Opinion
No. 01-09-00818-CV
Opinion issued July 8, 2010.
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Case No. 347,998-401.
Panel consists of Justices JENNINGS, ALCALA, and MASSENGALE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Alfredo Gaytan, challenges the trial court's rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Kathy Ann Terry, in Gaytan's suit against Terry for fraud. In three issues, Gaytan contends that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction" to grant Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion.
Gaytan identifies and presents legal argument on his three issues in a document that he has styled a "Motion to Abate." However, Gaytan does not request abatement of the appeal in this document. We have construed this document as Gaytan's appellant's brief because it generally complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1.
We affirm.
Background
In his petition for a bill of review, Gaytan alleged that Terry, the attorney for Jo M. Downing, who was the executor of his deceased wife's estate, committed fraud to deprive him of his homestead rights. In his answer, Terry generally denied Gaytan's allegations. Terry subsequently filed summary judgment motions, in which she asserted that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and Gaytan had no evidence of any element of his fraud claim against her.
Gaytan, in his petition, also makes reference to the wrongful conduct allegedly committed by the executor's "family, husband, sons, brothers, friends, and some other relatives." However, nothing in the record indicates that Gaytan ever served any defendants in the case other than Terry, and Terry is the only appellee that appears in this appeal.
We also note that Gaytan has untimely filed a document entitled "Supplement In Support of Motion to Abate," in which he contends that "good cause" exists to support the filing of this "supplement." On March 31, 2010, we granted Gaytan an additional twenty days to file a supplemental or reply brief to his original brief. Thus, any additional briefing by Gaytan was due to be filed in this Court on April 20, 2010. Gaytan filed this "supplement," which is dated May 7, 2010, on May 10, 2010. Within this "supplement," Gaytan attempts to raise additional issues and identify John Gilpin, the attorney for Terry, as an additional appellee. Nothing in the record indicates that Gilpin was ever a party in the proceedings below. We conclude that Gaytan's supplement, in which he seeks to raise new issues and identify new parties to this appeal, is untimely, and we do not consider it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6, 38.7.
In his response to Terry's summary judgment motions, Gaytan asserted that "defendants committed fraudulent concealment by supplying false information" to the trial court to deprive him of his homestead rights "by not making direct or indirect reference that the deceased was survived by a spouse in the applications to probate the will and order granting letters of administration." Gaytan did not attach any evidence to this response. He also filed two "motions to dismiss" Terry's summary judgment motions on the grounds that the motions were "not sworn or verified or supported by any affidavit"; the allegations contained in the motions were conclusory, controverted, baseless, and meritless; and there was no evidence attached to Terry's motions.
The trial court granted Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion.
Standard of Review
To prevail on a no-evidence summary judgment motion, a movant must allege that there is no evidence of an essential element of the adverse party's cause of action or affirmative defense. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard used to review a directed verdict. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 832-33 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). Although the nonmoving party is not required to marshal its proof, it must present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A no-evidence summary judgment motion may not be properly granted if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. See Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)). When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment motion, we assume that all evidence favorable to the nonmovant is true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Spradlin v. State, 100 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st] 2002, no pet.).
Service
In his first issue, Gaytan argues that the trial court "lacked jurisdiction" to grant Terry summary judgment because "service was defective" in that he was not served with Terry's summary judgment motions in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107. Although Gaytan acknowledges that he had actually received and responded to Terry's motions, he complains that the return receipt shows that the mail room clerk at the jail in which he was incarcerated was the person who was actually served with the summary judgment motions.
Gaytan also asserts that Terry never served Downing "according to the rules of citation." As noted above, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Gaytan served any other defendants with citation in this suit or that any other parties ever appeared in the below proceedings.
