In their brief, defendants Pedapati and Kline cite several decisions where the discovery rule was held to bar medical malpractice lawsuits. See Blair v. Blondis, 160 Ill. App.3d 184 (1987); Conley v. Springfield Clinic, 130 Ill. App.3d 369 (1985); Gaudynski v. Corbett, 81 Ill. App.3d 910 (1980); O'Bryant v. Starkman, 53 Ill. App.3d 991 (1977). For the reasons discussed below, the cases are inapposite.

]" Bates, 108 Ill. App.3d at 140-41. In urging affirmance, the defendants rely heavily upon this court's opinion in Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 401 N.E.2d 1218, which involved circumstances similar to those presented in the instant case. In Gaudynski, the plaintiff underwent surgery to repair a broken hip in May 1970. After surgery, he noticed that the area around the wound was red and swollen, and a yellowish-green secretion was draining from the scar.

Defendant argues that a consultation with attorneys is not sufficient as a matter of law. The cases cited by defendant do not stand for the proposition that a consultation with attorneys cannot be the point in time when discovery is made. ( Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 401 N.E.2d 1218; Nelson v. Jain (N.D. Ill. 1981), 526 F. Supp. 1154, aff'd (1983), 714 F.2d 150.) Rather, these cases hold that plaintiffs were apprised of sufficient facts to begin the limitations period prior to consultations with their attorneys. ( Gaudynski, 81 Ill. App.3d at 913, 401 N.E.2d at 1220; Nelson, 526 F. Supp. at 1156-57.) In this case, it is a reasonable inference from the facts that plaintiff became aware of the unnecessary surgery during a meeting with her attorneys. Her attorneys in this cause also represented her in her workers' compensation matter.

In addition, the other facts known by Peterson (see discussion supra) reveal clearly, according to the defendants, that Peterson should have known that someone had committed malpractice. In making their argument, the defendants rely principally on the case of Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 401 N.E.2d 1218. Peterson, on the other hand, responds that, although he knew that his foot was not healing properly, he did not realize that the complications could have resulted from malpractice until such was brought to his attention by a subsequent treating physician.

At that point the burden is upon the injured person to inquire further as to the existence of a cause of action. ( United States v. Kubrick (1979), 444 U.S. 111, 62 L.Ed.2d 259, 100 S.Ct. 352; Urchel v. Holy Cross Hospital (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 1050, 1052-53; Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 913-14; Ikenn v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 694, 699; Greenock v. Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 266.) In many, if not most, cases the time at which an injured party knows or reasonably should have known both of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused will be a disputed question to be resolved by the finder of fact.

Both section 2-615 and section 2-619 motions based on affirmative matter admit as true, for purposes of the motions, all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those facts ( Duncan v. Rzonca (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 184, 190, 478 N.E.2d 603 (section 2-615); Faerber Electrical Co. v. International Telephone Telegraph Corp. (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 704, 707, 463 N.E.2d 820 (section 2-619)), but not conclusions of law or conclusions of fact unsupported by specific facts ( Groenings v. City of St. Charles (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 295, 299, 574 N.E.2d 1316 (section 2-615); Bell Fuels, Inc. v. Lockheed Electronics Co. (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 940, 943, 474 N.E.2d 1312 (section 2-619)). Additionally, in ruling on a section 2-619 motion, the circuit court may consider pleadings, discovery documents and affidavits submitted by the parties. ( Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 914-15, 401 N.E.2d 1218.) Disputed questions of law are reviewed de novo.

At that point the burden is upon the injured person to inquire further as to the existence of a cause of action. ( United States v. Kubrick (1979), 444 U.S. 111, 62 L.Ed.2d 259, 100 S.Ct. 352; Urchel v. Holy Cross Hospital (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 1050, 1052-53; Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 913-14; Ikenn v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 694, 699; Greenock v. Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 266.) In many, if not most, cases the time at which an injured party knows or reasonably should have known both of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused will be a disputed question to be resolved by the finder of fact. ( Lipsey [ v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill.2d 32].) Where it is apparent from the undisputed facts, however, that only one conclusion can be drawn, the question becomes one for the court.

The trial court also noted that prior to the March 11, 1982, visit, plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she was told by the Missouri doctors her hip was dying, that further surgery was necessary, and that her pain was caused by avascular necrosis and bursitis. The trial court likened this case to Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 401 N.E.2d 1218, Conley v. Springfield Clinic (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 369, 474 N.E.2d 421, and Lesko v. Zuffante (1987), 165 Ill. App.3d 823, 520 N.E.2d 810. Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-619, the trial court may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and deposition evidence. (See Dunn v. Baltimore Ohio R.R. Co. (1987), 162 Ill. App.3d 97, 104; Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, 914-15.) A motion to dismiss should not be allowed if material facts are controverted and where the court must weigh the evidence.

Dr. Swanson spoke in terms of a "better chance" of having successful results, and given his medical history and the fact he had already been warned he could lose a leg, we cannot say conclusively that Alfonso recognized or should have known as a reasonable person that his condition was the fault of defendants. Defendants rely on Blair v. Blondis (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 184, Conley v. Springfield Clinic (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 369, and Gaudynski v. Corbett (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 910, as cases in which plaintiff's awareness of a physical problem, together with express dissatisfaction with his treatment and statements by other medical professionals, determined when the plaintiff should reasonably have known of his injury and its wrongful causation. Each case, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar.