Opinion
NO. 2017 CA 1710
06-04-2018
GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY A/S/O NATHAN BRACKIN v. MICHAEL METZ AND LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
LOUIS W. DELAHAYE L. PHILLIP CANOVA, JR. PLAQUEMINE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT GEICO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY A/S/O NATHAN BRACKIN WILLIAM C. ROWE, JR. JOSEPH S. MANNING BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU AND MICHAEL METZ BLAKE S. LEGER BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-IN-RECONVENTION- APPELLEE GEICO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. C648993
Honorable Wilson Fields, Judge LOUIS W. DELAHAYE
L. PHILLIP CANOVA, JR.
PLAQUEMINE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
GEICO CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY A/S/O NATHAN BRACKIN WILLIAM C. ROWE, JR.
JOSEPH S. MANNING
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU AND
MICHAEL METZ BLAKE S. LEGER
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-IN-RECONVENTION-
APPELLEE
GEICO CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ. PETTIGREW, J.
This matter arises from a December 8, 2015 automobile accident, involving a 2014 Chevrolet Silverado owned and operated by Michael Metz and a 2008 Honda Accord owned by Nathan Brackin but operated by Regan Ratcliff. GEICO Casualty Company ("GEICO"), as subrogee of Nathan Brackin, filed suit against Metz and his insurer, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company ("Farm Bureau"), seeking recovery of the property damage it paid as a result of the accident. Farm Bureau reconvened against GEICO and Ratcliff, requesting judgment against GEICO and Ratcliff for the amount paid pursuant to the terms of its policy with Metz. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment allocating 100 percent fault for the accident to Ratcliff, dismissing GEICO's claims against Farm Bureau and Metz, with prejudice, and rendering judgment against GEICO and in favor of Farm Bureau, as subrogee of Metz, in the amount of $1,542.76, plus court costs and judicial interest. The trial court signed a judgment on September 15, 2017, in accordance with its findings.
GEICO appeals from the adverse judgment, contending that the trial court erred in not allocating fault to Metz because (1) the right turning lane is not the favored roadway as designated by the trial court; (2) a right turning vehicle that turns into the path of an oncoming vehicle is presumed negligent, which presumption was not overcome by the evidence presented at trial; (3) a right turning vehicle has a duty to determine if a right turn can be made with reasonable safety, which was rebutted when the trial court decided that Metz failed to come to a complete stop and entered the intersection without determining it was safe to do so; and (4) the trial court erred in not allocating fault to Metz.
We note from the record that GEICO, in its capacity as defendant-in-reconvention, initially filed a motion and order for suspensive appeal from the trial court's judgment. Although it appears that the trial court may have originally signed this order for appeal, GEICO contends in its brief that the trial court subsequently "whited out" its signature and date on the signed order, stamping the order "FILE AS IS," and signing and dating it on September 28, 2017, with the following notation, "Court signed A Devolutive Appeal filed on Behalf of GEICO/Nathan Brackin." The trial court signed the motion and order for devolutive appeal filed by GEICO, in its capacity as subrogee of Nathan Brackin, on September 28, 2017. And, although GEICO has, in fact, filed two separate appellate briefs in this matter (albeit addressing the same issues), there can only be one appeal from a judgment. See
There is a statutory duty upon a motorist in making a right turn to ascertain that both the approach for the turn and the turn itself shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. La. R.S. 32:101(A)(1). Moreover, a motorist shall not turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in the position just described, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. La. R.S. 32:104(A).
Pursuant to La. R.S. 32:122, "The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which are within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard." A left turn is generally a dangerous maneuver that must not be undertaken until the turning motorist ascertains that the turn can be made in safety. A high degree of care is required of a left-turning motorist. A left-turning motorist involved in an accident is burdened with a presumption of liability, and the motorist must show that he is free of negligence. Duplantis v. Danos, 95-0545 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 1383, 1389-1390. An on-coming motorist has a right to assume that a left-turning motorist will yield the right-of-way. Anderson v. May, 2001-1031 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/13/02), 812 So.2d 81, 85.
