Opinion
J-S75020-17 No. 506 WDA 2017
03-06-2018
GRETCHEN GEIBEL v. HARRY SMITH AND DESIREE HASSELL APPEAL OF: DESIREE HASSELL
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered March 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
Civil Division at No(s): 2016-1498 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:
Desiree Hassell appeals, pro se, from the judgment of possession entered March 30, 2017, in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, regarding Gretchen Geibel's property located at 309 Lunn Boulevard, Farrell, Pennsylvania. Hassell raises three issues on appeal, challenging (1) whether the parties' contract provided for a recovery of funds, (2) whether she received due process; and (3) whether the trial court was biased. For the reasons below, we affirm.
The facts underlying this appeal are summarized by the trial court as follows:
[] Desiree Hassel[l], along with her live-in boyfriend, Harry Smith, had entered into an Article of Agreement on July 25, 2013 to purchase a house from [] Gretchen Geibel, and the property at 309 Lunn Boulevard, Farrell, Mercer County, Pennsylvania. [Hassell] agreed to purchase the property for $50,000.00 by
making monthly payments of $600.00 per month commencing August 15, 2013 and on the first day of each succeeding month thereafter for 18 months at which time the princip[al] balance would be due. [Hassell] was also obligated to pay all utilities, real estate taxes, insurance, and maintenance of the premises. [Hassell] took occupancy of the property upon executing the Article of Agreement and remained thereafter and still remains in this home.
It is uncontested that [Hassell] stopped making payments on March 1, 2015 when $325.00 was paid to [Geibel]. [Geibel] then continued to pursue the monthly payments and eventually gave a 30 day notice to vacate the premises.
[Hassell] failed to cure the default and/or vacate the premises and [Geibel] filed a Complaint in Ejectment on June 10, 2016 at which time [Hassell] was behind by almost $13,000.00. [Geibel] sought a monetary judgment as well as a judgment for possession of the premises.
This matter was assigned to the undersigned judge as the case manager and the Court met with the parties for an initial status conference on August 16, 2016 at which time [Geibel] appeared with her attorney and [Hassell] appeared pro se. The parties entered into settlement discussions at this off the record conference and the Court entered a Case Management Order. The case was then scheduled for the January 2017 trial list for a non-jury trial and a pre-trial conference on December 28, 2016. The Court also established a discovery deadline of October 17, 2016 and directed [Geibel's] attorney to provide [Hassell] a spreadsheet itemizing all of the monetary damages alleged as well as an amortization schedule. [Hassell] was ordered also to file an answer to the complaint by September 15, 2016.
The parties did not engage in discovery and [Geibel] filed a Motion for a Summary Judgment that was scheduled for argument on February 6, 2017 and the trial was continued generally pending resolution of the motion. On February 6, 2017, the Court granted the summary judgment motion as to Harry Smith and he was ordered to vacate the premises by March 12, 2017. Notably, Harry Smith who was also pro se in this matter did not file an appeal from the February 6, 2017 Order but is believed to still be residing in the subject house. In addition, on February 6, 2017 [Hassell] appeared again pro se and the parties reached an agreement embodied in an Order dated February 6, 2017 wherein
[Hassell] agreed to an Order granting possession of the property to [Geibel] and [Hassell] agreed to vacate the premises by midnight of March 12, 2017, unless she paid the sum of $3,650.00 to [Geibel] by February 16, 2017 and commenced paying $650.00 on the 15th day of the months of March, April and May. The Court scheduled a review conference for May 30, 2017. The February 6, 2017 Order also directed that a stay would be granted automatically for possession in [Geibel] if [Hassell] paid the funds as set forth above.Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2017, at 1-3. This timely appeal followed.
[Geibel] filed a Motion for Judgment for Possession on March 17, 2017 on the basis that [Hassell] had not complied with the February 6, 2017 agreed upon Order by paying $3,650.00 by February 16, 2017. [Geibel's] motion also averred that [Hassell] was granted an extension to April 2, 2017 to vacate the premises so long as she paid the sum of $1,300.00 to [Geisel] and allowed [Geisel] to inspect the premises. [Hassell] paid the $1,300.00 but inspection of the home did not occur.
[Hassell] appeared again before the Court with [Geisel] and her attorney on March 24, 2017 for a hearing on the Motion for Judgment for Possession and after a hearing the Court granted the Motion for Judgment for Possession and gave possession of 309 Lunn Boulevard to [] Geibel, and gave [Hassell] until midnight of April 2, 2017 to vacate the premises. [Hassell] did not object to this Order. Harry Smith was likewise evicted. The Prothonotary entered judgment for possession on March 30, 2017.
On April 3, 2017, the trial court ordered Hassell to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Hassell complied with the court's directive, and filed a concise statement on April 25, 2017.
As noted supra, Hassell purports to raise three issues on appeal. First, she argues there was "no affirmation of a contact, or agreement for monies payable past the expiration" of the parties' agreement. Hassell's Brief at 7. She maintains her final payment was made on March 1, 2015, and the contract did not include a "carryover clause." Id. at 8. Therefore, Hassell insists Geibel's lawsuit "requesting possession, along with damages for amounts not covered under contract or agreed to, should have been disallowed." Id.
Second, Hassell insists she was denied due process because she did not receive proper notice of Geibel's request for repossession of the property. See id. at 9. She contends that whether the contract is viewed as a landlord/tenant agreement or an installment land contract, "specific notice, due process, is required to be given prior by the seller/landowner requesting court assistance in reclaiming property." Id.
Lastly, Hassell contends the trial court judge was biased against her because (1) the judge and Geibel discussed the fact they had used the same home builder, and (2) the judge presided over a criminal prosecution against Harry Smith. See id. at 11-12.
Upon our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant statutory and case law, we conclude the trial court thoroughly addressed and properly disposed of Hassell's claims in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2017, at 4-8 (finding (1) recusal was not necessary under the facts of this case, and, in any event, Hassell waived the claim by failing to move for recusal in the trial court; (2) Hassell waived her claim that eviction was not a proper remedy once the lease/agreement expired by failing to file preliminary objections or move for summary judgment; (3) the Landlord Tenant Act was not applicable to the present action, and therefore, Geibel was not required to provide notice to vacate under the Act; and (4) in any event, the March 24, 2017, order was "based upon an agreement reached between" the parties). Accordingly, we rest upon its well-reasoned basis.
See Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/2017, at 4-5. See also Reilly by Reilly v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1300 (Pa. 1985) ("Once the trial is completed with the entry of a verdict, a party is deemed to have waived his right to have a judge disqualified, and if he has waived that issue, he cannot be heard to complain following an unfavorable result.").
See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 6. It merits emphasis that during the March 24, 2017, hearing, Hassell conceded that because she did not pay the $3,650.00 due under the parties' extended agreement, Geibel was "entitled to possession." N.T., 3/24/2017, at 9. --------
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/6/2018
Image materials not available for display.