First, rule 107, and the cases cited by Gaytan in his brief, relate to the service of citation, not the service of a summary judgment motion or other documents. TEX. R. CIV. P. 107. However, it is Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a that sets forth various methods of service for motions, including summary judgment motions. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. Second, there is no dispute that Gaytan, the plaintiff who filed the petition, and Terry, who filed her answer and her summary judgment motions, both appeared and were properly before the trial court during the summary judgment proceedings. Third, Gaytan admits that, even though an employee of the jail in which he was incarcerated signed the receipt for the summary judgment motions, Gaytan actually received them, apparently after they were signed for by the jail employee. In fact, Gaytan timely filed a response to Terry's summary judgment motions. Gaytan also filed two separate responses to the motions asking the trial court to dismiss Terry's motions. In his responses, Gaytan addressed the substance of Terry's summary judgment arguments and argued that Terry's summary judgment motions should not be considered. Moreover, Gaytan did not complain in his responses that he had not been served with copies of Terry's summary judgment motions or that he had received inadequate notice prior to the submission of Terry's summary judgment motions. Thus, Gaytan fully participated in the trial court's summary judgment proceedings without objection to the method of service of those motions. Accordingly, we conclude that Gaytan was in fact served with the motions, and he cannot now complain on appeal that he was not properly served. See Goforth v. Bradshaw, 296 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (stating that purpose of rule 21a "is to achieve actual notice and to set up presumptions to use in disputes about whether notice was achieved"; determining that even though report was served on party by regular mail, which is not authorized by rule 21a, there was "acknowledged" and "actual delivery" of report); Spiegel v. Strother, 262 S.W.3d 481, 482-84 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.) (discussing rule 21a and holding that defendant who acknowledged receipt of expert report through delivery to personnel at his office and also through priority mail had been served, even though service was not accomplished with one of methods specifically enumerated in rule 21a); Netherland v. Wittner, 662 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that when appellant acknowledged timely receipt of notice by regular mail, appellant appeared and fully participated at trial, and appellant did not claim harm arising from notice, appellee had fulfilled primary purposes of service under rule 21a); Hill v. W.E. Brittain, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, no writ) (stating that "service and notice in a technical sense [are] incidental where the main purpose of obtaining the appearance of all parties and their participation is accomplished").
The trial court's order granting Terry summary judgment states that Terry's motions were heard on August 3, 2009, rendering Gaytan's responses, which were signed by Gaytan on July 15, 2009 and file-stamped on July 23, 2009, timely. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a.
Gaytan raised a number of other complaints in his response to Terry's summary judgment motions that he does not raise on appeal. For example, Gaytan complained in his response that he had not been properly served with citation.
As noted above, the only rule Gaytan cites is rule 107, which does not apply. Nevertheless, we construe Gaytan's brief to raise the more general complaint that Terry did not serve the summary judgment motions in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
We overrule Gaytan's first issue.
Gaytan's Summary Judgment Responses
In his second issue, Gaytan argues that he was denied due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and due course of law under article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution because he timely filed a response to Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion and this response was not considered by the trial court.
According to the trial court's order, Terry's motion was heard on August 3, 2009. Gaytan's response was dated July 15, 2009. Nothing in the record substantiates Gaytan's complaint that the trial court refused to consider his response.
To the extent that Gaytan's argument may be construed as a direct challenge to the trial court's granting of Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion, we note that Terry sought summary judgment on the ground that Gaytan could produce no evidence on any element of his fraud claim against her. To establish a fraud claim, a plaintiff must show that that (1) a material representation was made, (2) the representation was false, (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, (4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that the other party should act upon it, (5) the party acted in reliance on the representation, and (6) the party thereby suffered injury. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001).
Gaytan attached no evidence to his response to Terry's summary judgment motion. Although Gaytan referred to numerous other documents that he had asserted were in the trial court's records, and although he argued that these documents evidenced Terry's alleged fraud associated with admitting his wife's will to probate, none of the documents is contained in the record before us. Gaytan failed to present any evidence in support of his fraud claim. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion.
We overrule Gaytan's second issue.
Verification
In his third issue, Gaytan argues that the trial court erred in granting Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion because it was "not sworn or certified."
A no-evidence summary judgment motion need not be sworn, verified, or "certified." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Terry's no-evidence summary judgment motion on the ground that it was "not sworn or certified."
We overrule Gaytan's third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.