Opinion
NO. 02-17-00308-CV
04-19-2018
STEPHEN EMERY GEIS APPELLANT v. LYNN GEIS APPELLEE
FROM THE 360TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 360-598080-16 MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Appellant Stephen Emery Geis seeks the dismissal of his agreed divorce decree and the entire case based on an alleged reconciliation of the parties and an alleged agreement to dismiss that Appellee Lynn Geis denies and that no evidence in the record supports. We affirm.
In 2016, Lynn filed a petition seeking a divorce from Stephen. On April 26, 2017, the parties reached a mediated settlement agreement. Both parties approved the final decree of divorce as to form and substance, and the trial court signed the decree on June 9, 2017. On July 6, 2017, Stephen filed a pro se motion for new trial asserting only that the trial court should grant the motion "for good cause." The motion was overruled by operation of law, and he timely filed this appeal.
In his sole issue, Stephen questions, "If the parties to divorce action reconcile their marriage and the parties agree to move for dismissal of the divorce pending in the Court of Appeals[,] . . . can they obtain a dismissal?" Stephen prays "that upon adequate confirmation of reconciliation from . . . Lynn . . . , this Court instruct the Honorable District Court to set aside its Decree and dismiss the action."
The record before us contains no evidence of reconciliation. Additionally, in her brief, Lynn contends that "[t]he parties have not remarried or reconciled" in any way, and she "denies that the parties have or will reconcile." We therefore decline to instruct the trial court to set aside the decree and dismiss the case. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(2) (providing that we may set aside a judgment and remand the case to the trial court to render judgment in accordance with an agreement). Similarly, because there is no evidence of reconciliation or an agreement to dismiss the case, we decline to reach the merits of Appellant's hypothetical issue because our holding would then be advisory. See Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000) ("[C]ourts have no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions."); accord Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102, 102 S. Ct. 867, 869 (1982) ("We do not sit to decide hypothetical issues or to give advisory opinions.").
We overrule Appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Mark T. Pittman
MARK T. PITTMAN
JUSTICE PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; MEIER and PITTMAN, JJ. DELIVERED: April 19, 2018