice in Superior Court, to have the defendant initial numbers one through nine on the plea form to indicate that they've reviewed those rights.
"Q: And would you have read those to her or would you have her read them to herself, how do you do that?
"A: I would have provided her with a copy of the plea form and read them to her. I believe, in this case, I presented her with a copy of the plea form prior to the plea so she could review it, and I also did review it with her, yes.
"Q: And did she express to you at any point that she didn't understand what was contained in that form?
"A: Not that I recall, no." Relief Hr'g Tr. at 32:2-20.
Moreover, Ms. Larsen testified that she explained the maximum penalties for each offense to Petitioner and provided her with copies of the relevant statutes. Id. at 33:8-14. The Court finds Petitioner understood the consequences of her plea.
In the final analysis of the plea colloquy, Petitioner acknowledged that she understood she was giving up certain constitutional rights with her plea of nolo contendere. Plea Hr'g Tr. at 6:8-7:12, Apr. 16, 2019. The Court asked Petitioner if she agreed with the facts she was pleading to as read by the prosecutor and she agreed the facts as read were true, and Petitioner agreed that the State could prove the facts as read beyond a reasonable doubt if the case went to trial. Id. at 9:23-10:9. Ultimately, this Court found that Petitioner made a plea that was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 12:6-9.
Petitioner acknowledged that Attorney Larsen explained the contents of the plea form with her. Id. at 4:2-4. Moreover, Petitioner admitted to the facts underlying the charged offenses and the corresponding elements of those offenses. Id. at 10:2-9; see Camacho, 58 A.3d at 186. Petitioner was also informed of her constitutional rights that she was giving up by entering her plea. Plea Hr'g Tr. at 6:8-7:12, Apr. 16, 2019; see Desamours v. State, 210 A.3d 1177, 1183 (R.I. 2019) (no Rule 11 violation for "bare-boned" plea colloquy where Superior Court justice advised applicant of rights he was waiving by entering plea and applicant confirmed his relinquishment of those rights). This Court is satisfied that Petitioner's plea was a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea, and that the requirements of Rule 11 and the Fourteenth Amendment were complied with in this case.
B
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
When evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, Rhode Island Courts have adopted the two-pronged standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Perkins v. State, 78 A.3d 764, 767 (R.I. 2013); see Guerrero v. State, 47 A.3d 289, 300 (R.I. 2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668). "Applicants are required to demonstrate that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . and (2) that such deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant's right to a fair trial." Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277, 1284-85 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If an applicant for postconviction relief does not make both showings, "'it cannot be said that the conviction or . . . sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.'" Simpson v. State, 769 A.2d 1257, 1266 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Our Supreme Court has stated when ruling on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, courts should consider counsel's performance in its entirety. Hazard, 64 A.3d at 756. Thus, "the benchmark issue is whether 'counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.'" Bustamante v. Wall, 866 A.2d 516, 522 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Toole v. State, 748 A.2d 806, 809 (R.I. 2000)).
1
First Prong
The first prong of the Strickland analysis requires the applicant to "demonstrate that 'counsel's performance was deficient, to the point that the errors were so serious that trial counsel did not function at the level guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'" Guerrero, 47 A.3d at 300 (quoting Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 2001)). To do so, Petitioner must show that "counsel's advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 610 (R.I. 2011) (internal quotation omitted). Our Supreme Court "requires that scrutiny of counsel's performance be highly deferential, and 'every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" Tassone, 42 A.3d at 1285 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603, 606 (R.I. 2011)).
Counsel's performance, therefore, "must be assessed in view of the totality of the circumstances and in light of 'a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Hazard v. State, 968 A.2d 886, 892 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Heath v. Vose, 747 A.2d 475, 478 (R.I. 2000)). With regard to the first prong, this Court must consider whether Ms. Larsen's advice to Petitioner regarding a potential plea to the bevy of charges was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Neufville, 13 A.3d at 610. The Court's scrutiny of Ms. Larsen's performance must be highly deferential, and it must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstruct the circumstances of Ms. Larsen's challenged conduct, and evaluate same from her perspective at the time. See Lynch, 13 A.3d at 606.
Petitioner argues that her counsel's performance was deficient because (1) Ms. Larsen's failure to advise Petitioner of the consequences of her plea to her eligibility for good time credits in prison fell below the conduct expected of the reasonable professional judgment of an attorney; (2) Petitioner pled nolo contendere because counsel failed to secure Petitioner's medical or psychological records for the Court, and she lost her ability to receive a more favorable judgment from a jury of her peers at trial; and (3) Ms. Larsen failed to adequately advise Petitioner of the consequences of her plea. Pet'r's Mem. at 5; see Second Am. Appl. ¶ 5. As a result of the aforementioned alleged inadequacies of Ms. Larsen, Petitioner avers that she was prejudiced through the acceptance of a plea deal rather than being able to proceed to trial, where the outcome of the case could have been different. Pet'r's Mem. at 7.
