Opinion
No. 04-15-00456-CR
03-09-2016
James GARZA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2009CR12648A
Honorable Melisa Skinner, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
James Garza was indicted for the offense of capital murder. The State did not seek the death penalty and, upon conviction, the trial court imposed what was, at that time, the statutorily mandated sentence of life without parole. In his original appeal to this court, Garza argued that because he was only seventeen years-old at the time of the offense, the sentence of life without the possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as defined by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). This court did not reach the merits of Garza's appeal, holding that he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. See Garza v. State, No. 04-11-00891-CR, 2012 WL 5236048 at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 24, 2012), rev'd, 435 S.W.3d 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Thereafter, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted Garza's petition for discretionary review and held that Garza did not forfeit his claim by his failure to argue it in the trial court. See Garza v. State, 435 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to this court to address the merits of Garza's argument. See id.
Accordingly, in Garza v. State, 453 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. ref'd), this court addressed the merits of his appeal. In that opinion, this court considered the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller and its applicability to Garza. We noted that in Miller, the Supreme Court "conclud[ed] the automatic imposition of life without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment when applied to those who are under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense." Garza, 453 S.W3d at 551 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464). Further, this court noted that in Miller, the Supreme Court "specifically refused to consider the argument that the Eight Amendment requires a categorical ban on life without parole for those under eighteen" while recognizing that such situations would be rare. Garza, 453 S.W.3d at 552 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). And, this court noted that while Garza's appeal was pending, the Texas Legislature "took the Supreme Court's warning to heart" and amended the Texas Penal Code to mandate a trial court to sentence the capital murder defendant to life, with the possibility of parole when the defendant was younger than eighteen at the time of the offense. Garza, 453 S.W.3d at 552 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a) (West Supp. 2015)). And, the legislature made the amendment applicable to cases that were on appeal on the effective date of the amended statute. Garza, 453 S.W.3d at 552. Thus, the amendment applies to Garza, assuming he was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. As we noted in our prior opinion, however, "Garza's age at the time of the offense was not definitively established in the record before us." Id. at 553. There was conflicting evidence showing he may have been seventeen, eighteen or nineteen years of age at the time of the offense. Id. Thus, we remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of Garza's age at the time of the offense and for resentencing accordingly. Id. In so doing, we stated:
In sum, we hold the burden of proof is upon Garza to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, which was September 6, 2009. Under the applicable law—Miller and the current version of section 12.31(a) of the Penal Code—if Garza carries his burden, the trial court must sentence him to life as opposed to life without the possibility of parole. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(1); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2469. If, on the other, Garza fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, the trial court must sentence him to life without the possibility of parole. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(2).Garza, 453 S.W.3d at 555.
In accordance with this court's opinion, the trial court held a hearing. At the hearing, Garza requested the trial court to appoint an expert witness on the issue of mitigation and that resentencing be held before a jury and that the potential range of punishment be that of a first degree felony (five years to life). The trial court denied Garza's requests and, after an evidentiary hearing that was limited to Garza's age at the time of the offense, found that Garza was seventeen years of age at the time of the offense. The trial court then sentenced Garza to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
On appeal, Garza argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request for individualized resentencing in accordance with Miller. In making this argument, Garza points to language in Miller, arguing that mandatory penalties, which preclude a sentencing authority from considering an offender's age and the many attendant matters, is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Thus, according to Garza, the mandatory sentence of life, without taking into consideration mitigating factors, for a youthful offender such as Garza, violates the Eighth Amendment.
The State responds that this exact issue has been determined by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Lewis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and directly controls this appeal. In Lewis, two juvenile capital murder cases were consolidated. The opening paragraph of the opinion states:
These consolidated cases ask us to interpret the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Miller v. Alabama, which held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids sentencing schemes for juveniles in which life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is mandatory rather than based upon an individualized sentencing assessment. Appellants argue that their sentences, which the appellate courts reformed to life imprisonment, are unconstitutional because they were not afforded individualized hearings at which to present mitigating evidence. We do not read Miller so broadly and therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate courts.Lewis, 428 S.W.3d at 861.
The Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed Miller v. Alabama, recognizing that the Supreme Court held that, because mandatory sentencing schemes make the differences that juveniles present irrelevant, the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme mandating life imprisonment without possibility of parole for juveniles. Lewis, 428 S.W.3d at 863. The Court of Criminal Appeals went on to say:
However, Miller does not forbid mandatory sentencing schemes. The mandatory nature of a sentencing scheme is not the aspect that precludes rehabilitation; rather, the sentencing scheme in Miller was unconstitutional because it denied juveniles convicted of murder all possibility of parole, leaving them no opportunity or incentive for rehabilitation. Life in prison with the possibility of parole leaves a route for juvenile offenders to prove that they have changed while also assessing a punishment that the Legislature has deemed appropriate in light of the fact that the juvenile took someone's life under specified circumstances. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a).Lewis, 428 S.W.3d at 863.
In applying Miller to the cases before it, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Appellants argue that they are entitled to individualized sentencing hearing before being assessed sentences of life imprisonment because they were juveniles at the time of their offenses. This is not what Miller requires. Miller does not entitle all
juvenile offenders to individualized sentencing. It requires an individualized hearing only when a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. After the reformations by the appellate courts, appellants are not sentenced to life without parole, and under Section 12.31 of the Penal Code, juvenile offenders in Texas do not now face life without parole at all. Therefore, appellants' cases do not fall within the scope of the narrow holding in Miller.Lewis, 428 S.W.3d at 863-64.
Garza makes the same arguments in this appeal as the appellants in Lewis. For the same reasons the appellants in Lewis were not entitled to individualized sentencing, Garza is likewise not entitled to individualized sentencing.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Karen Angelini, Justice Do not publish