Opinion
Civil No. 02-4719 ADM/FLN
March 22, 2004
George H. Smith, Esq., Trawick Smith, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for on behalf of the Plaintiff
Lonnie F. Bryan, Minneapolis, MN, for on behalf of the Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge for ruling on the Objections [Docket No. 19] by Plaintiff Zina Gates ("Plaintiff'), on behalf of Samuel Gates ("Samuel"), to Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel's Report and Recommendation ("RR") [Docket No. 18]. The RR recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 14] be denied and that the cross Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, ("Defendant") [Docket No. 16] be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the RR is adopted. The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in the RR and is incorporated by reference for the purposes of Plaintiff's present Objections.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards of ReviewThe district court must undertake an independent, de novo, review of those portions of the RR to which objection is made and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2).
In reviewing social security benefits determinations, the court must affirm the decision of the Commissioner if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Holley v. Massanari. 253 F.3d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 2001). While less than a preponderance, substantial evidence is enough that a reasonable mind would find it sufficient to support the conclusion reached. Holley. 253 F.3d at 1091. As long as substantial evidence of record exists, the court may not reverse the ruling of the Commissioner even if the court would have reached a different decision.Id. Both evidence that detracts from and evidence that supports the Commissioner's determination is to be considered. Id. In this case, the January 24, 2002 ruling of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALP') constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at 15-23 [Docket No. 13].
B. Plaintiff's Objections
Plaintiff generally objects to Judge Noel's recommendation of summary judgment for Defendant, but does not specify which conclusions or portions of the RR are in error. It appears Plaintiff's focal objection is to the RR's finding that substantial evidence supported the conclusion of the ALJ that Samuel's asthma and psychological problems are not functionally equivalent to a listed impairment and therefore that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits. See RR at 30-31.
To assess functional equivalence to a listed impairment, the ALJ must evaluate the level of the claimant child's ability to function in six domains: 1) acquiring and using information; 2) attending and completing tasks; 3) interacting and relating with others; 4) moving about and manipulating objects; 5) caring for yourself; and 6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi); Pepper ex rel. Gardner v. Barnhart. 342 F.3d 853, 854 (8th Cir. 2003). If the child has "marked" limitations in two domains, or an "extreme" limitation in one domain, the child's impairment is the functional equivalent of the impairments listed in the Federal Regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a); Pepper. 342 F.3d at 854. A limitation is "marked" when the child's impairment or impairments seriously interfere with his ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). When measured by standardized testing, a marked limitation is generally indicated by scores "at least two, but less than three, standard deviations below the mean." Id. An "extreme" limitation causes very serious interference with the child's ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities and is usually associated with standardized test "scores that are at least three standard deviations below the mean." Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).
To support her objection to the ALJ's determination and to the RR, Plaintiff recites the results of several tests and assessments given to Samuel, as well as the opinion of psychologist Dixie L. Grace ("Dr. Grace") that Samuel needs supervision when performing certain tasks and that he and his parents could benefit from in-home assistance. Objections at 6-9; Tr. at 287. Plaintiff apparently relies on Samuel's test scores, often placing him in very low national percenfiles, as well as Dr. Grace's report of maladaptive behavior, to establish functional equivalence under the Social Security Regulations.
Plaintiff's bald reiteration of the medical findings in this case without legal argument or support do not undermine the finding of no functional equivalence under the applicable standards. The ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Pepper, 342 F.3d at 855. The ALJ properly considered Samuel's abilities in each of the six domains and relied on the expert opinions of Dr. Hammarsten, an internal medicine and pulmonary specialist, and Dr. Butler, a clinical psychologist, who had each reviewed the medical records and concluded Samuel did not have a disability under the relevant law. Tr at 18-21, 22. Although Dr. Howe, Samuel's treating pediatrician, opined that Plaintiff should receive benefits for Samuel on account of his asthma and learning difficulties, after consideration the ALJ discounted this evidence as conclusory and unsupported by the record. Tr. at 20-21; see Rogers v. Chater, 118 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997) (treating physician's opinion may be subordinated to other better supported assessments). As stated in the RR, the ALJ expressed his reasons for giving greater weight to the testimony of Dr. Hammarsten and Dr. Butler, and this decision is grounded in substantial evidence in the record as a whole. RR at 30-31;see Tr. at 20-21, 39-53, 178-81, 278-81.
Neither Dr. Grace's post-hearing opinions nor Plaintiff's counsel's assertion that Samuel missing a lot of school renders him markedly limited in his "health and physical well-being" detracts from the record so greatly as to warrant reversing the ruling of the ALJ. The RR correctly concludes that the Commissioner's decision should be upheld, and it is thus adopted.
Even if Samuel were found to have a marked limitation in this domain, to qualify as disabled he must have either an extreme limitation in a single domain or show marked limitations in at least two of the functional domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a); Pepper, 342 F.3d at 854.
III. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Objections [Docket No. 19] are DENIED,
2. The RR [Docket No. 18] is ADOPTED,
3. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 14] is DENIED,
4. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16] is GRANTED.