The trier of fact is owed some deference in allocation of fault since the finding of percentages of fault is a factual determination. Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 2000-0066 (La. 10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, 680, cert. dismissed, 532 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 1651, 149 L.Ed.2d 508 (2001). Thus, a trier of fact's allocation of fault is subject to the manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong standard of review. See Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). Allocation of fault is not an exact science, or the search for one precise ratio, but rather an acceptable range, and any allocation by the fact finder within that range cannot be clearly wrong. Foley v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 2006-0983 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 144, 166. Only after making a determination that the trier of fact's apportionment of fault is clearly wrong can an appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of lowering it or raising it to the highest or lowest point respectively which is reasonably within the trial court's discretion. Clement v. Frey, 95-1119 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 611.
In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact should consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed. In assessing the nature of the conduct of the parties, various factors may influence the degree of fault assigned, including: (1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger; (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct; (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct; (4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior; and (5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought. Watson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967, 974 (La. 1985). These same factors guide the appellate court's evaluation of the respective fault allocations. See Clement, 666 So.2d at 611.
After hearing from the witnesses and considering the documentary evidence, the trial court offered the following oral reasons from the bench:
All right. After listening to the testimony of the three witnesses that testified and looking at the diagram of defendant's number four and defendant number two, Ms. Ratcliff drew on defendant number four where she was and where the Metz vehicle was and where the point of impact was. Based off her drawing, I understand what plaintiff's counsel is saying. She has the point of impact on the service road right in front of the westbound lane of the service road. Which shows that she was on the service road. But Mr. Oncale's drawing in terms of where the accident took place, the accident based off defendant's number two that Mr. Oncale drew on put the accident happening on Florida Boulevard and they had not gotten to the service road. Yes -- so the accident did not take place on Gloria Street or the service road, according to Mr. Oncale. The court [does] not believe all of the testimony of Mr. Metz in terms of he came to a complete stop and looked in all directions before he traveled to go on the service road. The court believes more his deposition statement that he came to -- that he slowed down and looked in all directions before he made his turn. In looking at the intersection, he is in the favored position in terms of the right turning lane. The vehicles that he has to yield or stop to are the vehicles on the service road going east and westbound to make sure that none of those vehicles are traveling on the service road in that intersection. And actually, even those vehicles have to stop to make sure none of the
vehicle[s] on the favored road, which is Florida Boulevard is coming making that turn in the intersection. Ms. Ratcliff made a turn, although the eastbound two lanes allowed Ms. [Ratcliff] to travel in front of them, but Mr. Metz vehicle did not. And Ms. Ratcliff has to make sure that all lanes of traffic are cleared on the eastbound lanes of Florida Boulevard, which are three lanes, the two going eastbound and the turning lane, before she can make a safe, left hand turn. The court finds that [Mr.] Metz -- I'm sorry, Ms. Ratcliff is the cause of the accident by not making sure that all lanes of traffic were clear before she made her left hand turn. And the court hinges its decision based on defendant number two, the diagram drawn by Mr. Oncale, who is a disinterested witness, who stated that the accident happened right in front of his vehicle, which he was in the right lane of the eastbound traffic and Ms. [Ratcliff's] vehicle was still in front of his vehicle, at least a portion of it before she -- when she was hit. So that indicates to the court that all lanes of traffic [were] not clear for Ms. [Ratcliff] to make a safe maneuver of a left hand turn in front of on-going traffic. The court finds 100 percent fault on ... Ms. Ratcliff.
The accident in this case occurred at the intersection of Florida Boulevard and Gloria Drive, an intersection not controlled by any traffic lights or signs. At the time of the accident, Ratcliff was attempting a left turn from Florida Boulevard across multiple lanes of traffic onto Gloria Drive. Metz, who was in the right turning lane of Florida Boulevard, was in the process of turning right onto Gloria Drive when he collided with Ratcliff's vehicle.
