Although the preceding cases arose in the context of eminent domain proceedings, we are persuaded by the presence of similar language in other contexts that they correctly state a general rule suitable for application in the instant case. In deciding that the holder of an unexercised option was not an "equitable owner" entitled to a tax exemption, for example, the court in Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956), relied upon 32 Am.Jur. Landlord and Tenant § 300 in stating: [U]nder a lease with option to purchase the relation of the parties is merely that of landlord and tenant until the option is exercised, and the tenant has no estate in the land beyond the lease until he elects to purchase.

As we explained over fifty years ago, "until an optionee exercises the right to purchase in accordance with the terms of his option he has no estate, either legal or equitable, in the lands involved." Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 1956). We have since reiterated that principle.

To the contrary, this Court has long held that the status of parties to the ordinary lease with an option to purchase remains that of landlord and tenant until the option is exercised and that the lessee has no equitable interest in the property. Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956). We hold only that under the stipulated facts of this case, the project is not subject to ad valorem taxation because the Authority holds virtually all the benefits and burdens of ownership.

E.g., Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266, 38 A.L.R. 1151 (1925). See generally, Gautier v. Lapof, Fla., 91 So.2d 324 (1956). Other courts have concluded that an option creates a vested interest in the property, and that since the interest is presently vested there is no reason to invoke the rule against perpetuities, which assumes a future vesting.

E.g., Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266, 38 A.L.R. 1151 (1925). See generally, Gautier v. Lapof, Fla., 91 So.2d 324 (1956). Other courts have concluded that an option creates a vested interest in the property, and that since the interest is presently vested there is no reason to invoke the rule against perpetuities, which assumes a future vesting.

Further, the holder of an option to purchase real estate may maintain an action for specific performance against a purchaser who with knowledge of the option acquired subsequent interests in the property. See Cwiakala v. Giunta, 23 N.J. Super. 261, 92 A.2d 849 (1952); but cf. Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1956) (holder of option has neither legal nor equitable title in property sufficient to maintain an action for declaratory judgment); Durfee Housing Furnishing Co. v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 100 Vt. 204, 136 A. 379 (1927) (holder of option does not have legal title in property sufficient to maintain an action in ejectment). Analogously, in Meyers v. Markham, 90 Minn. 230, 96 N.W. 335, 787 (1903), we held that a vendee under a contract for the sale of land may, where the vendor subsequently conveys the land to a third party with notice of the contract, seek performance of the contract against the third party.

The exemption from forced sale under section 4, Article X of the Florida Constitution, however, is different than the exemption from taxation for homestead and, as noted by one court, "must not be confused." See Taylor v. Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 563 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2006); S. Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1956). Section 6, Article VII of the Florida Constitution affords a homestead tax exemption to individuals who maintain a permanent residence on real estate to which they hold legal or equitable title "upon establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by law."

In sum, it is my opinion that a permanently and totally disabled veteran is required by sections 196.011 and 196.081, Florida Statutes, to hold title to the property for which he or she claims an exemption on January 1 of the tax year for which the exemption is claimed. Cf., Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956) (purchasers of property not entitled to homestead exemption for tax year 1954, as they did not have legal or equitable title to property on January 1, 1954, when status or title of property determined who was entitled to homestead exemption for tax year 1954); Horne v. Markham, 288 So.2d 196, 197 (Fla. 1973) (constitutional provision providing for homestead exemption from taxation does not establish an absolute right to homestead exemption; rather, taxpayers who qualify will be granted exemptions only upon establishment of their right thereto as prescribed by law). Sincerely,

After a hearing on the motion, the trial judge entered an order which included the following findings: 7. An option to purchase does not create any rights in land and the option cannot be related back to the date of the creation of the option or of the lease, Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956). 8.

Leon County Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Hartsfield, 698 So.2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1997). See Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956), cited in Hartsfield, 698 So.2d at 530 (no equitable ownership even when lease contains option to purchase); Hull v. Maryland Cas. Co., 79 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1954) (doctrine of equitable conversion becomes operative only upon entry of an agreement to convey title to realty); Valencia Center, Inc. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 464 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (landlord remains owner of property burdened by lengthy lease at economically inadequate rent), pet. for review denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1985); B.W.B. Corp. v. Muscare, 349 So.2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (only contract for sale of property establishes vendee as beneficial owner); Sweet v. First Nat'l Bank, 254 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (vendee becomes beneficial owner only when vendor-owner makes specifically enforceable contract to sell property), cert. denied, 259 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1972); cf. Hartsfield, 698 So.2d at 526 (lessee equitable owner when lessor holds title only to facilitate financing and lessee may acquire title by