We recognize that a minority of states adhere to a contrary reasonableness standard. See e.g. Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278–81 (Iowa 2000) (refusing to enjoin construction of fence that would have intruded on a sixteen-and-a-half-foot-wide easement by as little as two inches; reasoning that balancing the needs of the dominant and servient estate owners will maximize aggregate utility); Musselshell Ranch Co. v. Seidel–Joukova, 362 Mont. 1, 261 P.3d 570, 577 (2011) (requiring removal of culvert installed in irrigation ditch, but stating that “[s]ome permanent encroachments may not justify a finding of unreasonable interference”); Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 910 A.2d 392, 395 (2006) (reciting the majority rule, but reaching the opposite conclusion where there was no evidence that sign interfered with use of the easement for ingress and egress); Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So.3d 312, 316–17 (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (owner of dominant estate not entitled to removal of encroaching columns until such time as they actually interfere with use of the easement); Baum v. Glen Park Props., 660 S.W.2d 723, 726–27 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (allowing erection of sign within easement so long as it did not interfere with ingress and egress); D'Abbracci v. Shaw–Bastian, 201 Or.App. 108, 117 P.3d 1032, 1040 (2005); DeHaven v. Hall, 753 N.W.2d 429, 439–40 (S.D.2008). We find the majority approach more persuasive.
We recognize that a minority of states adhere to a contrary reasonableness standard. See e.g. Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278–81 (Iowa 2000) (refusing to enjoin construction of fence that would have intruded on a sixteen-and-a-half-foot-wide easement by as little as two inches; reasoning that balancing the needs of the dominant and servient estate owners will maximize aggregate utility); Musselshell Ranch Co. v. Seidel–Joukova, 362 Mont. 1, 261 P.3d 570, 577 (2011) (requiring removal of culvert installed in irrigation ditch, but stating that "[s]ome permanent encroachments may not justify a finding of unreasonable interference"); Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 910 A.2d 392, 395 (2006) (reciting the majority rule, but reaching the opposite conclusion where there was no evidence that sign interfered with use of the easement for ingress and egress); Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So.3d 312, 316–17 (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (owner of dominant estate not entitled to removal of encroaching columns until such time as they actually interfere with use of the easement); Baum v. Glen Park Props., 660 S.W.2d 723, 726–27 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (allowing erection of sign within easement so long as it did not interfere with ingress and egress); D'Abbracci v. Shaw–Bastian, 201 Or.App. 108, 117 P.3d 1032, 1040 (2005) ; DeHaven v. Hall, 753 N.W.2d 429, 439–40 (S.D.2008). We find the majority approach more persuasive.
We address each of these contentions below, keeping in mind that "[a]n appellate court employs a limited standard of review in chancery matters." Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So. 3d 312, 316 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). "The findings of the chancery court will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence unless the court abused its discretion, applied an erroneous legal standard, was manifestly wrong, or committed clear error."
We address each of these contentions below, keeping in mind that "[a]n appellate court employs a limited standard of review in chancery matters." Gaw v. Seldon , 85 So.3d 312, 316 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). "The findings of the chancery court will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence unless the court abused its discretion, applied an erroneous legal standard, was manifestly wrong, or committed clear error."
The two remaining claims asserted against L & M are trespass and ejectment. "Liability for trespass requires proof of: (1) interference with the right of exclusive possession of one's land and (2) an invasion that is the 'direct result of some act committed by the defendant.'" Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So.3d 312, 318 (¶ 23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Thomas v. Harrah's Vicksburg Corp., 734 So.2d 312, 315 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). Similarly, "[a] civil action seeking ejectment as relief may be maintained in all cases where the plaintiff is legally entitled to the possession of the land sued for and demanded."
"Liability for trespass requires proof of: (1) interference with the right of exclusive possession of one's land and (2) an invasion that is the 'direct result of some act committed by the defendant.'" Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So. 3d 312, 318 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Thomas v. Harrah's Vicksburg Corp., 734 So. 2d 312, 315 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). Similarly, "[a] civil action seeking ejectment as relief may be maintained in all cases where the plaintiff is legally entitled to the possession of the land sued for and demanded."
rule is necessarily accurate; the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the rule appears to us to be roughly equal to the number of jurisdictions that have rejected it or declined to apply it. Compare Squaw Peak Cmty. Covenant Church of Phoenix v. Anozira Dev., Inc., 719 P.2d 295, 299 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1986); Sand Lake Shoppes Family Ltd. P'ship v. Sand Lake Courtyards, LC, 816 So.2d 143, 145- 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Waikiki Bus. Plaza, Inc., 719 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986); Johnson, 319 P.3d at 487; Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Props., Inc., 561 P.2d 818, 822 (Kan. 1977); Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 833 A.2d 536, 547 (Md. 2003); Xanadu Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Ocean Walk Horizontal Prop. Regime, 410 S.E.2d 580, 581 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); Lamb v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 985 P.2d 433, 437-38 (Wyo. 1999), with Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278-81 (Iowa 2000); Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 910 A.2d 392, 395 (Me. 2006); Gaw v. Seldon, 85 So.3d 312, 317 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Baum v. Glen Park Props., 660 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Mo.Ct.App. 1983); D'Abbracci v. Shaw-Bastian, 117 P.3d 1032, 1041 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); DeHaven v. Hall, 753 N.W.2d 429, 439-40 (S.D. 2008).
Berlin v. Livingston Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. , 232 So. 3d 148, 154 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Gaw v. Seldon , 85 So. 3d 312, 316 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ). "The findings of the chancery court will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence unless the court abused its discretion, applied an erroneous legal standard, was manifestly wrong, or committed clear error."
This Court has held that "[l]iability for trespass requires proof of: (1) interference with the right of exclusive possession of one's land and (2) an invasion that is the direct result of some act committed by the defendant." Gaw v. Seldon , 85 So.3d 312, 318 (¶ 23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation mark omitted). Furthermore, "because trespass is an intentional tort, there must be proof that the trespasser intended to enter upon the particular piece of land in question."
Id. Therefore, we will simply reverse and render an award of $10 in nominal damages, as the Supreme Court and this Court have done in prior cases. Id. (rendering judgment for $10 in nominal damages in the absence of proof of actual damages); seeReeves v. Meridian S. Ry. LLC , 61 So.3d 964, 968–69 (¶¶ 22–23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (rendering judgment for $10 in nominal damages where there was no proof that trespass caused any actual damages); Gaw v. Seldon , 85 So.3d 312, 318 (¶¶ 21–24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (same). We reject Main Street's argument that it was entitled to the reasonable rental value of the narrow strips of property at issue.