Our standard of review is governed by Section 288.210, which states in pertinent part: "The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court shall be confined to questions of law." See also Burns v. Labor Industrial Relations Commission, 845 S.W.2d 553, 554-555 (Mo.banc 1993);Geiler v. Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, 924 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Mo.App.E.D. 1996). Thus, the decision of the Commission in unemployment compensation cases will be disturbed on appeal only where it is unsupported by competent substantial evidence or unauthorized by law. Division of Employment Security v. Gardner-Denver Machinery, Inc., 941 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo.App.W.D. 1997).
Still, "[t]he Commission may not arbitrarily ignore relevant evidence not shown to be disbelieved or noncredible." Geiler v. Mo. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n , 924 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). We may set the decision aside on specified grounds including "[t]hat there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award."
That exhibit is a written statement by Ms. Phillips that states, in pertinent part, "I seen [sic] the moneybasket . . . fly across the room." Employer argues the Commission's failure to cite and consider this testimony was erroneous under Geiler v. Missouri Labor Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 924 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Mo.App. E.D. 1996), because the Commission did not explicitly state it was disbelieved or found to be non-credible. This argument ignores the inherent discrepancy between this written statement by Ms. Phillips and her oral testimony at the hearing.
That exhibit is a written statement by Ms. Phillips that states, in pertinent part, "I seen [sic] the moneybasket . . . fly across the room." Employer argues the Commission's failure to cite and consider this testimony was erroneous under Geiler v. MissouriLabor Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 924 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996), because the Commission did not explicitly state it was disbelieved or found to be non-credible. This argument ignores the inherent discrepancy between this written statement by Ms. Phillips and her oral testimony at the hearing.
As noted above, the "Commission determines the weight and credibility of the evidence, and, when that evidence conflicts, the Commission's determination of the facts is conclusive." Geiler v. Mo. Labor and Industrial Relations Comm'n, 924 S.W.2d 606, 608-609 (Mo.App.E.D. 1996). However, the Commission may not "disregard or ignore undisputed testimony of a witness not shown to have been impeached or disbelieved by the agency."
We will not second guess that determination. Geiler v. Missouri Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 924 S.W.2d 606, 608-09 (Mo.App. 1996); G.C. Serv. Ltd. Partnership v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 913 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Mo.App. 1996). In its Report and Order, effective June 6, 1995, the PSC clearly chose to accept Dr. Solt's testimony, as it had the right to do. It thus authorized MGE to allocate Account 191 TC Factor 2 costs to both sales and transportation customers.
Indeed, it is obvious that the Referee (and Commission) believed much of Claimant's evidence regarding the DFA job, as the Referee (and Commission) found Claimant was hired by DFA at an annual salary of $19,760, the amount testified to by Claimant and confirmed by Exhibit 1. Furthermore, the Referee (and Commission) found Claimant was to be reviewed for a possible wage increase of $5,000 annually after three months at DFA, a finding consistent with Claimant's testimony and Exhibit 1. In Geiler v. Missouri Labor and Industrial RelationsCommission, 924 S.W.2d 606, 609[9] (Mo.App.E.D. 1996), the Eastern District of this Court held Commission may not arbitrarily ignore relevant evidence not shown to be disbelieved or noncredible. However, because of our disposition of this appeal (set forth infra), we need not decide whether Commission could properly ignore Claimant's evidence about commencing work at DFA when the record is bare of any suggestion that Commission disbelieved such evidence.
In the instant case, Claimant maintains her evidence established a causal connection between her job at Hudson and the anxiety and depression from which she was suffering when she failed to return to work on July 16, 1996. Specifically, Claimant argues that Kallenbach's note to whom it may concern dated September 10, 1996, and Kallenbach's letter to Avery dated June 14, 1996, established causation. Claimant hypothesizes that inasmuch as the Tribunal's findings of fact and conclusions of law do not mention Kallenbach's September 10, 1996, note, the Tribunal (and therefore Commission) failed to consider it. Citing Geiler v. Missouri Labor andIndustrial Relations Commission, 924 S.W.2d 606, 609[9] (Mo.App. E.D. 1996), Claimant insists that Commission may not arbitrarily ignore relevant evidence not shown to be disbelieved or non-credible. Hudson has filed no brief in response to Claimant's brief; however, Division has filed a brief urging affirmance of Commission's decision. Division asserts Claimant failed to satisfy her burden of proving her "illness" was causally connected to her work or Hudson.