Metz and Ratcliff offered differing versions of where their respective vehicles were leading up to the collision. Ratcliff testified that she was travelling westbound on Florida Boulevard as she approached Gloria Drive. The traffic at the intersection of Florida Boulevard and Gloria Drive was backed up, but had stopped to allow her to make her left turn onto Gloria Drive. Ratcliff stated, "I crossed both lanes of traffic. They let me go. And when I made it to the intersection going onto Gloria, that's when I got hit." She added, "I was in the service road when I got hit." Ratcliff noted that she did not see the Metz vehicle until "he was there." When asked to mark on a picture of the roadway exactly where she was when she began to make her left turn, Ratcliff replied, "I was here. And I made a left turn. And then I was here when I got hit. Yes." Exhibit D-4 was introduced with Ratcliff's markings on it, indicating that according to Ratcliff, she began her turn from the innermost westbound lane of Florida Boulevard, turned left across the median and the two eastbound lanes of Florida Boulevard, and was crossing the service road to enter Gloria Drive when she was hit.
According to Metz, he was in the right-turn lane heading eastbound on Florida Boulevard, intending to turn onto the service road just prior to the collision. There were vehicles to his left stopped at the intersection. When asked if he came to a stop before proceeding with his turn, Metz stated, "I would have had to come to a stop, because I checked. There's four different directions of traffic to check, so." Metz was asked about his prior deposition testimony wherein he indicated, "Well, as I was headed eastbound, I got into the turn lane to make my right turn. And I came almost to a complete stop and looked to my left and east as well as west and north and proceeded to make my right hand turn." Metz maintained that he may have "misspoke" during his deposition because "common sense tells you, if you have to look four directions, you're not moving a whole lot." Metz testified that the point of impact was in between the front passenger door and the rear passenger door of the Ratcliff vehicle.
The only independent witness to the accident who testified at trial was Brandon Oncale. Oncale was travelling eastbound on Florida Boulevard in the far right-hand lane, but not the turning lane. He was one of the stopped vehicles at the intersection when Ratcliff began her left turn. When asked about the accident, Oncale stated, "The back of [the Ratcliff] car might have still been in front of me when the collision took place. I just remember she was in front of me when I heard [the Metz vehicle] coming." And according to Oncale's markings on Exhibit D-2, the point of impact between the Ratcliff vehicle and the Metz vehicle occurred close to the turning lane that Metz was in just prior to the collision.
If the trial court's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). Considering that the record provides a reasonable basis for the trial court to have found that Metz was in a "favored position" in the right turning lane and that Ratcliff was required to be certain that all lanes of traffic were cleared before she entered the intersection, we reject GEICO's arguments on appeal as meritless. Moreover, with regard to the allocation of fault, although the trial court did not specifically refer to the Watson factors, a review of the trial court's reasons for judgment reveal that the trial court clearly considered the principles outlined in Watson in allocating 100 percent of the fault for the accident to Ratcliff. Thus, as the law provides that we must give great deference to the allocation of fault as determined by the trier of fact, we cannot disturb the trial court's allocation of fault on appeal absent a finding that the allocation is clearly wrong. See Fontenot v. Patterson Insurance, 2009-0669 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 259, 274. We have examined the trial court's allocation of fault in light of the Watson factors set forth above. Based on the facts of this case, we do not find the allocation of fault constituted manifest error. Considering the record in its entirety, we are satisfied that it reasonably supports the conclusion that Ratcliff was 100 percent at fault in causing the accident.
For reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's September 15, 2017 judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed against GEICO. We issue this memorandum opinion in accordance with Uniform Rules--Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1.B.
AFFIRMED.
Succession of Jones, 189 La. 693, 703, 180 So. 489, 492 (1938); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 185 La. 729, 735, 170 So. 548, 550 (1936). Thus, our discussion herein focuses on GEICO's brief filed in its capacity as subrogee of Nathan Brackin.