Petitioner testified at the postconviction-relief hearing that she was not advised about good time credit by Attorney Larsen prior to her plea and that she thought she would automatically be receiving good time credit. Relief Hr'g Tr. at 10:4-16. Attorney Larsen testified that she has been an attorney for twenty-five years, served as an assistant attorney general for seven years, handled hundreds of capital cases, and conducted twenty jury trials. Id. at 26:3-27:21. As detailed supra, Attorney Larsen crafted plea deal negotiations around Petitioner's concerns about receiving good time credits. Id. at 30:10-13. Additionally, Ms. Larsen reached out to then general counsel of the ACI inquiring about good time credits, while also sending Petitioner numerous letters discussing good time. Id. at 30:13-20. Attorney Larsen also testified she met with Petitioner to discuss the case and to provide copies of discovery five or six times at the ACI and four more times in the cell block at Superior Court. Id. at 31:7-12. The Court finds Ms. Larsen's conduct in advising Petitioner about good time credits reasonable and Petitioner's testimony that she was not advised prior to her plea that good time credits would not be automatic due to the nature of her charges not credible.
Petitioner further argues that Attorney Larsen was deficient in that she failed to use her medical records to obtain a better judgment from the Court. Petitioner testified that Attorney Larsen "wouldn't go through my medical records" and that she had a mental condition Attorney Larsen did not care about. Id. at 5:14-18. As detailed supra, Attorney Larsen used Petitioner's medical records and mental health history during negotiations to obtain an amended assault with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault count and to obtain a better deal for Petitioner. Id. at 29:8-11, 30:8-10. Attorney Larsen even reduced her advice to writing in some twenty-two letters, "so Ms. Gelpi could refer back if she did have problems with her recollection." Id. at 30:20-24. The Court finds Ms. Larsen's conduct in utilizing Petitioner's medical records reasonable, especially considering Ms. Larsen safeguarded the records and specifically testified that she did not share the actual records with the Attorney General's Department. Id. at 29:3-7. Moreover, Petitioner was facing a maximum sentence of life in prison and ultimately received a sentence of thirty (30) years to serve.
Finally, Petitioner argues that Attorney Larsen was deficient in failing to advise Petitioner of the consequences of her plea. Petitioner testified at the postconviction-relief hearing that she "can't recall" if Attorney Larsen went over the plea form with her prior to her plea. Id. at 7:12-14. Petitioner further testified that she did not understand what was happening the day of the plea because she did not "understand what nolo contendere means." Id. at 9:20-24. However, this Justice explained to Petitioner at her plea hearing that "a plea of nolo is, for all purposes, the same as a guilty plea in Rhode Island and that by entering a nolo plea that you're admitting sufficient facts to substantiate the charges and amended charges which have been brought against you[.]" Plea Hr'g Tr. at 4:13-17, Apr. 16, 2019.
Moreover, Attorney Larsen testified at the postconviction hearing that she met with Petitioner at least nine times about her case, that Petitioner did not have difficulty understanding what was going on with her case, and that Petitioner was adamant as to which particular acts she would and would not plead to. Relief Hr'g Tr. at 31:9-11, 31:15-17, 33:22-24. If Petitioner was "adamant about what she would accept a plea to and what she wouldn't," it follows that Petitioner was aware that certain plea agreements had consequences other plea agreements did not. Id. at 34:17-18. Importantly, Ms. Larsen discussed the ramifications of going to trial with Petitioner, including the maximum penalties for each of the offenses, and that she could be sentenced to serve consecutive time on each of the counts she was facing. Id. at 33:1-12. In the final analysis, Ms. Larsen testified that while she was prepared to go to trial, there was a lot of back and forth on the plea deal over the course of two years, and Petitioner agreed with the ultimate plea. See id. at 35:15-36:7. Attorney Larsen was diligently preparing for trial, but ultimately Petitioner chose to plead. Petitioner's decision to plead was informed by Ms. Larsen's considered advice and experience, enabling her to weigh the potential consequences of going to trial as opposed to accepting a plea.
In "look[ing] at the entire performance of counsel," the Court is satisfied that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel. Tassone, 42 A.3d at 1286 (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted). The Court cannot conclude that Attorney Larsen's performance "was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 945 (R.I. 2010). This Court is satisfied that Attorney Larsen's performance prior to a potential trial, during plea negotiations, and her representation during the hearing certainly fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance to which Petitioner was entitled. Accordingly, Petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.
2
Second Prong
Because of Petitioner's failure to prove that Attorney Larsen's representation was constitutionally deficient, the Court need not-and will not-address the second prong of the Strickland standard. Page, 995 A.2d at 945 (declining to consider the second Strickland prong when "counsel's performance was reasonable and, as such, did not run afoul of even the first prong . . . under the Strickland test"). Nevertheless, this Court notes that Petitioner was in no way prejudiced by Attorney Larsen's representation of her. It is clear to this Court that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and a just result was produced. Bustamante, 866 A.2d at 522.
IV
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not satisfied her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that postconviction relief is warranted. Furthermore, this Court is satisfied that defense counsel provided competent and professional services in defense of the charges against Petitioner. Accordingly, the Second Amended Application for Post Conviction Relief is denied and dismissed.
Counsel shall submit an appropriate order for entry.