But the rule does not appear to have been approved in New York and New Hampshire. Tillman v. Davis, 95 N.Y. 17, 24; Pinkham v. Blair, 57 N.H. 226. Moreover, it is settled in Massachusetts as well as elsewhere that "where a clause is fairly susceptible of two constructions also, that certainly is to be preferred which inclines to the inheritance of the children of a deceased child," Bowker v. Bowker, 148 Mass. 198, 203; Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374; and in Connecticut that, "when the terms of a will leave the intention of the testator in doubt the courts generally incline to adopt that construction which conforms more nearly to the statute of distributions," Geery v. Skelding, 62 Conn. 499, 501; Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377. As put by Rapallo, J., in Low v. Harmony, 72 N.Y. 408, 414: "When the language of a limitation is capable of two constructions, one of which would operate to disinherit a lineal descendant of the testator, while the other will not produce that effect, the latter should be preferred. An intention to disinherit an heir, even a lineal descendant, when expressed in plain and unambiguous language, must be carried out; but it will not be imputed to a testator by implication, when he uses language capable of construction which will not so operate." We are not, however, dealing with wills or settlements, but with the words "next of kin," as used in a statute, passed, in acknowledgment of losses incurred by the ancestors, under circumstances rendering conjecture futile as to what their action, if exercising a volition in the matter, might be, and where the act clearly indicates the judgment of Congress that the next of kin for the purposes of succession genera
Not only must all parts of the will be considered, but each and all its provisions should, so far as possible, be harmonized and given effect. Gold v. Judson, 21 Conn. 615, 624; Colt v. Colt, 32 Conn. 422, 446; Security Co. v. Hardenburgh, 53 Conn. 169, 170, 2 A. 391. A construction which will disinherit the natural objects of the testator's bounty is not favored, and a construction which conforms, so far as possible, to our statute of distributions is to be preferred. Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377, 380, 28 A. 537; Geery v. Skelding, 62 Conn. 499, 501, 27 A. 77; Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222, 224. Account should be taken of the relative situations of the parties, the ties of affection subsisting between them, and the motives which would naturally influence the mind of the testator, as well as the existence of a moral duty on his part toward the party who will benefit from compliance with his desires and recommendations. Poor v. Bradbury, 196 Mass. 207, 209, 81 N.E. 882; Foster v. Willson, 68 N. H. 241, 38 A. 1003, 1004; Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274, 277.
Again, as an aid to construction where the meaning is in doubt, that construction will be adopted which most nearly conforms to the statute of distributions. Hamilton v. Downs, 33 Conn. 211, 214; Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222, 224, 225; Geery v. Skelding, 62 Conn. 499, 501, 27 A. 77; Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377, 381, 28 A. 537. Under our statute Gladys, at the time the will was made, was the sole child and heir of Nora Ford, and upon her death intestate, would take her property under the statute of distributions, and the testator well knew this fact.
We, therefore, hold that in the distribution of the residue of the estate the defendants, Fannie M. Pease, Minnie P. Pease, Sarah P. Pease, and Bessie M. (Pease) Bowers, will take one fourth thereof to be equally divided between them, that the defendants, Caroline Van Huysen and Susan Eastman, will take one fourth thereof to be equally divided between them, and that the defendants, Clara Leslie and Anna Perry will each take one fourth thereof; the share of said Clara Leslie in the personal estate will be paid to the defendant, Marion G. L. Harmon. The following cases, upon various aspects of the case, are in harmony with this conclusion, although in none is the language of the will, and the facts, precisely the same as in the instant case. McClench v. Waldron, 204 Mass. 554. Dollander v. Dhaemers, 297 Ill. 274, 130 N.E. 705. Ferrer et al. v. Pyne et al., 81 N.Y. 281. Fissel's Appeal, 27 Pa. St., 55. White v. Holland, 92 Ga. 216. Geery et als. v. Skelding et als., 62 Conn. 499. Lyon et als. v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222. Fraser v. Dillon, 78 Ga. 474. It is conceded that the defendant, Congregational Church Building Society, is the organization referred to in said will as the "Congregational Union for Church Building," and is entitled to the legacy thus bequeathed.
176 Ala. 250, 57 So. 849; 116 Ala. 252, 22 So. 555; 110 Miss. 789, 70 So. 893; 178 Ala. 117, 59 So. 58; 43 Ala. 666; 157 Ala. 79, 47 So. 220, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1045; 76 Fla. 459, 80 So. 65; 202 Ala. 578, 81 So. 80; 177 Ala. 88, 58 So. 417; 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193, 55 Am. St. Rep. 295; 200 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E. 484, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 945, 21 Ann. Cas. 412; 34 Ala. 208; 30 Ala. 391; 279 Ill. 274, 116 N.E. 658. If words of will leave intention of testator uncertain, a construction requiring children of a deceased child to take per stirpes should be sustained. 33 Conn. 222; 45 Conn. 467, 29 Am. Rep. 688; 62 Conn. 499, 27 A. 77; 40 Cyc. 1412; 30 A. E. Encyc. Law, 688. The law favors distribution of estates under rule giving to the child of a deceased son such share as his parent would have taken. 127 Ind. 276, 26 N.E. 56; 135 Ind. 278, 34 N.E. 991; (Ky.) 68 S.W. 631; 187 Ky. 709, 220 S.W. 532; 70 Mich. 179, 38 N.W. 20; 30 Pa. Super. 145. The words "equally" and "share and share alike" apply as readily to a per stirpes division as to per capita.