Geller v. Geller

3 Citing cases

  1. Stubbs v. Facey

    159 A.D.3d 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)

    The plaintiff appeals.Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly directed the plaintiff to maintain a life insurance policy naming the parties' child as beneficiary and the defendant as trustee of the insurance policy funds (see Geller v. Geller, 69 A.D.3d 563, 564, 892 N.Y.S.2d 196 ; Peri v. Peri, 2 A.D.3d 425, 767 N.Y.S.2d 846 ).Further, in valuing and equitably distributing the defendant's enhanced earning capacity from his medical license, which was earned during the marriage, the Supreme Court properly took into consideration the marital portion of the defendant's student loan debt in determining his enhanced earning capacity (cf. Heydt–Benjamin v. Heydt–Benjamin, 127 A.D.3d 814, 815, 6 N.Y.S.3d 582 ).

  2. Chaudry v. Chaudry

    95 A.D.3d 1058 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 36 times

    Under the circumstances of this case, including the present and future earning capacity of the parties, the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the plaintiff, and the marital standard of living, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in its determination of the amount and duration of maintenance ( see Monroe v. Monroe, 71 A.D.3d 647, 895 N.Y.S.2d 827;Geller v. Geller, 69 A.D.3d 563, 892 N.Y.S.2d 196;Litvak v. Litvak, 63 A.D.3d 691, 880 N.Y.S.2d 690;Appel v. Appel, 54 A.D.3d 786, 864 N.Y.S.2d 92;Wortman v. Wortman, 11 A.D.3d 604, 783 N.Y.S.2d 631). However, the maintenance awarded should be taxable to the plaintiff and deductible by the defendant ( see Markopoulos v. Markopoulos, 274 A.D.2d 457, 459, 710 N.Y.S.2d 636).

  3. Hendry v. Pierik

    78 A.D.3d 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 5 times

    ncourages economic independence, the present and future earning capacity of the parties, the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, the duration of the marriage, whether the amount and duration of the award is appropriate in light of the preseparation standard of living, the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse, the income and property of the parties, the distribution of the marital property, and the health of the parties" ( Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691, 692; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 51-52). Under the circumstances of this case, including the parties' ages, respective earning potentials, predivorce standard of living, relative incomes and available assets, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding nondurational maintenance to the defendant in the sum of $2,150 per month until the later of either the plaintiff reaching the age of 62 or permanently retiring ( see Geller v Geller, 69 AD3d 563, 564; Wasserman v Wasserman, 66 AD3d 880, 883; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d at 692; Borra v Borra, 218 AD2d 780). However, we agree with the plaintiff that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in making the defendant's awards of maintenance and child support retroactive to the date of the commencement of the action.