Opinion
CASE NO. 2:08-cv-493-MEF (WO).
May 29, 2009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Gateway Trade Finance, LLC ("Gateway") filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) on June 23, 2008, bringing a breach of contract claim against Howell Enterprises, LLC ("Howell Enterprises") and Jeff Howell ("Howell"). On January 23, 2009, the Court dismissed Howell Enterprises after Howell Enterprises filed a Notice of Bankruptcy. See Doc. #28. This cause is before the Court on Gateway's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 25) against Jeff Howell, an Individual filed on November 12, 2008. In its motion, Gateway argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it is undisputed that Howell entered into a contract with Gateway and subsequently breached that contract. Gateway also seeks $569,441.72 in damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. The Court agrees that Howell breached his contract with Gateway and finds that the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (diversity). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations in support of both personal jurisdiction and venue.III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
IV. FACTS
The Court has carefully considered all documents and affidavits submitted in support of the motion. The submissions of Gateway, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following undisputed facts:
Howell was given an opportunity to file an opposition brief but indicated to the Court orally that no response would be filed.
A. Contract liability
On May 4, 2007, Gateway and Howell Enterprises entered into a contract ("Agreement"). According to the Agreement, Gateway was responsible for purchasing and taking title to disassembled golf carts on behalf of Howell Enterprises. Howell Enterprises then assembled the carts, held the carts in trust, and sold them to a third party. Howell Enterprises then paid some proceeds from the sales to Gateway.
Howell also entered into a contract ("Personal Guaranty") with Gateway to secure the Agreement between Gateway and Howell Enterprises. Neither Howell Enterprises nor Howell has paid all sums due to Gateway under the Agreement.
B. Damages
Under the terms of the Agreement, Howell Enterprises's principal debt to Gateway is $295,428.38. The Agreement provides that interest on any amount Howell Enterprises owes to Gateway will accrue at a rate equal to Prime Rate plus five percent. In this case, Gateway contends that the applicable interest rate is 13.25% and the amount of interest accrued is $40,883.87.
The Agreement also states that Gateway is entitled to a commission fee of $117,924.36 on the carts which were sold out of trust and a reimbursement of $7,242.86 in costs and fees associated with the transaction. Gateway obtained $7,407.50 from the auction of some carts to offset some of Howell Enterprise's debt. As a result, Howell owes Gateway is $454,071.97. The Agreement additionally obligates Howell Enterprises to pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in the event of a default. Gateway represents in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment that the reasonable attorneys' fees in this case were $115,369.75. However, Gateway has failed to provide the Court with any factual predicate for this assertion.
V. DISCUSSION
In the State of Washington, interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law and therefore appropriate for summary judgment. Dice v. City of Montesano, 128 P.3d 1253, 1257 (Wash. 2006). To prevail on a breach of contract claim on summary judgment, a party must show that there are no issues of material fact as to (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a material breach of that contract, and (3) resulting damage. St. John Med. Ctr. v. State ex re. Dep't of Soc. Health Servs., 38 P.3d 383, 390 (Wash.Ct.App. 2002); see also Travelers Cas. Sur. Co. of Am. v. Johnson, No. 26165-4-II, 2008 WL 309699, at *2 (Wash. 2008).Here, there is no dispute of fact that a contact existed between Howell and Gateway, that Howell materially breached that contract, and that Gateway was damaged by the breach. Because no reasonable fact finder could find that Gateway did not show Howell breached the Personal Guaranty, Gateway is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of contractual liability.
While Gateway asserts that Howell owes it a total amount of $569,441.72 and the undisputed facts establish most of that sum, the Court cannot find that the amount of attorneys' fees is an undisputed fact even absent any argument to that effect by Howell. For this reason, the Court cannot grant judgment as a matter of law on the record now before it.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court finds that Plaintiff Gateway Trade Finance, LLC. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 25) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
(2) The trial and pretrial in this matter are CANCELLED;
(3) The Court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the amount of the judgment on July 15, 2009 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 2A in Montgomery, AL after holding an evidentiary hearing on damages.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. 890 F.2d 371 376 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , , , , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) : The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); , , (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).