Even courts that have recognized an exception to immunity that allows for a person to be held liable for conduct that occurs in both an immune and nonimmune capacity have attempted to cabin the doctrine in various ways, such as limiting it to circumstances in which the obligations and duties of the two capacities are unrelated and not inextricably linked. See, e.g. , Kolacki v. Verink , 384 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678, 323 Ill.Dec. 445, 893 N.E.2d 717, 722 (2008) (holding that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the "dual capacity" test when "the defendant’s duties are so intertwined that the defendant’s conduct in the second capacity does not generate any obligations that are unrelated to the duties flowing from the defendant’s first capacity as employer, coemployee, or agent"); Gaspard v. Graves , 934 So.2d 158, 161 (La. Ct. App. 2006), writ den. , 929 So.2d 1286 (La. 2006), writ den. , 929 So.2d 1289 (La. 2006) (the plaintiff failed to overcome exclusivity bar with respect to the individual owners of the employer where "their second capacity as owners of the building leased to [employer] is inextricably intertwined with their capacity as [the plaintiff’s] employer such that they cannot be held liable in tort" (emphasis added)); accord. Garelle v. Geinitz , 145 A.D.3d 1383, 1384, 44 N.Y.S. 3d 575, 577 (2016) (holding that, "where the defendant is both the property owner and a corporate officer of the plaintiff’s employer, the defendant’s responsibility to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work may be merged, in which case, workers’ compensation benefits are the sole remedy for the plaintiff"; the defendant is subject to suit only if the "defendant’s duty of care toward [the] plaintiff was owed purely in [the] capacity as owner of the property at the accident site, and not at all as a coemployee" (internal q
For purposes of summary judgment, because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882 and 2006-0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286 and 929 So.2d 1289. Summary judgment is seldom appropriate for determinations based on subjective facts, such as motive, intent, good faith, knowledge, and malice. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751.
Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material, for purposes of summary judgment, can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882 and 2006-0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286 and 1289. Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code. The judiciary's role in interpreting insurance policies is to determine the common intent of the parties to the contract.
Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material, for purposes of summary judgment, can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882 and 2006-0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286 and 1289. Automobile liability insurers in Louisiana are required to include UM coverage in all policies issued unless the insured specifically rejects it.
Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material, for purposes of summary judgment, can be seen only in the light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882, 2006-0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286 and 1289. Travelers' liability for the plaintiffs' losses is contractually contingent upon the liability of its insured, Feather & Fin. The plaintiffs seek recovery from Feather & Fin under the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, and assert that the vehicle being operated by Aaron Dick was a covered auto under the policy. The basis for an employer's liability for its employee's tort is found in La. C.C. art. 2320.
Id. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material for purposes of summary judgment can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006–0882, 20060958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286, 1289.Mineral Royalty
Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material for purposes of summary judgment can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882, 2006-0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286, 1289. To establish a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the standard of care applicable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury. See La. R.S. 9:2794(A); Hoot v. Woman's Hosp. Foundation, 96-1136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 97-1651 (La. 10/3/97), 701 So.2d 209. The initial burden of proof is with the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
Whether a particular fact in dispute is material for purposes of summary judgment can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves , 2005-1042 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied , 2006–0882, 20060958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286, 1289. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966 was amended and reenacted by Acts 2015, No. 422, § 1, with an effective date of January 1, 2016.
Whether a particular fact in dispute is material for purposes of summary judgment can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves , 2005–1042 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied , 2006–0882, 2006–0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286, 1289. In the instant case, plaintiff contends that Hotard is liable for her injuries herein.
Whether a particular fact in dispute is material for purposes of summary judgment can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882, 2006-0958 (La. 6/16/06), 929 So.2d 1286, 1289. Louisiana jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff in an action based on a failure to obtain informed consent prove the following four elements in order to prevail: (1) a material risk existed that was unknown to the patient; (2) the physician failed to disclose the risk; (3) the disclosure of the risk would have led a reasonable patient in the patient's position to reject the medical procedure or choose another course of treatment; and (4) the patient suffered injury. Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, 2013-0579 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So.3d 922, 929-930, citingBrandt v. Engle, 2000-3416 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 614, 619 n.1.