Opinion
No. 04-16-00437-CV
05-10-2017
Michael E. GEIGER, Appellant v. Paul A. HAMPEL, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2013CI13615
Honorable Renée Yanta, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice AFFIRMED
In six issues, Michael E. Geiger challenges a final summary judgment order disposing of his claims against Paul A. Hampel. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 16, 2013, Geiger, an inmate, filed suit against Hampel, a lawyer. According to the allegations in the suit, Geiger sought to retain Hampel to represent him in a parole proceeding. Geiger characterized his claims as claims for invasion of privacy and injunctive relief and sought actual and punitive damages. Geiger also complained of violations of federal criminal laws.
Hampel was not served with the suit until August 1, 2014, almost a year after it was filed. Hampel filed his first pleading in the case, a summary judgment motion, on October 31, 2014. Geiger filed an objection and response to the summary judgment motion on January 13, 2015.
On May 11, 2015, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Hampel. The trial court then set Geiger's remaining claims for a jury trial on May 26, 2015. However, the trial was stayed when Geiger filed an appeal challenging the partial summary judgment order. This court ultimately dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Geiger v. Hampel, No. 04-15-00329-CV, 2015 WL 4638070, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 15, 2015, no pet.) (dismissing appeal because no final judgment existed and no authority permitted an interlocutory appeal).
On April 13, 2016, Hampel filed another motion for summary judgment, raising both traditional and no-evidence grounds.
On May 23, 2016, the trial court held a hearing in the case. Geiger appeared at this hearing by telephone. During the hearing, the trial court set a June 3, 2016 deadline for Geiger to file a summary judgment response or any other motions for the court's consideration. The trial court informed Geiger it would consider the motions by submission; however, it also informed Geiger that if any claims remained after ruling on the motions, the matter would be set on the trial docket.
On June 1, 2016, Geiger filed documents titled, "Motion for Order of Default Judgment," "Motion of Special Damages and Discriminatory Violation of Due Process," and "Motion for Order Summary Judgment."
On June 14, 2016, the trial court signed an order granting Hampel's motion for no evidence and traditional summary judgment and denying Geiger's recently-filed motions. Geiger appealed.
NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In his first issue, Geiger argues that Hampel's no-evidence summary judgment motion failed to "prove or satisfy actual no evidence as alleged in the [] petition and exhibits." Geiger's briefing on this issue is confusing, but the crux of his argument seems to be that the trial court erred in granting no-evidence summary judgment because Hampel failed to satisfy the requirements for a no-evidence summary judgment.
Rule 166a(i) governs no-evidence summary judgment motions. It provides that after an adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence on one or more essential elements of a claim on which the adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). When a party moves for no-evidence summary judgment, the respondent has the burden to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged element of its cause of action. See id. "The court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact." Id.
Hampel's no-evidence summary judgment motion challenged specific elements of Geiger's claims. Specifically, Hampel argued (1) no evidence existed to support Geiger's invasion of privacy claim because there was no evidence that Hampel intentionally intruded on Geiger's solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns; (2) no evidence existed to support Geiger's request for mental anguish damages because there was no evidence that Geiger suffered compensable mental anguish; (3) no evidence existed to support Geiger's request for punitive damages because there was no evidence to support a finding of fraud, malice, or gross negligence; and (4) no evidence existed to support Geiger's request for injunctive relief because there was no evidence of a wrongful act that gave rise to imminent and irreparable harm for which there was no remedy at law. Geiger presented no evidence in response to Hampel's no-evidence motion. On this record, the trial court was required to grant Hampel's no-evidence summary judgment motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The trial court did not err in granting Hampel's no-evidence summary judgment motion. We overrule Geiger's first issue.
Hampel's motion also sought summary judgment on traditional grounds, arguing (1) Geiger was not entitled to injunctive relief because he had no valid cause of action, and (2) the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine whether Hampel violated federal criminal laws.
DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS
In his second issue, Geiger argues the trial court's failure to render a default judgment against Hampel deprived Geiger of his rights to due process and access to the courts.
"The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require adequate briefing." ERI Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010); In re Estate of Valdez, 406 S.W.3d 228, 235 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). In particular, Rule 38.1(i) requires that an appellant's brief contain clear and concise arguments with "appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant who fails to satisfy these requirements waives the issue on appeal. Valdez, 406 S.W.3d at 235.
Here, Geiger cites several cases to support the arguments made in this section of his brief, but the cases are inapplicable. None of the cases address the issue presented, which is whether Geiger's rights to due process and access to the courts were violated when the trial court did not render a default judgment against Hampel. Therefore, Geiger's second issue is waived due to inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
LACK OF TRIAL NOTICE
In his third issue, Geiger argues the trial court erred by not providing him notice of the trial setting.
