Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:01-CV-2560-R
November 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed September 9, 2002, is now before this Court. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jerry Gee ("Gee"), was an employee of Defendant, Rus Dallas ("Rus"), for the period from March 23, 1999 to February 10, 2000, during which time Plaintiff was 40 to 41 years old. Rus provides rental uniform services and is a subsidiary of Defendant, Omni Services, Inc. ("Omni") Plaintiff began work as a "Sales Representative," and was promoted to the position of "Service Supervisor" on August 9, 1999. On February 10, 2000, Plaintiff was discharged from Rus.
Plaintiff was born on December 8, 1958. ( Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 6).
Subsequent to the commencement of this litigation, both Omni and Rus were purchased by Cintas and now operate under the Cintas name. ( Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 n. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that his discharge was motivated by both age and religious discrimination. Specifically, he alleges that managers at Rus discriminated against employees who were not both young and members of the Mormon Church. On December 4, 2001, after his grievance was dismissed by the EEOC, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court alleging that his discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
II. ANALYSIS
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDRule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Because employment discrimination claims "involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent," summary judgment is generally an inappropriate tool for resolving these cases. Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). However, if Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, Bauer v. Albermarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999), or if defendant presents strong evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and the plaintiff is unable to counter with additional evidence of pretext, summary judgment may be properly granted. Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. PLAINTIFF'S RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin". 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, the first step in examining a Title VII claim is to determine whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Bauer, 169 F.3d. at 966.
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, a claimant must show that he:
1) is a member of a protected class; 2) was qualified for the position that he held; 3) was discharged; and 4) after his discharge was replaced with a person who is not a member of the protected class.Bauer, 169 F.3d at 966 ( citing Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has satisfied the first 3 elements of the prima facie case; namely, that Plaintiff was not a member of the Mormon Church (non-Mormons are the protected class), was qualified for the position he held at the time of discharge, and was discharged. Defendants "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 6. However, Defendants contend that summary judgment must be granted because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fourth element. Id. To satisfy the fourth element, Plaintiff must offer evidence from which it could be inferred that, after Plaintiff's discharge, he was replaced by an employee who is not a member of the protected class. Bauer, 169 F.3d at 966. In other words, Plaintiff is required to produce evidence that his replacement was a member of the Mormon Church.
The parties are in dispute as to who was hired to replace Plaintiff. Plaintiff, in his deposition, stated that his replacement was James Hall ("Hall"). Joint Appendix at 21-22. However, Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence that Hall was a member of the Mormon Church. Defendants dispute Plaintiff's assertion that he was replaced by Hall and instead contend that he was replaced by Daniel Murphy ("Murphy"). Joint Appendix at 1. In addition, Defendants offer evidence, in the form of a sworn declaration from Gilbert Green ("Green"), the assistant general manager for Rus Dallas at the time of Plaintiff's discharge, that Murphy is not a member of the Mormon Church. Id. Although Plaintiff, in his response to Defendants' motion, questions the basis of Green's personal knowledge regarding Mr. Murphy, he does not offer any evidence to contradict Green's sworn statements. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-5.
The determination of who replaced Plaintiff after his discharge is a factual one and hence ordinarily is a task for the fact-finder at trial. However, to meet his burden, Plaintiff must provide evidence not only of who his replacement was, but also that his replacement was a member of the Mormon Church. See Abraham v. Diagnostic Center Hospital Corp. of Texas, 138 F. Supp.2d 809, 813 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (stating that Abraham had "submitted competent summary judgment evidence" that he was replaced by someone who was not a member of the protected class). Plaintiff, in the record currently before the Court, has failed to offer any evidence that either Hall or Murphy was a member of the Mormon Church. Plaintiffs deposition does allege that several general statements favoring Mormons were made by management at Rus. Joint Appendix at 25-26, 28, 29-31. However, such broad-brush allegations do not compensate for Plaintiff's failure to provide any evidence that his replacement was not a member of the protected class. Plaintiff has failed to establish the fourth element of his prima facie case for religious discrimination. Consequently, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the claim of religious discrimination under Title VII is hereby GRANTED.
C. PLAINTIFF'S AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In the Fifth Circuit, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to ADEA claims as well as Title VII claims. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., ___ F.3d. ___" slip op. no. 01-10808 at 6 n. 2 (5th Cir. October 28, 2002) ( citing Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Under the ADEA, the elements of a prima facie case for age discrimination are:
(1) the Plaintiff was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position at issue; (3) he was within the protected class; and (4) he was replaced by someone younger or outside the protected group.
Sandstad, slip op. at 6 ( citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 645 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Similar to their attack on Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim, Defendants' contend that Plaintiff has failed to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case. Defendants "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7. As discussed supra, the evidence reveals a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff was replaced by Hall or Murphy. However, unlike his claim for religious discrimination, Plaintiff has provided evidence of the minimum facts necessary to establish the fourth element of the prima facie case under the ADEA. Plaintiff has asserted, in his deposition, that he was replaced by Hall and that Hall was approximately 28 years old. Joint Appendix at 21. Defendants counter by asserting that Plaintiff was replaced by Murphy who was approximately 39 or 40 years old. Defendants "Reply Brief at 4 n. 3 (stating Murphy to be 39 at the time Plaintiff was terminated, but not stating how old he was at the time he was hired to replace Plaintiff). Evidence suggesting a 28 year old was hired to replace Plaintiff (who was 41 at the time of his discharge), satisfies the fourth element of Plaintiff's prima facie case for age discrimination. As Defendants' have not sought summary judgment on the ADEA claim on any other grounds, there is no need to address the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Therefore, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the claim of age discrimination under the ADEA is hereby DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.