Opinion
FBTCV156052571S
01-17-2017
Richard T. Geany v. City Carting, Inc
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Richard E. Arnold, Judge.
The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to all three counts of the plaintiff's complaint, which is dated October 6, 2015. Defendant claims there are no genuine issues of material fact that the defendant did not agree to form some type of contract commitment with the plaintiff. The plaintiff's complaint contains three counts which allege: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) promissory estoppel. The defendant has filed a memorandum of law and supporting documents in support of its motion. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of law and supporting document in objection to the motion for summary judgment. Oral argument on the defendant's motion and the plaintiff's objection was heard by the court on October 17, 2016.
According to the plaintiff, he began employment with the defendant, City Carting, Inc., on or about December 1998, as a driver. He remained in that position until " approximately June 17, 2015, when he was terminated from employment for conduct that allegedly occurred during the course of his employment."
The plaintiff states that during his time of employment with the defendant, the defendant through its employees, agents and servants made oral express and implied promises and oral representations to the plaintiff that he was satisfactorily performing his job duties and awarded him merit pay increases. The defendant allegedly orally represented that the plaintiff would not be discharged from employment without the use of a progressive disciplinary policy. Plaintiff further alleges that during his period of employment, a progressive disciplinary policy was in place to be followed by the defendant in its actions with its employees. Based on said policy, employees, plaintiff included, would be expected to have continued employment if the policies were followed. Therefore, the defendants' employees would not be discharged unless they violated the progressive disciplinary policy. Based on this policy and the oral representations made to the plaintiff by the defendant's agents, servant and employees, the plaintiff felt his job was secure and in reliance, thereon, he did not pursue any other job opportunities.
It's the plaintiff's position that because of express and implied oral promises of the defendant, in conjunction with the progressive disciplinary policy, a contract existed between the defendant and the plaintiff. The defendant argues it disclaimed all express and implied employment contracts. It states that its employee handbook policy language makes it clear that the employer, City Carting, could terminate its employees, including the plaintiff, at anytime at its discretion, meaning the employment is " at will." The defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot offer any evidence to establish that a contract was entered into between the parties that altered the at-will status of the employment. Further, the defendant claims that, in fact, the plaintiff was progressively disciplined for repeated behavioral issues in the workplace on six prior occasions prior to his termination, and he was terminated with good cause and justification for undisputed conduct when while driving the defendant company's truck, the plaintiff made an obscene gesture to an innocent bystander who was in another vehicle.
I
Standard of Law
" The law governing summary judgment and the accompanying standard of review are well settled. Practice Book § [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings . . ." (Citation omitted.) Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hosp. and Medical Center, 166 Conn.App. 510, 517, 142 A.3d 363 (2016). " In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . ." Id.
" The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . The movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of such issues but the evidence thus presented, if otherwise sufficient, is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist . . . To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the non-movant must recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated in the movant's affidavits documents . . . The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue . . . The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter-affidavits and concrete evidence . . ." Id., 517-18.
II
Discussion
City Carting argues it had, and still has, an employee handbook with policies that expressly disclaim all express and implied employee contracts. The defendant states that all employment at City Carting is " at-will" and there are no contracts in connection with employment except and unless the terms are agreed upon in writing and signed by the Chief Executive Officer (" CEO"). The plaintiff did, in fact, receive a copy of the handbook. Further, the " Acknowledgment of the receipt of the employee handbook, which was signed by the plaintiff, clearly and expressly disclaimed contracts of employment and clearly states that the at-will employment status could only be altered through a written contract signed by the CEO." The Acknowledgment states as follows:
The court has a copy of the plaintiff's written acknowledgment of receipt of the Handbook. The Handbook provisions are effective as of January 1, 2013, and the plaintiff signed the acknowledgment on February 8, 2013. The plaintiff, by signing, agreed that he must comply with all of the provisions of the Handbook and that failure to do so could lead to disciplinary actions " up to an including termination."
