Gay v. Warden

Full title: MICHAEL GAY (INMATE #205321) v. WARDEN, STATE PRISON

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville

Date published: Jun 10, 2010

2010 Ct. Sup. 12353 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010)

Opinion

No. CV 07 4001607

June 10, 2010

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (115.00)

(This decision corrects a scrivener's error which misidentified the trial court as Hadden, J. The trial court is properly identified herein as Holden, J.)

NAZZARO, J.

The petitioner, Michael Gay, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on March 6, 2007, challenging the legality of his detention. After the appointment of counsel, he filed an amended petition on November 6, 2009. On December 10, 2009, the respondent filed a return, denying the material allegations of the petition and asserting that some of the petitioner's claims are barred by res judicata. The petitioner filed a reply on December 23, 2009, asserting that res judicata does not apply to his claims because they present new facts and evidence. The respondent then filed the present motion for summary judgment on January 13, 2010, to which the petitioner filed an objection on January 20, 2010. The court heard oral argument on the motion on January 26, 2010.

FACTS

The following facts are not in dispute. On January 6, 2006, the petitioner pleaded guilty to charges of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in connection with a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 16, 2001, in which the petitioner's passenger was left paralyzed from the neck down and with one amputated arm. On that same date, he also pleaded guilty to assault of a public safety officer arising from an incident that occurred on March 21, 2005. Attorney Elizabeth Reid represented the petitioner in these matters.

Shortly after pleading guilty, the petitioner hired private counsel, Attorney Tina Sypek D'Amato. On February 6, 2006, the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court, Holden, J., denied after a hearing on the merits. On March 20, 2006, the petitioner filed a second motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court, Holden, J., also denied after a hearing on the merits. On March 27, 2006, the petitioner was sentenced to a total effective sentence of five years to be served consecutive to the sentence that he received for violating his probation.¹

1 The November 16, 2001 accident occurred while the petitioner was on probation. Following a violation of probation hearing, the petitioner was found in violation of the conditions of his probation and sentenced to seven years in prison. See State v. Gay, 87 Conn.App. 806, 814, 867 A.2d 26, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 999 (2005).

DISCUSSION

"At any time after the pleadings are closed, any party may move for summary judgment, which shall be rendered if the pleadings, affidavits and any other evidence submitted show that there is no genuine issue of material fact between the parties requiring a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 23-37. "Because res judicata . . . if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).

The respondent moves for summary judgment as to the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Attorney Reid on the ground that they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as they were already fully litigated before the trial court and Appellate Court in the context of the petitioner's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. In support of the motion, the respondent filed a memorandum of law and the following documents: (1) the decision in State v. Gay, 108 Conn.App. 211, 947 A.2d 428, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 913, 954 A.2d 186 (2008); (2) the record before the Appellate Court in State v. Gay, supra, 108 Conn.App. 211; (3) a copy of a certified transcript of the February 27, 2006 hearing held on the petitioner's first motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (4) a copy of a certified transcript of the March 27, 2006 hearing held on the petitioner's second motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The petitioner objected to the motion, asserting that his claims against Attorney Reid were not fully litigated in the prior proceedings because of the ineffective assistance of Attorney D'Amato.²

2 Although the petitioner asserted in his reply that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Attorney Reid presented new facts and evidence not reasonably available at the time of the prior litigation, he made no such showing in his objection or at the hearing on the respondent's motion for summary judgment.

"The doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment serves as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving any claims relating to such cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made . . . The doctrine . . . applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings and to state habeas corpus proceedings . . . However, [u]nique policy considerations must be taken into account in applying the doctrine of res judicata to a constitutional claim raised by a habeas petitioner . . . Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights . . . the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . . [is limited] to claims that actually have been raised and litigated in an earlier proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kearney v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn.App. 223, 234, 965 A.2d 608 (2009).

A plea of guilty may be withdrawn on the ground that it "resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel." Practice Book § 39-27(4). In Bridges v. Commissioner of Correction, 97 Conn.App. 119, 905 A.2d 103, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 921, 908 A.2d 543 (2006), the Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition on the ground of res judicata because the petitioner had already raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied by the trial court. In dismissing the petitioner's appeal, the Appellate court explained: "[The] factual issues concerning his plea, as well as the nature of the representation afforded him by his trial counsel, already have been resolved, adversely to him, in a prior proceeding. The judgment rendered by the court with regard to the petitioner's motion for permission to withdraw his pleas constituted a judgment on the merits of the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Id., 121.

In the present case, prior to being sentenced, the petitioner filed two motions to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground, inter alia, that they were the result of the ineffective assistance of Attorney Reid. In his first motion, filed on February 6, 2006 and later amended on February 17, 2006, he claimed that Attorney Reid rendered ineffective assistance (1) by allegedly telling him that he could plea guilty to buy himself some time to hire a private attorney, who could then move to have his pleas withdrawn prior to sentencing and (2) by failing to contact the victim of the motor vehicle assault.³ In his second motion, filed on March 20, 2006, the petitioner claimed that Attorney Reid rendered ineffective assistance by being unprepared for trial. Specifically, he alleged that she failed (1) to investigate the scene of the motor vehicle accident, (2) to read the transcripts of his violation of probation hearing and (3) to contact the victim.⁴

3 Court Record, pp. 11-16.

4 Court Record, pp. 17-26.

In his amended petition, the petitioner is again seeking to having his guilty pleas withdrawn on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. This time, he alleges that Attorney Reid rendered ineffective assistance (1) by failing to adequately investigate the circumstances of the motor vehicle accident and (2) by failing to adequately prepare for trial in that she failed to review certain police reports and medical reports with the petitioner and to assemble witnesses in support of his defense at trial. The petitioner also alleges in his amended petition that Attorney D'Amato was ineffective in that she too failed to adequately investigate the motor vehicle accident.

As in Bridges, the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Attorney Reid have already been resolved by means of his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. A hearing was held on each of his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, at which both Attorney Reid and he testified. In denying the first motion on the record, the court indicated that "there [was] no basis to suggest or support" a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.⁵ Similarly, in denying the second motion, the court stated: "[T]here is nothing on the evidence to suggest that your plea ought to be withdrawn based upon any effective [sic] counsel . . ."⁶ Furthermore, on appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court finding no evidence in the record to support the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Attorney Reid. See State v. Gay, supra, 108 Conn.App. 216 ("[t]he defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas because his appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance . . . [w]e are unpersuaded").

5 Transcript of February 27, 2006 Hearing, p. 70.

6 of March 27, 2006 Hearing, p. 92.

As illustrated supra, there is no dispute that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Attorney Reid in the context of his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. Accordingly, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata the petitioner is barred from raising those same claims or those that could have been raised in the prior proceedings in the present habeas matter. The motion for summary judgment is thereby granted as to the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Attorney Reid. This judgment does not affect any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that the petitioner may have against Attorney D'Amato.

CONCLUSION

As there are no disputed issues of material fact and the respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the respondent's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.