In a civil case, before reversing a judgment because of an error of law, an appellate court must find that the error amounted to such a denial of the appellant's rights as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment, or that the error probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting his case on appeal. G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011). The rule applies to all errors. Id. The appellant has the burden to establish harm on appeal. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 667 (Tex. 2009).
Even if we were to assume that Geiger was not provided notice of the trial setting, we could not reverse the judgment because Geiger was not harmed by the lack of notice. The May 26, 2015 trial was stayed when Geiger appealed the granting of the partial summary judgment. Furthermore, Geiger's suit never went to trial; it was disposed of by summary judgment. Therefore, any lack of notice of the trial setting was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a) (providing that a judgment cannot be reversed on appeal unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented proper presentation of the case on appeal). We overrule Geiger's third issue.
RULINGS ON MOTIONS
In his fourth issue, Geiger argues the trial court erred by only considering and ruling on Hampel's motions while refusing to consider and rule on Geiger's motions. Notwithstanding Geiger's argument, the record shows the trial court did in fact rule on many of Geiger's motions.
The only potentially pertinent authorities Geiger cites in this section of his brief stand for the proposition that when a trial court fails to rule on a motion after a reasonable time, a party may seek a writ of mandamus from the trial court to compel the trial court to act. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (refusing to grant mandamus relief when record failed to show that the relator had asked the trial court to rule on his motion and that the trial court had refused to rule); Chiles v. Schuble, 788 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting mandamus relief to require the trial court to hold a hearing on the relator's motion). Because this is not a mandamus proceeding, Geiger's authorities are inapplicable here. Therefore, Geiger's fourth issue is waived due to inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
LACK OF SERVICE
In his fifth issue, Geiger argues the trial court's final order granting summary judgment must be reversed because he was not served with a copy of Hampel's first summary judgment motion. In his first summary judgment motion, Hampel argued that he was entitled to judgment because Geiger's parole review was not affected by any action taken by Hampel and no attorney-client relationship existed between Hampel and Geiger. The trial court granted the motion in part, concluding that no attorney-client relationship existed between Hampel and Geiger.
Although Geiger asserts he was not served with Hampel's first summary judgment motion, Geiger did file an objection and response to the motion before the court ruled on it.
Again, even if we were to assume that Geiger was not served with Hampel's first summary judgment motion, we could not reverse the judgment. The partial summary judgment ruling, that no attorney-client relationship existed between Hampel and Geiger, was not essential to the disposition of Geiger's suit. Hampel's later-filed no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motion was the dispositive motion in this case. Therefore, any lack of service of Hampel's first summary judgment motion was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a) (providing that a judgment cannot be reversed on appeal unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented proper presentation of the case on appeal). We overrule Geiger's fifth issue.
BENCH WARRANT
In his sixth issue, Geiger argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a bench warrant. On May 19, 2016, Geiger filed a written request for a bench warrant to appear in person at the May 23, 2016 hearing. The trial court impliedly denied Geiger's request for a bench warrant; however, it did arrange for Geiger to appear at the hearing by telephone and Geiger did in fact appear at the hearing by telephone.
Although it is well-established that litigants cannot be denied access to the courts simply because they are inmates, an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person in every court proceeding. In the Interest of Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). Instead, courts must weigh the inmate's right of access to the courts against the protection of the correctional system's integrity. Id. Courts consider a variety of factors when deciding whether to grant an inmate's request for a bench warrant, including the cost and convenience of transporting the inmate to the courtroom; the security risk the inmate poses to the court and the public; whether the inmate's claims are substantial; whether the matter's resolution can reasonably be delayed until the inmate's release; whether the inmate can and will offer admissible, noncumulative testimony that cannot be effectively presented by deposition, telephone or some other means; whether the inmate's presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility; whether the trial is to the court or a jury; and the inmate's probability of success on the merits. Id. at 165-66. The inmate bears the burden to establish his right to a bench warrant; it is not the trial court's responsibility to independently inquire into relevant facts not provided by the inmate. Id. at 166. We review a trial court's decision to deny a request for a bench warrant for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, Geiger's bench warrant request did not explain why it was necessary for him to appear at the hearing in person. Additionally, although Geiger did not appear at the hearing in person, he appeared and participated by telephone. At the hearing, the trial court set a deadline for Geiger to file any additional documents in the case, and advised Geiger that the court would consider the pending motions, including Hampel's summary judgment motion, by submission. No testimony or other evidence was presented at the hearing.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Geiger's request for a bench warrant to appear in person at the hearing. We overrule Geiger's sixth issue.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Karen Angelini, Justice