Opinion
C. A. 4:24-2909-JD-TER
05-21-2024
Nathaniel Geathers, Plaintiff, v. Larry McNeil, Clay Anderson, John Doe, and Unknown Defendants,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action filed by a pro se litigant, proceeding in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed in this case. This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for her, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The “special judicial solicitude” with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's action is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff was previously notified of deficiencies in his original complaint and given an opportunity to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff availed himself of that opportunity and filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10). The Amended Complaint continues with deficiencies and is subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff is not detained; . Plaintiff alleges he has been deprived of personal property, specifically his 2013 F-150 Ford truck, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 10 at 4). Plaintiff alleges his truck was taken after the execution of an arrest warrant. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff alleges John Doe was seen driving Plaintiff's truck around town. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff alleges as injuries: emotional distress, humiliation, and loss of business to perform dry wall jobs. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff's request for relief is return of his truck and monetary damages. (ECF No. 10 at 6). Plaintiff's only allegations against Anderson is that he had the arrest warrant. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff sues Defendants Anderson, Doe, and unknown defendants in their official capacities only. Plaintiff does not make any personal allegations against Defendants Sheriff McNeil or “unknown defendants,” as such these Defendants should be summarily dismissed.
In order to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against any particular state actor, a “causal connection” must exist between the conduct alleged by the plaintiff and the particular defendant named in the suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 166 (1985); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury resulting from a specific defendant's specific conduct and must show an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977) (for an individual to be liable under § 1983, the Plaintiff must show that the defendant named acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights). Plaintiff here must demonstrate that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 and Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 11 Fed. App'x 212, 215 (4th Cir.2001) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against five defendants when the plaintiff did not allege any of the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his civil rights). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
As to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Anderson and Doe, Plaintiff's allegations and request for relief appear to only revolve around Plaintiff's loss of his truck/property. Deprivations of property by state employees are not actionable under § 1983 and do not offend due process when adequate post-deprivation state remedies are available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Plaintiff has remedies under South Carolina law to obtain relief for the alleged taking of his personal property, by proceeding pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 231 (4th Cir.2008)(State courts are available for property claims and the State process is constitutionally adequate). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his constitutional rights based on the alleged deprivation of his property.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 with prejudice under § 1915(e) and § 1915A and without issuance and service of process.
It is recommended that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).