My employment relationship with City Carting or related companies is on an " at-will" basis unless I have a different written agreement with the Company or as law may otherwise dictate. I understand I have a right to terminate my employment at any time, with or without cause or notice, and that the Company has the same right. I further understand that my status as an " at-will" employee may not be changed except in writing and signed by the CEO of the Company.
The defendant argues the plaintiff has admitted in his deposition testimony that he did not have a written employment contract and did not have an written " promise" of employment. Additionally, the plaintiff did not have any document that altered his status as an " at-will" employee. The defendant claims that the only verbal representations upon which the plaintiff relies are statement by a superior, John Valenti and Safety Manager Bryan Ayers at safety meetings. At his deposition the plaintiff testified that Valenti told him " as long as you keep your nose clean and do your job, you have no fear of losing your job." Plaintiff also testified that at safety meetings it was reiterated that " any disciplinary actions would run a course."
The defendant notes that the plaintiff was progressively disciplined on six prior occasions between September 9, 2008 and September 17, 2014, before he was terminated on June 17, 2015 for the obscene gesture to another motorist, which occurred on June 16, 2015.
The defendant has submitted copies of photos of the defendant " giving the middle finger" to the complaining motorist on June 16, 2015. The photos were supplied to the defendant by the motorist. The plaintiff, as a result of his prior disciplinary procedures was previously suspended without pay for his behavior before his termination. The court has reviewed employee disciplinary reports for Sept. 8, 2008, May 25, 2010, August 13, 2010, Sept. 9, 2013, Aug. 23, 2014, Sept. 17, 2014 and June 17, 2015.
The employee handbook contains numerous references to the employee having employment " at-will." The handbook provides:
Unless proscribed by statute of contract, all employment is " at-will" . . . At will employment . . . means employees may be terminated by the Company at any time for any reason, or for no reason, with or without advance notice . . . [T]he Handbook does not constitute or contain a contract or a promise of any kind and the Handbook cannot be changed without notice or consultation. The Handbook does not constitute any express limitation on the at-will employment relationship established by the Company with its employees. Any commitment to an employment relationship other than one that is at-will must be set out in writing and signed by an authorized officer of City Carting.
As for provisions regarding progressive disciplinary, the Handbook, in addition to reiterating that City Carting is an at-will employer, also provides as follows:
[T]he Company specifically reserves the right to respond without restrictions to issues related to unsatisfactory work performance or inappropriate work behavior. Any range of steps or disciplinary actions may be taken, in any order, up to and including immediate termination where the Company deems such a step or action to be appropriate.
Corrective action interventions that may be employed by City Carting are listed in the Handbook and they are not to be considered as limitations on other actions the Company could take, including termination of employment. The Handbook specifically states employees can be disciplined or terminated for poor job performance based upon the circumstances of each individual case. Included in a lengthy list of transgressions that can be considered poor job performance are for example:
1. Unsatisfactory quality of work;
2. Failure to follow instructions or Company procedures;
3. Poor attitude, communication or teamwork;
4. Using vulgar, profane or obscene language in any form-text, words, images, etc.
The defendant, therefore, claims the plaintiff's employment was " at-will" and the undisputed material fact establish the plaintiff, on prior occasions, was disciplined with warnings, and then suspensions before his employment was finally terminated.
The plaintiff argues that because his reliance on the oral express and implied promises by the defendant, along with his reliance on the progressive disciplinary policy, he felt his job was secure. He claims a contract existed between he and his employer for employment, as long as, the plaintiff performed his job duties in a satisfactory manner. He claims there was no cause for his termination pursuant to the progressive disciplinary policy. He alleges he has lost salary, benefits and other " perquisites of employment" and has sustained other incidental expenses.
