The Alabama court may satisfy this factual basis "requirement by eliciting an in-court statement from the defendant, by an in-court statement from the district attorney, or from evidence presented ...." G.E.G. v. State , 54 So. 3d 949, 955 (Ala. 2010) (quotation omitted). "The district attorney's assertions of what he expects the evidence to show will suffice."

In Alabama, a guilty plea "is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment," not just an admission to the crime in the abstract. G.E.G. v. State , 54 So. 3d 949, 954 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Scott v. State , 917 So. 2d 159, 166 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) ). Of course, here Hunter pled guilty not to the crime charged in the indictment (attempted murder), but to the lesser-included offense of menacing.

See docs. 2 at 16-17; 3 at 4-7. In Alabama, "[a] voluntary guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses with the need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to the defendant's guilt, and is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment." G.E.G. v. State, 54 So. 3d 949, 954 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159, 166 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)). 1.

The parties do not dispute that the first three elements of the test are satisfied. Nor could they. Holley made a knowing and voluntary guilty plea in state court, and there is no indication that he preserved any issues for appeal. So as a matter of state law, Holley admitted he made an improper lane change, and he waived any challenges to the legality of his arrest. SeeG.E.G. v. State , 54 So.3d 949, 956 (Ala. 2010) ; Vann v. State , 44 Ala.App. 523, 214 So.2d 925, 926 (1968). Determining that Holley made an improper lane change was necessary to his conviction. It is the same issue now before the court.

In Alabama, "'[a] voluntary guilty plea concludes the issue of guilt, dispenses with the need for judicial fact finding, is conclusive as to the defendant's guilt, and is an admission of all facts sufficiently charged in the indictment.'" G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 949, 954 (Ala. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 166 (Ala.Crim.App.2005)). Notably, in discussing facts admitted to by a defendant, we have stated that,

"Alabama law also recognizes that a criminal defendant may waive many constitutional, statutory, and procedural rights. See G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 949, 955 (Ala. 2010)('By pleading guilty, a defendant waives three constitutional rights: the right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers.' Heptinstall v. State, 624 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)(citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969))).

And, again, Hineman has failed to argue that the corpus delicti rule is somehow exempt from this general rule. See, e.g., G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 949, 956 (Ala. 2010) (issue of admissibility of defendant's confession without corroboration waived by guilty plea). Therefore, he has failed to adequately support his claim that the corpus delicti rule applies to his case.

Ex parte Landrum, 57 So.3d 77, 81 (Ala.2010). Cf. G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 949, 955 (Ala.2010) (“ ‘By pleading guilty, a defendant waives three constitutional rights: the right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers.’ Heptinstall v. State, 624 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)).

Once the trial court has determined that the plea is knowing and voluntary, the trial court need only satisfy itself that the defendant knew what he was pleading guilty to.” G.E.G. v. State, 54 So.3d 949, 956 (Ala.2010).

Alabama law also recognizes that a criminal defendant may waive many constitutional, statutory, and procedural rights. See G.E.G v. State, 54 So. 3d 949, 955 (Ala. 2010) ("By pleading guilty, a defendant waives three constitutional rights: the right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers." Heptinstall v. State, 624 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969))).