Opinion
Record No. 2568-92-4
February 8, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY PAUL F. SHERIDAN, JUDGE.
Denman A. Rucker (Rucker Rucker, on brief), for appellant.
Mary E. Craig, Assistant County Attorney (Arlington County Attorney's Office, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick.
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Benita Gault (Gault) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, Brittany. She argues that the trial court erred in finding that (1) she had abused and neglected her daughter, and (2) she had failed to substantially correct the conditions that caused such abuse. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, giving it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). "Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
Termination of residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) is permitted if the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) termination is in the best interests of the child; (2) the neglect or abuse suffered by the child presents a serious and substantial threat to the child's life, health or development; and (3) it is not reasonably likely that the conditions which led to the neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated to allow the safe return of the child within a reasonable period of time.Edwards v. Arlington County, 5 Va. App. 294, 306, 361 S.E.2d 644, 650 (1987).
Brittany Gault (Brittany) was born on June 14, 1988, in Washington, D.C. to Gault and John Horsey. Six weeks later, Gault and the child's father took Brittany to Ohio where Gault was arrested for passing bad checks. Mr. Horsey returned to the Washington D.C. area with Brittany and left her with a woman Gault had met in a bar. Brittany remained with this woman for eight months. During that time, Brittany received no inoculations or vaccinations, and was hospitalized for seventeen days with gastroenteritis, and for ten days with diarrhea.
On April 19, 1989, when Brittany was ten months old, Gault returned to the Washington D.C. area and was arrested in Arlington, Virginia for violating the terms of her probation. Upon her arrest, Gault signed an entrustment agreement with Arlington County Social Services, and Brittany was placed in foster care. At the time Brittany was initially placed with Arlington County, she had not received regular pediatric care, was retarded in her muscle development and had behavioral problems.
In September 1989, Gault was erroneously released from the Arlington County jail. During the several months she was free, Gault did not visit her daughter. When Gault was picked up by the police and returned to jail, her thirteen year sentence was suspended for five years, contingent upon her completing a drug treatment program. She was subsequently admitted to the Second Genesis drug treatment program on April 20, 1990, but absconded from the program six days later. Gault was rearrested in August, 1990. On December 18, 1990, the court imposed a prison sentence of twelve years and eight months, and Gault was incarcerated in the women's penitentiary in Goochland, Virginia.
While incarcerated, Gault was evaluated by Dr. Fred M. Kerman, who testified at trial that she suffered from clinical depression, an anti-social personality disorder and a long-standing psychoactive substance abuse problem. Dr. Kerman's prognosis was "very guarded to poor" concerning Gault's ability to avoid drug abuse and criminal activities.
Dr. Kerman also evaluated Brittany. He observed her in her foster home, and found that Brittany was a part of a close-knit family and attached to her foster parents and their two other children. Dr. Kerman opined that "it would be very traumatic for [Brittany] to be removed from this support environment and placed in a situation of . . . [the] unknown."
On the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the Commonwealth demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Brittany had been abused and neglected by Gault and that the neglect suffered by Brittany posed a serious and substantive threat to her health and development. Additionally, the court had clear and convincing evidence that it was unlikely that Gault would be able to correct the conditions and habits of a lifetime, including her drug abuse and the continuing criminal behavior which led to Brittany's placement in foster care, within a reasonable length of time, so as to enable Gault to provide a proper home in the foreseeable future. See Code § 16.1-283(B).
As in Ward v. Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 144, 408 S.E.2d 921 (1991), we are faced with a mother who has a long-standing substance abuse problem which continues to affect her ability to parent, and who has, without good cause, failed to follow through with substance abuse treatment. Although "the statutory scheme of Code § 16.2-283 is designed to 'balance the needs of the child against the rights of the parents and the common interest in preserving family relationships,'"Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 539, 394 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1990) (citation omitted), it is clear from the evidence that there is no real family relationship to preserve in this case, only a legal bond.
"It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities." Kaywood, 10 Va. App. at 540, 394 S.E.2d at 495. For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.