The plaintiff argues that this case involves a wrongful discharge of employment, and it is for the jury to evaluate whether the employer's conduct allows an inference that the defendant employer intended to create an express or implied contract of employment. " Summary judgment procedure is particularly inappropriate where the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn, deal with questions of motive, intent and subjective feelings." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 111, 639 A.2d 507 (1994), citing Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 646-47, 443 A.2d 471 (1982). The plaintiff states that questions of defendant's motive and intent in discharging the plaintiff should be resolved at trial rather than by summary judgment. Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 208 Conn. 106, 122, 544 A.2d 170 (1988). However, Pesino v. Atlantic Bank, 244 Conn. 85, 92, 709 A.2d 540 (1998) notes that the determination of the parties' contractual commitment is normally a question of the parties' intent and an inference of fact, unless the language is so " definitive" as to be a question of law.
A.
Count One: Breach of Employment Contract
The plaintiff argues that material issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiff was discharged in breach of contract. The plaintiff claims the defendant's representatives represented to the plaintiff that as long as the plaintiff satisfactorily performed his job, the plaintiff would have a secure job position. Lastly, the plaintiff also argues that there are material issues of fact as to whether a contract existed.
Connecticut is an at-will employment state. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). " In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability." (Citations omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Company, 267 Conn. 210, 225, 837 A.2d 759 (2004). " Consequently, in the absence of an employment contract, or an illegal discriminatory motive, an employer has the right to terminate an employee at any time without liability." Id. at 225-26, 837 A.2d 759. " Courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation." Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 700-01, 802 A.2d 731 (2002); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. at 477, 427 A.2d 385.
" As a general rule, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 211 n.1, 520 A.2d 217 (1987). " Pursuant to traditional contract principles, however, the default rule of employment at will can be modified by the agreement of the parties." Id. In order to create a binding employment contract in Connecticut, there are specific and definite requirements. " Under established principles of contract law, an agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements." Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 313, 528 A.2d 1123 (1987); A. Corbin, Contracts (1963) 95; 1 Restatement (Second), Contracts (1981) 33; see also, D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 215, 520 A.2d 217. The duration and conditions of the plaintiff's employment, salary and fringe benefits are considered material terms and essential to an employment contract. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 215, 520 A.2d 217. " Under the law of contract, a promise is generally not enforceable unless it is supported by consideration." Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Ser. Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104, 837 A.2d 736 (2003); E. Farnsworth, Contracts (1982) 2.9, p. 89; A. Corbin, Contracts (1963) 193, p. 188. " In the absence of a consideration in addition to the rendering of services incident to the employment, an agreement for permanent employment is no more than an indefinite general hiring, terminable at will of either party without liability to the other." Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 736, 118 A.2d 316 (1955).
Accordingly, to prevail on the First Count of his complaint alleging the existence of an agreement between the parties, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake some form of actual contract commitment to him under which he could not be terminated without just cause. Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 15, 662 A.2d 89 (1995).
" The court agrees with the defendant, that in the present matter, the alleged representations of the defendant's employees fail to create any contractual commitment of continued employment because: (1) the alleged terms were not definite or certain; (2) there was no consideration supporting the alleged promise; (3) a promise of indefinite employment does not create an employment contract; (4) a progressive disciplinary policy does not create an employment contract; and (5) a promise that an employee will not be fired but for just cause does not create an employment contract." Goncalves v. Superior Plating Co., Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. No. CV085015711, (Sept. 9, 2010, Arnold, J.).
The plaintiff's claim is premised on conversation with John Valenti, the defendant's representative and employee, regarding the plaintiff's employment. The plaintiff testified that Valenti told the plaintiff, " as long as you keep your nose clean and do your job, you have no fear of losing your job." The plaintiff claims he also relied upon statements by Safety Manager Bryan Ayers at safety meetings to the effect that " any disciplinary would run a course." These alleged representations are insufficient to create an express or implied employment contract. Alleged representations that there was a progressive disciplinary system and that the plaintiff could only be discharged for just cause also do not create an actionable employment contract. The plaintiff cannot establish there was any definite promise made to him, or that there was a meeting of the minds with City Carting, his employer. " [A] contractual promise cannot be created by plucking phrases out of context; there must be a meeting of the minds between the parties." Reynolds v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp., 40 Conn.App. 725, 730, 673 A.2d 573, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 913, 675 A.2d 885 (1996). Any statements made by Valenti and/or Ayers, as alleged by the plaintiff, cannot reasonably be construed as a promise. The vague statements allegedly made by did not give rise to an enforceable contract. Goncalves v. Superior Plating Co., supra, Docket No. CV085015711, (Sept. 9, 2010, Arnold, J.); see also, Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 313, 528 A.2d 1123 (1987).
