" P. 329. In George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892 ( 109 S.E.2d 883) and Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 ( 113 S.E.2d 223), decided after the Statewide Probation Act (Ga. L. 1956, p. 27; Code Ann. §§ 27-2702 — 27-2721), it was held that Code Ann. § 27-2711, which provides that "The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation and may provide that the probationer shall [do or not do enumerated things]," was not exclusive in its provisions "but `the court has authority to impose restrictions not specifically listed therein.'" Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1), supra.

Code § 27-2711 sets forth the usual terms and conditions of probation. It has long been the rule, however, that Code § 27-2711 permits a trial court to impose other conditions not specifically enumerated. Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 223) (1960); State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 670 ( 208 S.E.2d 472) (1974); Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 261 ( 274 S.E.2d 595) (1980); Code § 27-2502. However, we have found no statute or other authority which would authorize a trial court to require third parties to maintain a residence for an adult defendant without their consent.

Probated and suspended sentences, upon reasonable conditions, have traditionally been used by trial judges in Georgia as effective tools of rehabilitation and serve a useful purpose in appropriate cases as an alternative to confinement. E. g., see, Davis v. State, 53 Ga. App. 325, 329 ( 185 S.E. 400); Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 223); O'Quinn v. State, 121 Ga. App. 231 (3) ( 173 S.E.2d 409); Falkenhainer v. State, 122 Ga. App. 478 ( 177 S.E.2d 380); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392 ( 67 S.E.2d 124). The defendant in the present case has made only a general attack on the present sentence as being illegal, contending it is per se violative of public policy.

The appellant cannot complain of lack of notice where he voluntarily and without solicitation admits in judicio that he has violated the terms of his probation. Compare George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892 ( 109 S.E.2d 883); Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (2) ( 113 S.E.2d 223); Dingler v. State, 101 Ga. App. 312 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 496); Rainwater v. State, 127 Ga. App. 406 ( 193 S.E.2d 889). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

However, a sentencing judge has wide authority and latitude to impose special conditions of probation pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-35, including a requirement that the defendant reside at a diversion center. See generally Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 223) (1960). Accordingly, the issue presented for resolution is whether the failure of one, such as appellee, to abide by such a requirement will subject him to a prosecution for the felony offense of escape, and not merely to a revocation of his probation.

We do not inquire as to the authority of the board to suspend him. See Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 223); Geiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 800, 802 (3) ( 232 S.E.2d 109); Mann v. State, 154 Ga. App. 677, 681 ( 269 S.E.2d 863); Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 440 ( 274 S.E.2d 799); Johnson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 226 ( 291 S.E.2d 94); Biddy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 4, 5 (4) ( 225 S.E.2d 448); Wilson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 501, 504 (8) ( 260 S.E.2d 527). We do not find it to be illogical for the trial court, as a condition of probation, to require repayment of the salary he received while suspended.

The acts enumerated in this statute are not exclusive, and the trial court has the authority to impose conditions not specifically listed therein. Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 223) (1960). Code Ann. § 27-2506 (now OCGA § 17-10-3 (e) (4)), which relates to punishment in misdemeanor cases, provides: "In addition to or instead of any other penalty for the punishment of a misdemeanor involving a traffic offense, ... a judge may impose any one or more of the following sentences: ... (d) Probation or suspension of all or any part of a penalty upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the judge."

1. The condition the defendant was charged with violating was one which provided for a "10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. Curfew." This court and our Supreme Court have often held that Code Ann. § 27-2711 (Ga. L. 1958, pp. 15, 23; as amended through Ga. L. 1965, pp. 413, 416) is to be construed as permissive rather than exclusive, permitting under its terms any reasonable probation condition to be imposed. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 893 (1) ( 109 S.E.2d 883); Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) ( 113 S.E.2d 223); Geiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 800, 802 (3) ( 232 S.E.2d 109); Wood v. State, 150 Ga. App. 582, 583 (2) ( 258 S.E.2d 171); State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 670 ( 208 S.E.2d 472); Ward v. State, 248 Ga. 60, 63 (2) ( 281 S.E.2d 503). 2. From an examination of the record and transcript it is apparent that there is some evidence sufficient to sustain the trial judge's finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probation and that because of a pattern of several such violations his conduct was wilful and intentional.

Code Ann. § 27-2709 gives jurisdiction to the trial court to determine the question of probation of a defendant who has been found guilty of a criminal offense; Code Ann. § 27-2711 permits the court to determine the terms and conditions of probation, and lists 10 conditions of probation. It is well settled that the conditions enumerated in that section are not exclusive, but the trial court may impose other requirements not specifically listed therein. Wood v. State, 150 Ga. App. 582, 583 ( 258 S.E.2d 171) (1979); Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 ( 113 S.E.2d 223) (1960). Banishment of one convicted of a crime from a county or counties has been held to be a reasonable condition of probation.

But, of course, there must be some evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his probated sentence as charged in the notice given him of the revocation hearing. See Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 ( 113 S.E.2d 223) and Ware v. State, 137 Ga. App. 673 ( 224 S.E.2d 873). Here the evidence with reference to the commission of the armed robbery is slight and based upon circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime. Defendant's main contention is that the witnesses used against him were convicted felons, and the credit which the trial court should give to this testimony was questionable.