Opinion
May 3, 2001.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGill, J.), entered August 11, 2000 in Clinton County, which denied defendant's motion to correct errors in a prior order of child support.
Donald Gaudette, Rouses Point, appellant in person.
Van Crockett, Plattsburgh, for respondent.
Before: Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello, Mugglin and, Rose, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant is no stranger to this Court having been before us five times previously concerning issues of child support and custody (see, Gaudette v. Gaudette, 263 A.D.2d 626, appeal dismissed, lv dismissed, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 789; Matter of Gaudette v. Gaudette, 263 A.D.2d 620; Matter of Gaudette v. Gaudette, 262 A.D.2d 804, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 790; Gaudette v. Gaudette, 234 A.D.2d 619, appeal dismissed 89 N.Y.2d 1023; Matter of Pandozy [Gaudette] v. Gaudette, 192 A.D.2d 779). On this occasion, defendant appeals from the denial of his motion "for the correction of court errors in child support", errors which purportedly relate to Supreme Court's alleged failure to recognize his inability to be gainfully employed. The crux of defendant's argument is that four prior orders of Supreme Court failed to properly take this inability to work into account in calculating his child support arrearages, with particular emphasis on the court's denial of that portion of a March 1997 application which sought a downward modification of arrears for the time period preceding the filing of that application (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]).
Fundamentally, a party may not raise matters of substance by a motion for correction of errors (see, CPLR 5019 [a]; Kiker v. Nassau County, 85 N.Y.2d 879, 881). Rather, "such errors must be corrected either by way of appeal or by vacatur of the judgment itself" (Chemical Bank v. Buxbaum, 76 A.D.2d 850, 851). Here, defendant has either failed to appeal, failed to perfect an appeal or already received appellate review of each of the orders he now attacks. Specifically, the first of these orders (entered March 1, 1995) was not appealed, as we have already had occasion to observe (see, Gaudette v. Gaudette, 234 A.D.2d 619, 621, supra). The second and third orders were each the subject of prior appeals to this Court, were resolved on the merits and, insofar as relevant to the instant matter, determined adversely to defendant (see, Gaudette v. Gaudette, 263 A.D.2d 626,supra; Gaudette v. Gaudette, 234 A.D.2d 619, supra). The last order is the subject of a notice of appeal dated March 27, 2000; however, no appeal has been perfected and the time to do so has since expired (see, 22 NYCRR 800.12). Moreover, upon our own review of the record, we find no basis to exercise our discretion to treat defendant's motion as one seeking to vacate the allegedly offending orders (see, Szabo v. Szabo, 71 A.D.2d 32, 35), since defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the precise issue of arrearages in these prior proceedings and advances no compelling argument to vacate them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.