Even if one assumes, however, that there was an enforceable contract, the defendant has produced evidence for this motion that the defendant did have just cause to terminate the plaintiff. Prior to the plaintiff's termination on June 17, 2015, the plaintiff had been subject to warnings regarding his behavior and job performance. He was given the opportunities to improve his attitude, quality of work and willingness to follow instructions. He was advised in writing by way of the Handbook, which he acknowledged he received, that " corrective action interventions could be employed by City Carting including termination of employment." The defendant was an at-will employee and the defendant had a right to terminate the plaintiff's employment. The defendant, additionally, had followed a progressive disciplinary policy on six prior occasions and only then terminated the plaintiff for his latest behavior where he gave an obscene gesture to a passing motorist. The motion for summary judgment is granted as to Count One, which alleges a breach of contract.
B.
Negligent Misrepresentation
Our courts have long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation. " One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 643, 850 A.2d 145 (2004); Petitte v. DSL Net, Inc., 102 Conn.App. 363, 372, 925 A.2d 457 (2007).
Traditionally, an action for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result. Nazami v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626, 910 A.2d 209 (2006); Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 73, 873 A.2d 929 (2005); Johnnycake Mt. Assocs. v. Ochs, 104 Conn.App. 194, 201, 932 A.2d 472 (2007).
Since the rule of liability is based upon negligence, the defendant is subject to liability if, but only if, has failed to exercise the care or competence of a reasonable person in obtaining or communicating the information. 3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 552, comment (e), p. 130 (1977). " Whether evidence supports a claim of . . . negligent misrepresentation is a question of fact." (Citations omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 201-02, 932 A.2d 472. " Proving a false representation is, however, only one part of a claim of actionable misrepresentation. To prevail, the plaintiff also was required to show that he reasonably relied on that misrepresentation." Visconti v. Pepper Partners LTD. Partnership, 77 Conn.App. 675, 682-83, 825 A.2d 210 (2003); Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 575, 657 A.2d 212 (1995); D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 218, 520 A.2d 217; 3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 552, pp. 126-27 (1977).
An action in contract is for the breach of a duty arising out of a contract; an action in tort is for a breach of duty imposed by law. Goncalves v. Superior Plating Co., supra, Docket No. No. CV085015711, (Sept. 9, 2010, Arnold, J.) Out of a contractual relationship a tort liability, such as in negligence, may arise. A party may bring a claim. It is also true that " a remedy for negligent misrepresentation is independent of a remedy for a breach of contract." Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 232 Conn. at 563, 657 A.2d 212. A plaintiff is not barred from pursuing a negligence claim because they may also have a breach of contract claim. Id.
The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant made misrepresentations by supplying the plaintiff with false information to induce the plaintiff to act upon it. Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., supra, 274 Conn. 72-73. Two of the plaintiff's superiors allegedly conveyed to the plaintiff that he would be progressively disciplined and if the plaintiff did nothing wrong, " kept his nose clean, " the plaintiff would have a job. As recited herein, the defendant claims the representations made by Valenti were not false because the plaintiff failed to " keep his nose clean, " and as a result he was terminated. His termination followed multiple disciplinary reports in the past.
Nonetheless, " [w]hether evidence supports a claim of . . . negligent misrepresentation is a question of fact." (Citations omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 201-02, 932 A.2d 472. Thus, a liberal reading of Count Two, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, reveals that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the defendant's employees made misrepresentations to the plaintiff that induced the plaintiff to act by remaining in the defendant's employment instead of seeking other employment opportunities. The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the termination of the plaintiff's employment by the defendant has caused the plaintiff pecuniary harm. " Whether the defendant's representations were, in fact false; whether defendant knew or should have known its representations to the plaintiff were false; and whether the plaintiff reasonably relied upon any misrepresentation are normally questions of fact that the evidence will determine. Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 201-02, 932 A.2d 472; Mokonnen v. Pro Park, Inc., 96 Conn.App. 625, 633, 901 A.2d 725 (2006); Mips v. Becon, Inc., 70 Conn.App. 556, 558, 799 A.2d 1093 (2002). There are genuine issue of material fact as to Count Two. The motion for summary judgment is denied as to Count Two alleging a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
C.
Promissory Estoppel
" Section 90 of the Restatement Second states that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel '[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.' A fundamental element of promissory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and definite promise which a promisor could reasonably have expected to induce reliance. Thus, a promisor is not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason to expect any reliance at all. E. Farnsworth, supra, at 2.19, p. 95." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 206, 520 A.2d 217.
The alleged representations by the defendant's employees to the plaintiff do not invoke a cause of action for promissory estoppel because they are neither sufficiently promissory nor sufficiently definite to support contractual liability. The statements were, on their face, no more than representations indicating that the defendant intended to continue providing employment to the plaintiff in the future, so long as the plaintiff abided by the rules of employment, as set forth in the Handbook. There is no claim that these representations were not made in good faith at the time they were allegedly made. Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, these representations manifested no present intention on the part of the defendants to undertake immediate contractual obligations to the plaintiff. See D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 214-15, 520 A.2d 217. Furthermore, none of the alleged representations contained any of the material terms that would be essential to an employment contract, such as terms regarding the duration and conditions of the plaintiff's employment, and his salary and fringe benefits. At most, the defendant's employees made representations to the plaintiff concerning the expectation of future employment. These alleged representations stopped short of making the plaintiff a definite promise of employment on which he could reasonably have relied. Id., at 215, 520 A.2d 217. " A fundamental element of promissory estoppel, therefore, is the existence of a clear and definite promise which a promisor could reasonably have expected to induce reliance. Thus, a promisor is not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason to expect any reliance at all." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Ser. Corp., supra, 267 Conn. at 104-05, 837 A.2d 736.
Additionally, the promise must reflect a present intent to commit as distinguished from a mere statement of intent to contract in the future. See D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 214-15, 520 A.2d 217. " [A] mere expression of intention, hope, desire, or opinion, which shows no real commitment, cannot be expected to induce reliance, and, therefore, is not sufficiently promissory. The requirements of clarity and definiteness are the determinative factors in deciding whether the statements are indeed expressions of commitment as opposed to expressions of intention, hope, desire or opinion." (Citations omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Ser. Corp., supra, 267 Conn. at 106, 837 A.2d 736. The alleged statements by Valenti and Ayers, the defendant's employees were a mere expressions of intention and were their opinion. They could not have been expected to induce reliance. In addition they lacked the necessary requirements of clarity and definiteness.
Additionally, to succeed on a claim of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff who seeks to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel must have relied on the alleged promises of continued future employment and a progressive disciplinary system. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, supra, 202 Conn. at 213, 520 A.2d 217. That reliance, of course, may take the form of action or forbearance. Id. Nevertheless, the asserted reliance, regardless of its form, must result in a detrimental change in the plaintiff's position. Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Ser. Corp., supra, 267 Conn. at 112-13, 837 A.2d 736. Moreover, " [i]f the claimed reliance consists of the promisee's forbearance rather than an affirmative action, proof that this forbearance was induced by the promise requires a showing that the promisee could have acted." Id., at 113, 837 A.2d 736; 1 E. Farnsworth, supra, § 2.19, p. 164. In objecting to summary judgment, the plaintiff has not submitted any such proof or any such testimony in his deposition. The motion for summary judgment is granted as to Count Three, which alleges a claim for promissory estoppel.
III
Orders
The motion for summary judgment is granted as to Counts One and Three alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel, respectively. The motion is denied as to Count Two alleging negligent misrepresentation.